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EPIC PERSUASION: RELIGION AND RHETORIC IN THE *ILIAD* AND VĀLMĪKI'S *RĀMĀYAṆA*

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INTRODUCTION

RHETORIC AND THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

The history of religions in the Chicago tradition has been heavily hermeneutical. It has sought to interpret and to understand "the religious meaning of humankind's religious experience and its expressions through the integration and 'significant organization' of diverse forms of religious data." At the same time, the Chicago tradition has emphasized that a comprehensive, total picture of religion is its goal, and it is this "priority of the whole" that, in part, compels me to break with tradition and to look for another model than hermeneutics with which to conceive my task.[1]

Joachim Wach, for example, adopted the essentially Romantic notion that meanings were expressions of genuine experience, expressions by means of which historians could "recognize" (erkennen) what had previously been "cognized" (kennt). Wach modified the Romantic notion of meaning in two ways. First, he thought of experience not as "psychological experience" (Erlebnis) but as the experiences or encounters of life (Erfahrung). Second, he insisted that external expressions or

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[1]Joseph M. Kitagawa, "Religious Studies and the History of Religions," paper delivered at the conference on Revisioning the Study of Religion, University of Denver, Denver, Colorado, September 27, 1983, p. 14.

objectifications had structures that merited study on their own--what he once called the "objective Geist." Within this framework, Wach advocated an "integral study of religious expressions:" a "full linguistic, historical, psychological, technological, and social enquiry, in which full justice is done to the intention of the expression and to the context in which it occurs, and in which this expression is related to the experience of which it testifies."[1]

Wach's formulation contains an inevitable tension between his universal intent and the context in which he pursues that intent, the context of a quasi-Romantic notion of meaning. The "struggle of experience for expression"[2] has a particular, limited type of religion as its ancestor. Pietism may have privileged emotional experience, and Wach may include thought and will along with feeling in what he calls the "integral" religious experience,[3] but that simply makes Wach's a sophisticated rather than a sentimental Pietism. In either case, the emphasis on experience as the source of religion--the fount of true religion (cp. the title of Johann Arndt's meditations[4])--arose in opposition to a Protestant scholasticism

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[1]Joachim Wach, Types of Religious Experience: Christian and Non-Christian (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 28-29; italics added.

[2]Cp. Joachim Wach, Sociology of Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), p. 17.

[3]See Joachim Wach, The Comparative Study of Religions (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 32-33.

[4]Wach, too, goes so far as to distinguish false and incomplete religious experiences; cp. Types, p. 33.

that vehemently proclaimed salvation quite apart from any experiences, a scholasticism that sought to give assurance of salvation despite all experience. In that assurance lay any profundity the teachings of the scholastics might have had. Thus, when Wach derives all religious expressions from religious experience, he does not identify that which all religions share. He favors a particular type of religion, and as a result, his Religionswissenschaft cannot achieve full totalization.

Mircea Eliade centers the history of religions on an existentialist notion of meaning with quasi-Kantian overtones. For him, religious symbols reveal Being and thus make authentic existence possible, but they do so as structures of (the archaic) human consciousness. Thus, Eliade advocates a morphology of the sacred that exploits structural homologies in identifying the elementary constituent forms according to which the sacred manifests itself. At the same time, he envisions a history of religions that is a "total hermeneutics." On the one hand, historians of religions must not be content to study the context of their "documents" by every means available; they must understand them on their own plane of reference. On the other hand, historians of religions must not simply decipher the meaning of religious phenomena; they must locate them historically and elucidate their cultural contributions. "Homo religiosus," Eliade insists, "represents the 'total man.'"[1]

Eliade's psychological depth and his profound sensitivity

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[1]Mircea Eliade, The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 8.

to the general dynamics of religious symbols make for much more powerful accounts than Wach's arid generalizations. Still, Eliade's notion of meaning requires him to insist on the irreducibility of the sacred, even when he advocates his "total hermeneutics:" "... a religious datum reveals its deeper meaning when it is considered on its plane of reference, and not when it is reduced to one of its secondary aspects or its contexts."[1] This "paradigm of the hierophany" frustrates any ambitions Eliade's grand système may have toward totality. It transmutes any attempt to consider religion apart from the modalities of the hierophany into an act of disciplinary hybris, an improper longing for Being at the Center. Consequently, Eliade finds it impossible to deal with some religious phenomena that are entirely accessible--and of intense interest--to Wach, such as religious authority.[2] Concerned to do justice to the one irreducible element in religion, Eliade develops a history of religions that is capable of doing justice virtually to that element alone.

Of course, one might argue that historians of religions only need to take a sufficiently sophisticated notion of hermeneutics as their model, such as the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur. For several reasons I prefer a different approach.

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[1] Ibid., p. 6.

[2] Compare Eliade on "technicians of the sacred" with Wach on religious authority, and Eliade's homo religiosus with Wach's homines religiosi (see my "Homo religiosus," in The Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Mircea Eliade et al. [New York: Macmillan, forthcoming]).

Hermeneutics has no monopoly on understanding. Its proper task is to retrieve and apply ("hermeneuein") communicated meanings, traditionally in theology, literature, and law. To be sure, there are countless particular instances of communicated meanings in religion. But when the whole to be understood is not a particular communicated meaning, such as a sacred text, but religion--not even a particular religion but religion in its entirety--can one really use the interpretation of communicated meaning as a model? Who would be communicating on such a global scale, and to whom?[1]

I prefer to replace "meaning" with "event" as the central category for the history of religions. My mode of investigation is not hermeneutics but history. In one European language the connection between category and discipline becomes almost tautological: Geschichte is the study of Geschehen.[2] I

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[1]At least two answers are possible, but neither satisfies me. According to the first, religion in its entirety is the communication of humanity as a whole. But humanity as a whole is an abstraction. It is not compatible with the basic unit of communicated meaning, the sententia or actual statement. Humanity as a whole cannot communicate in "sentences." The alternative answer is "the sacred." If one has a particular "Sacred" in mind (e.g., the Christian God), communication is certainly possible, but the investigation of that communication belongs to a different whole, the formation of a particular religious vision. If, on the other hand, "the sacred" is taken as a generic category, one encounters once again an abstraction incapable of sententiae.

[2]Quirks of translation and history yield another tautology--"the history of religions is history"--but this tautology is only apparent. "History of religions" has been adopted by the International Association for the History of Religions as the rough English equivalent of the German Religionswissenschaft. Because the scope of "science" is narrower than that of "Wissenschaft," "the science of religion" is a phrase generally avoided. Thus, the statement, "The

correlate my approach quite deliberately with a metaphysics that assigns priority to actuality rather than to idea and an "anthropology" that views human thought as a form of activity (praxis). Moreover, I have a particular image of my audience in mind. The hermeneutically conceived history of religions addressed questions of meaning and meaninglessness that dominated the European intellectual scene following World War I. Of course, concerns with meaning persist today, now in more ornate, semiotically transformed guise. But in our post-colonial era, questions of action and allied questions of power and powerlessness are coming to the fore on the global scene and have invaded with force even the upper echelons of European and American intellectualism. It is, in part, this global audience that I have in mind when I take "history" rather than hermeneutics as my model for the history of religions.

The history of religions conceived hermeneutically has

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history of religions is history," is not tautological because the first "history" does not refer to history. There is another reason why the statement is not tautological: the second "history"--history as I conceive my enterprise--does not refer to the vision of history which led scholars to use that word as a substitute for Wissenschaft. "History of religions" became current in English and the Romance languages under the impact of the positivistic critical history of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (see A. Eustace Hayden, "From Comparative Religion to the History of Religions," Journal of Religion 2 [1922]: 577-87). Some still promote essentially this sort of history as the basic method of Religionswissenschaft (cp. Kurt Rudolph, Historical Fundamentals and the Study of Religions [New York: Macmillan, 1985]), but by "history" I mean something different. I mean that mode of understanding humanity whose central category is the event, whatever actual methods the scholar may employ. I do not conceive my break with tradition as a radical beginning de novo. I am merely shifting or permuting the tradition by substituting one category--granted, a very fundamental one (event)--for another (meaning).

been "introverted." Historians of religions have directed their attention to whatever manifested religious meaning, the more meaningful, the more clearly religious. Thus, Eliade privileged the morphology of hierophanies, insisted upon the need to define a religion's "center," and vigorously defended the preference he accorded to the accounts of religious specialists. By contrast, a history of religions conceived historically must be "extraverted." Any event in which religion occurs can and, in the end, must be taken into account. The most obvious of these may well be events in which the "sacred" and the human directly interact. In terms of religious action, we may think of prayer or meditation, sacrifices, or other common ritual occurrences. But religion does not occur only in specifically religious settings. It may be said to occur in any event significantly influenced by religious relationships, identities, capabilities, and norms--that is, by relationships, identities, capabilities, and norms established or defined by events of direct religious interaction.[1] Religion occurs in these supposedly "nonreligious" events because in them religion "assumes" concrete form. In them, religiously established realities become actualities. Such events are necessary topics for a history of religions that strives for a comprehensive and integrative grasp of all the events of religion.

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[1]Broadening horizons in the history of religions is also characteristic of the Chicago tradition. Not only did Wach break fresh ground with his work on sociology. Eliade's treatment of Western technological and artistic endeavors in religio-historical terms has been perhaps the most creative broadening of the discipline ever attempted.

Given the hermeneutical predilection for meaning, a particularly pointed example of the extraverted research that I have in mind presents itself: the religious text. A sacred text, like any text, is not simply a disembodied religious meaning. Is is also an act, or rather, a set of acts, among them, the composition of the text, the portrayal and retrieval of the text, the effects of the text on the religious community, and vice versa. All of these acts, together with the meaning that each expresses, I encompass with the cumbersome term "communication event," and to the analysis of communication events as acts rather than as meanings I assign the term "rhetoric."[1] The investigation of rhetoric in my sense might seem to fall outside the essential task of a history of religions conceived as hermeneutics (that is, outside the understanding of religious meaning). Certainly, the exemplars of the Chicago tradition have turned their scholarly attention elsewhere.[2] But the action as well as the meaning of sacred texts is part of what we commonly call "religion," and the

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[1] I take my cue from Paul Ricoeur, who joins meaning and event in the interpretation of discourse. Similarly, I distinguish two aspects of the communication event, act and meaning. But unlike Ricoeur, I do not limit a text merely to the transmission of meaning, so that I prefer to speak not of discourse--events of meaning--but of communication events.

[2] The hermeneutics of Erlebnis, Ausdruck, and Verstehen that Wach adopted and modified contributed significantly to the decline of rhetoric in the nineteenth century. In this view, rhetorical activity stands opposed to the genius's pure expression of experience (cp. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method [New York: Seabury Press, 1975], p. 64). For the decline of rhetoric in the French-speaking world, see Gérard Genette, "Rhetoric Restrained," in Figures of Literary Discourse (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 103-26.

history of religions, to be truly comprehensive, must deal with that action, too.

In what follows, I take up two texts, the Iliad and the Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa (hereafter simply the Rāmāyaṇa),[1] and ask a single, limited question about rhetoric: Why do speakers in the two poems attempt to persuade differently? Within the poetic universe that each epic portrays, I suggest, speeches are "nonreligious" events in which religion occurs. They are a peculiar variety of applied religious praxis, for they attempt to actualize for persuasive purposes the sorts of power that stand at the heart of religious practices in both poems. But I

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[1] I use the standard critical editions of both texts, the Oxford text for the Iliad--Homeri Ilias, ed. David B. Monro and Thomas W. Allen, 2 vols., 3d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1920; reprint ed., 1969, 1971)--and the Baroda text for the Rāmāyaṇa--The Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa Critically Edited for the First Time, ed. G. H. Bhatt et al., 7 vols. (Baroda, India: Oriental Institute, 1960-1974)--although I have some reservations about using the latter (see pp. 124-25, n. 1). Unless otherwise noted, I quote from Richmond Lattimore's translation of the Iliad (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951). All translations from the Rāmāyaṇa are my own.

I concentrate on kāṇḍas 2 through 6 of the Rāmāyaṇa, which are recognized universally as, in some sense, "authentic." Recently, J. L. Brockington has divided this block of material into two stages on the basis of intense philological scrutiny. Brockington notes, "Anyone unconvinced by the analysis here made can amalgamate subsequent statements about the first and second stages to arrive at the collective evidence of these books as contrasted with that of the Bāla and Uttara kāṇḍas and the passages rejected from the text of the Critical Edition" (Righteous Rāma: The Evolution of an Epic [Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984], p. 48, n. 58). Conversely, anyone convinced by Brockington's analysis is more than welcome to view the conclusions that I draw here as based on the amalgam that resulted in the second stage of the Rāmāyaṇa's history. I have not found that the answers to the questions I ask vary significantly with Brockington's first two stages, and in fact I find many of the developmental assumptions underlying Brockington's analysis rather arbitrary, but I am willing to be convinced of the contrary on both counts.

am not overly anxious about making this point. I postpone narrowly "religio-historical" considerations until the final chapter, and I do so deliberately. An extraverted history of religions, such as I envision, must be willing to grapple with the topics it discusses on their terms as well as on its own.

I have chosen to study these two epics for several reasons. First, hermeneutically oriented historians of religions have always found the religious character of epics ambiguous. These two texts, for example, appear in most discussions of Greek and Indian religions. On the hermeneutical view, however, they are not themselves strictly religious. They do not convey specifically religious meanings. For example, Eliade sees in epic poetry simply the anthropomorphization of originally mythic--originally religious--themes.[1] But I believe that both texts are more directly religious, and that rhetoric can help us see why.

Second, especially the religion of Homer and his heroes stands outside the type of religiosity that the hermeneutical history of religions, and particularly Wach's history of religions, took as paradigmatic. It is at least in part the nature of Homeric religion that makes the Iliad an epic where rhetoric and its overtones occupy center stage. But I am not simply attempting to rectify one specific failure in religio-historical research. I am attempting to rectify the

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[1]For Eliade's view of epic, see especially Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), pp. 39-46.

model that a strong tradition in the history of religions has applied to all religious traditions. As a result, a comparative study is preferable to a specific study of the Iliad. I have chosen Indian epic in general because of its formal similarities with Greek epic (see chapter one) and because I am able to read Sanskrit. The Rāmāyana seemed a better choice than the Mahābhārata on several counts. Its length is more manageable. Its incipient kāvya style is more accessible to uniform poetic treatment than the itihāsa style of the Mahābhārata. Not the least, certain thematic parallels allow for comparison in just those areas that have attracted my attention. Both the Iliad and the Rāmāyana portray heroes who embody qualities central to their respective societies, who undertake to separate themselves from their communities as a result of those same qualities, and who remain unmoved by society's attempts to dissuade them. The different manners in which Homer and Vālmīki develop this same, general theme are quite instructive.

Achilles's ultimate "weapon" vis à vis his fellow Argives, vis à vis Agamemnon, is implacability. Such implacability confronts a society founded on persuasion with the impossibility of persuasion and, in consequence, with inevitable disaster. Of course, Homeric society is no secular state. Its ordering of human life has a deep, religious foundation. The altars of the gods stand next to the places of assembly and retribution, in Athens as on the banks of Troy. In the end, the gods do temper Achilles's wrath, they do "persuade" Achilles to relent;[1] thus

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[1]In the course of the following study, I will develop the

they "preserve" the Greeks (and, for the time being, the Trojans) from ultimate misfortune. But the poet's rhetoric provides the essential context for his image. Society's religious formulation does not provide comfortable certainty, no firm confidence that "God's in his heaven, all's right with the world." The poet communicates to his audience awe at the power and ambivalence of society's foundations, awe at human agony (achos) and the rage (mēnis, cholos) that it provokes, a rage whose effects finally dwindle only with the last flicker of Hektor's pyre. That final flicker signals, nevertheless, that in the end Zeus and Thetis can still persuade Achilles to relent, that in the end society's divine foundations hold firm. Thus, Homer can employ a divinely moved denouement with more psychological conviction than the device could later muster, a device called later still the deus ex machina. In the Iliad, the world is fresh, as Eliade might say. In the Iliad, the gods still dwell in the world. They do not need to come to it on a crane.

Not persuasion but order is the foundation of Rama's rājya, the impersonal dharma that, for full adherence, demands an inner being, an inner ātman that dharma itself has shaped (dharmātma). Speech-making and implacability--"impersuadability"--are

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crucial distinction between peithein ("to persuade," active) and peithesthai ("to be persuaded," passive; i.e., "to obey"). In these terms, the gods do not persuade Achilles, because they do not actively engage in attempts at persuasion. Achilles is simply persuaded, that is, he simply obeys. The distinction also adds nuance to my remarks on the deus ex machina that soon follow, but that nuance is probably overly subtle to be drawn now.

bivalent. To the dharmabhrt (dharma-bearer), persuasion is temptation, while implacability is steadfastness. To the adharmika (the a-dharmic) persuasion is salvation, implacability persistence in pāpa (evil). The Rāmāyaṇa does not illustrate the ultimate victory of persuasion. The poet uses the failure of persuasion to mark his antagonists, those whose inner ātmānah are genuinely dharmic or a-dharmic. Persuasion, or rather, persuasion's failure, is the first stage in the ultimate, actual victory of dharma over adharma, the ultimate, physical annihilation of "evil" (adharma).

Vālmīki does not simply portray this world. He celebrates it, and in celebrating it he disseminates it and makes it real. He bestows upon his hearers the gifts of dharma, the gifts of Rāmarājya. Yet Vālmīki is not without regret. It is not always possible to bear the surrender of sukha (pleasure) to dharma with perfect equanimity. In the interests of dharma, Rāma feels compelled to renounce the rescued Sītā. Vālmīki may have reconciled husband and wife in the end, but his audience--the "authors" of the Uttarakāṇḍa, the pseudonymous final book--knew better. Their sensibilities preferred permanent separation. For all the celebration of dharma's supremacy, the taste (rasa) of Vālmīki's poetry is karuṇa (sorrowful compassion).

The preceding is a hint. What follows takes the first step. The rhetoric of the poets and their audiences is lost to us, but the speeches within the poems present full if imagined rhetorical situations. Persuasional speeches in each epic define the parameters within which the events of the poems must

be seen, the image in relation to which the poems as events--the poets' rhetoric--must be surmised. My aim here is to demonstrate that persuasional speeches in each epic attempt to actualize forms of power whose religious character can be clearly seen.

In "White Mythology" Jacques Derrida reminds us of the inescapable, metaphorical roots--the religious roots--of Western metaphysical notions.[1] My study, too, turns back upon itself, but I do not limit rhetoric to metaphor nor its residual effects to metaphysics. In the end, I ask about rhetoric and answer in the manner that I call scholarship because in every sphere of life I, too, attempt to "persuade," because I, too, have inherited the structures, now "effaced," of a religion that grounded life in rhetoric, for which the divine manifested itself in epic persuasion.

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[1]Jacques Derrida, "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy," New Literary History 6, no. 1 (Autumn 1974): 6-74. As I mention several times throughout the course of the present study, I view rhetoric as a total praxis, as activity occurring at every level of the event of speaking. Thus, I diverge from Derrida and those literary critics who, like Paul de Man, conceive of rhetoric as metaphor or even those who, like Gérard Genette, demand a rhetoric that includes all the figures.

TEXTUAL QUOTATIONS

ODYSSEUS:

. . . Yet even now
stop, and give way from the anger that hurts the heart.
Agamemnon
offers you worthy recompense if you change from your anger.
Come then, if you will, listen to me, while I count off for you
all the gifts in his shelter that Agamemnon has promised:
Seven unfired tripods; ten talents' weight of gold; twenty
shining cauldrons; and twelve horses, strong, race-competitors
who have won prizes in the speed of their feet. That man would
not be
poor in possessions, to whom were given all these have won him.
nor be unpossessed of dearly honored gold, were he given
all the prizes Agamemnon's horses won in their speed for him.
He will give you seven women of Lesbos, the work of whose hands
is blameless, whom when you yourself captured strong-founded
Lesbos
he chose, and who in their beauty surpassed the races of women.
He will give you these, and with them shall go the one he took
from you,
the daughter of Briseus. And to all this he will swear a great
oath
that he never entered into her bed and never lay with her
as is natural for human people, between men and women.
All these gifts shall be yours at once; but again, if hereafter
the gods grant that we storm and sack the great city of Priam,
you may go to your ship and load it deep as you please with
gold and bronze, when we Achaians divide the war spoils,
and you may choose for yourself twenty of the Trojan women,
who are the loveliest of all after Helen of Argos.
And if we come back to Achaian Argos, pride of the tilled land,
you could be his son-in-law; he would honor you with Orestes,
his growing son, who is brought up there in abundant luxury.
Since, as he has three daughters there in his strong-built
castle,
Chrysothemis and Laodike and Iphianassa,
you may lead away the one of these that you like, with no
bride-price,
to the house of Peleus; and with the girl he will grant you as
dowry
many gifts, such as no man ever gave with his daughter.
He will grant you seven citadels, strongly settled:

Kardamyle and Enope and Hire of the grasses,
Pherai the sacrosanct, and Antheia deep in the meadows,
with Aipeia the lovely, and Pedasos of the vineyards.
All these lie near the sea, at the bottom of sandy Pylos,
and men live among them rich in cattle and rich in sheepflocks,
who will honor you as if you were a god with gifts given
and fulfill your prospering decrees underneath your scepter.
All this he will bring to pass for you, if you change from your
anger.

Iliad 9.259-99

LAKSMANA:

Formerly you were gentle, restrained, and devoted to the welfare
of all creatures;
overcome by anger you should not forsake nature.

Charm in the moon, radiance in the sun, blowing in the wind,
patience in the earth--
all these are constant, as is the highest glory in you.

I do not know whose broken war-chariot this is,
by whom or for what reason it was armed and fitted out.

This place, trodden by hoofs and marked by wheels, sprinkled
with drops of blood,
this place is the site of a very violent struggle, now
complete, o earth-lord's son.

This was a struggle of one, not two, o best of speakers;
I do not see the track of a great army left behind.

You ought not destroy the worlds on account of what was done by
one.
Lords of the earth--gentle, tranquil--punish justly.

You have always been the refuge of all creatures, their highest
resort.
Who would consider the destruction of your wife good, o
Rāghava?

Streams, oceans and mountains, gods, Gandharvas, and Dānavas
cannot do your displeasure, as sādhus cannot with respect
to their initiator.

By whom, o king, Sītā has been taken, that one you ought to
seek,
with me as second, bow in hand, with paramarsis for
companions.

The ocean we will investigate, mountains and forests too,
and various ghastly caves, lotus ponds and water streams.

Deva-worlds and Gandharva-worlds will we investigate together,
so long as we shall not discover your wife's abductor.

But if the thirty lords do not surrender your wife voluntarily,
then, o Indra of Kosala, afterwards you will act at the
appropriate time.

But if virtuously, voluntarily, properly you
do not receive Sītā prudently, o Indra of men,
then destroy with golden-shafted
rains of arrows, resembling Indra's thunderbolts.

Rāmāyana 3.61.4-16

CHAPTER ONE

RHETORIC IN FORMULAIC POETRY

Achilles sulks. Rāma raves. In response, Odysseus and Laksmana attempt to persuade. Odysseus and Laksmana must persuade. If Odysseus fails, the Achaians perish. If Laksmana fails, the world perishes. Yet what different attempts at persuasion! Even in translation we see different themes, different comparisons, different--what shall we say?--"movements?" Odysseus offers Agamemnon's gifts. Laksmana offers reminders of accustomed behavior and "duty." Odysseus compares his gifts with the races of women, Helen of Troy, Orestes, "no man ever before," and the gods. Laksmana invokes the qualities of sun, moon, wind, and earth and likens streams and oceans, gods and Gandharvas to initiates. Odysseus's gifts follow one after the other: now . . . , when we sack Troy . . . , when we return home. Laksmana proceeds by stops and starts, so that the end of each śloka leaves us a little uncertain what he will say next.

Why is it that people speak differently?--No; that question is too broad. Why is it that Odysseus attempts to persuade one way, Laksmana another, and neither speaks quite the speech I would have spoken? The differences are not characterological. Odysseus and Laksmana do not speak--persuade--idiosyncratically. Their speeches belong to larger patterns of rhetorical

activity--to two rhetorical praxeis, if you will--depicted in the Iliad and the Rāmāyana. The differences between these two praxeis disclose, I maintain, the dynamic structures, the religious structures, of the poets' imagined universes. The differences between these two praxeis hint, I maintain, at the rhetorical activity, the religious activity, of the poets themselves.

Persuasion is a dialectic of form and "content."[1] The media that speakers employ establish the empirical constraints that limit their efforts. The contents of their speeches actualize, or attempt to actualize, the power capable of effecting the kinds of changes that speakers desire. In the encounter of media and powers, rhetorical differences emerge.

The first point to note is the strange sound to the plural "powers." We do, of course, say "powers" when speaking of quasi-personal localizations of power--"the powers that be"--but even the phrase "quasi-personal localizations of power"

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[1] I define persuasion as change that (1) occurs as the result of one person (Odysseus, Lakṣmaṇa) controlling interaction with another (Achilles, Rāma) (2) in order that the other (Achilles, Rāma) might alter his (or her) own interactions and interrelations with other persons and things (return to battle, redirect anger) (3) and do so in an act whose proximate cause lies in that other's (Achilles's, Rāma's) own capacity for autonomous action, however that capacity might be conceived.

In the body of this dissertation I use the word "rhetoric" and the adjective "rhetorical" to refer to attempts at persuasion, whether successful or not, by a kind of reverse synecdoche--the whole for the part--since not all rhetoric aims at persuasion. Occasionally, however, I will resort to the neologism, "persuasional," where the connotations of "persuasive" are inadequate (because they imply success) and where using "rhetorical" according to a reversed synecdoche might lead to confusion; e.g., I prefer "persuasional speeches" to either "persuasive speeches" or "rhetorical speeches."

tells us that as an abstract, power is singular; that differences in the manifestations of power are due to the media in which power operates. As a result, we ignore variations in power itself. I do not simply mean variations in conceptions of power, although concepts vary, too. I mean actual variations in dynamic operations and applications, in static potentials and tensions, from which power itself is indistinguishable and which compel us, in recognition of historical plurality, to speak of the encounter of media and powers, plural.

To understand the differences between Odysseus's and Laksmana's rhetoric, it is essential to recognize the existence of fundamentally different powers. Odysseus and Laksmana actually share the same medium. I do not mean that the Iliad and the Rāmāyana are written in identical meters and languages. But the Iliad and the Rāmāyana are both "formulaic" poetry, in a sense that I define shortly. Yet Odysseus and Laksmana utilize the shared formulaic medium in remarkably different ways. Within common empirical limits, speeches in the Iliad and the Rāmāyana actualize, or attempt to actualize, two different persuasive powers.

My strategy is simple. First, I consider the empirical limits that the formulaic medium imposes on the operation of persuasive power (chapter one). Then I plunge into the intricacies of rhetorical praxis in each epic. Guided by the conviction that persuasion is not a semantic (argumentative) praxis but a total praxis, I discern patterns according to which the verbal medium is used in all its dimensions. Eventually I

integrate these patterns into unified accounts of persuasive power in the Iliad and the Rāmāyana (chapters two and three). It is then possible to place persuasive power in a broader context. In each epic, I suggest, the power of persuasion is nothing less than religious power. In each epic, persuasional praxis is a variety, perhaps an unexpected variety, of religious praxis (chapter four).

On "Formulaic" Poetry

During the twentieth century, literary scholars have applied to the Iliad and the Rāmāyana a single theory with some success, the "oral-formulaic theory."[1] Strictly speaking, this theory

[1]The oral-formulaic theory was originally devised in comparative studies of Homeric epic and South Slavic oral poetry. Foundational works include The Making of Homeric Verse: The Collected Papers of Milman Parry, ed. Adam Parry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), Albert B. Lord, The Singer of Tales (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), and selected articles by James A. Notopoulos, such as "Mnemosyne in Oral Poetry," Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 69 (1938): 463-93, "Parataxis in Homer," ibid. 80 (1949): 1-23, and "Studies in Early Greek Oral Poetry," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 68 (1964): 1-77. By now, the literature on the oral-formulaic nature of Homer is massive, although relatively dormant for the past decade, largely because the dream of a distinctive poetics for oral poetry was never realized. For a recent summary, see the introduction to G. S. Kirk, The Iliad: A Commentary, vol. 1: Books 1-4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Literature on the oral-formulaic character of the Rāmāyana is more limited. See especially Nabaneeta Sen, "Comparative Studies in Oral Epic and the Vālmīki Rāmāyana: A Report on the Bālakāṇḍa," Journal of the American Oriental Society 86 (1966): 397-409, and "The Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa and the Raghuvaṃśam: Stylistic Structure of Oral Poetry as Contrasted to Classical Poetry," Jadavpur Journal of Comparative Literature 8 (1968): 85-95; and Minoru Hara, "Vālmīki, The Singer of Tales," in S. K. De Memorial Volume, ed. R. C. Hazra and S. C. Banerji (Calcutta: K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1972), pp. 117-28. Orality is presupposed by J. L. Brockington, "Stereotyped Expressions in the Rāmāyaṇa," Journal of the American Oriental Society 90 (1970): 210-27, and

advances two claims: first, that poems such as the epics of Homer and Vālmīki were composed in the process of oral recitation; and second, that in composing these poems, poets relied upon a traditional store of patterned expressions uniting word, meaning, and meter (formulae). In this view, oral composition requires a heavy reliance on stereotyped expressions. As a result, it is possible to distinguish oral poems from the products of literate poets such as Vergil and Kālidāsa empirically by means of the incidence of formulaic expressions.

Neither adjective, oral or formulaic, applies to the Iliad or the Rāmāyana certainly and unequivocally. Since Milman Parry first generalized the Homeric epithet into his notion of formula--"a group of words which is regularly employed under the same metrical conditions to express a given essential idea"[1]--the formula has eluded neat delimitation.[2] Furthermore,

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more recently, Righteous Rāma. For a general, critical assessment of the oral-formulaic theory, see Ruth Finnegan, Oral Poetry: Its Nature, Significance, and Social Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 58-73.

[1]Parry, p. 272; cp. p. 13.

[2]So-called "soft Parryists" have extended "formula" to many less precise forms of resemblance; e.g., Joseph A. Russo, "A Closer Look at Homeric Formulas," Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 94 (1963): 235-47, and "The Structural Formula in Homeric Verse," Yale Classical Studies 20 (1966): 217-40 (critiques of Russo's views in J. B. Hainsworth, "Structure and Context in Epic Formulae: The Question of the Unique Expression," Classical Quarterly, n.s. 58 [1964]: 155-64, and William M. Minton, "The Fallacy of the Structural Formula," Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 96 [1965]: 241-53). Michael N. Nagler has abandoned morphological specificity altogether in favor of a formula conceived of as a preverbal, preconscious

evidence for oral performance of the Iliad and the Rāmāyaṇa may be solid, but evidence for oral composition is more slender.[1]

Persuasion, conceived of as a dialectic of medium and power, sidesteps these difficulties. The oral-formulaic theory is concerned with the material that the poet uses and the manner in which the poem originated, but questions of rhetoric deal instead with the poem's form and its effects. Fortunately, the parameters within which formulaic theorists seek to place their formulae are somewhat clearer than the formulae themselves.

Beginning with Milman Parry, studies of enjambement have established the Homeric hexameter as a relatively discrete unit.

Gestalt, first in "Towards a Generative View of the Oral Formula," Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 98 (1967): 269-311, later refined and elaborated in Spontaneity and Tradition: A Study in the Oral Art of Homer (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1974). By contrast, Bennison Gray argues that metrical considerations are fortuitous; he attributes repetition in folk and primitive literature to the oral nature of that literature. See his "Repetition in Oral Literature," Journal of American Folklore 84 (1971): 289-303.

[1]For the view that Homeric culture is above all an oral culture, see especially Eric A. Havelock, Preface to Plato (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963). But the fact that the texts we have presume some form of writing, together with their mammoth size and careful architecture, makes others more sceptical. For the possibility that the Homeric epics were composed by literate poets, perhaps working from oral traditions, but in any case composing poems that were meant to be heard, see Joseph A. Russo, "Is 'Oral' or 'Aural' Composition the Cause of Homer's Formulaic Style?," in Oral Literature and the Formula, ed. Benjamin A. Stolz and Richard S. Shannon, III, Center for the Coordination of Ancient and Modern Studies (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan, 1976), pp. 31-71. Larry D. Benson has raised serious questions about the alleged sign of orality (a high formulaic density) by pointing to obviously literary texts, such as translations from Latin, that exhibit formulaic characteristics. See "The Literary Character of Anglo-Saxon Formulaic Poetry," Publications of the Modern Language Association 81 (1966): 334-41.

Even when sense does not completely stop at line's end, and it does so four to five times out of ten, the end of the line often brings a pause in meaning.[1] In addition, the line itself is not an indivisible entity. A caesura at midline is almost invariable; one in the last half-line is somewhat less frequent but still universally in the neighborhood of 60 percent; caesura in the first half-line is of roughly similar frequency.[2] Taken together, these caesurae demarcate the "four-cola line" perceptively analyzed by Hermann Fränkel and H. N. Porter.[3] Fränkel's and Porter's cola are certainly not invariant, but for our purposes they need not be. It is sufficient to note that

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[1] On enjambement, see Milman Parry, "The Distinctive Character of Enjambement in Homeric Verse" and "Whole Formulaic Verses in Greek and Southslavic Heroic Song" in Making, pp. 251-65 and 376-90; Albert B. Lord, "Homer and Huso III: Enjambement in Greek and Southslavic Song," Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 79 (1948): 113-24; and G. S. Kirk, "Studies in Some Technical Aspects of Homeric Style: 2. Verse-structure and Sentence-structure," Yale Classical Studies 20 (1966): 105-52.

[2] G. S. Kirk, "Studies in Some Technical Aspects of Homeric Style: 1. The Structure of the Homeric Hexameter," Yale Classical Studies 20 (1966): 76-104, esp. 76.

[3] Hermann Fränkel, "Der kallimachische und der homerische Hexameter," Göttingen Gelehrte Nachrichten (1926), pp. 197-229, and, less extensively, Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy, trans. Moses Hadas and James Willis (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1973), pp. 30-34; and H. N. Porter, "The Early Greek Hexameter," Yale Classical Studies 12 (1951): 1-63. See, further, Mark W. Edwards, "Some Features of Homeric Craftsmanship," Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 97 (1966): 115-79; but compare Kirk's study cited in the preceding note. Suggestive but inconclusive on a possible historical connection between Greek and Indian compositional forms, including a common heritage of certain regularized units (formulae) is Gregory Nagy, Comparative Studies in Greek and Indic Meter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974).

when the standard colometric pattern is violated, it is violated by discrete units (cola) of alternate sizes.

Vālmīki's śloka, about twice as long as the hexameter (32 syllables instead of 12 to 17), is considerably more rigid in terms of the size of its constituents and its own discreteness.[1] In the rare instances when a sentence extends beyond a śloka's end, there is always a natural break in sense. For example, the first śloka may simply describe the grammatical subject, or the second may simply accumulate adjectives about the grammatical object. Nowhere does an object in one śloka, for example, depend without apposition on a verb in the preceding śloka. Within the śloka, boundaries are similarly sacrosanct. The śloka divides into four pādas of eight syllables each, marked by caesura. Only in rare cases where the poet wishes to extend a compound the entire length of a half-śloka (the printed line) for emphasis, does lack of word-break obliterate caesura. Otherwise, pādas remain intact.

Formally, then, the Iliad and the Rāmāyaṇa consist of collocated discrete units: lines and ślokas, cola and pādas. That these units vary in size and rigidity from Homer to Vālmīki is not important here.[2] No one would suggest that both poets

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[1]The most complete (but unreadable) account of epic meter is still found in Edward Washburn Hopkins, The Great Epic of India: Its Character and Origin (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1901). Of minor interest are Hermann Oldenberg, "Jatakastudien" and "Zur Geschichte des altindischen Erzählungsstiles," in Kleine Schriften, ed. Klaus L. Janert, 2 vols. (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1967), 2: 1069-1108 and 1477-1510.

[2]The difference in rigidity, if not in size, between

employ the same meter. What distinguishes "formulaic" works such as the Iliad and the Rāmāyaṇa from works by polished poets such as Vergil and Kālidāsa are three salient characteristics that also set formal limits on persuasional praxis:

> (1) Formulaic poems consist formally of relatively discrete units that are strung together (parataxis).

(The shaping presence of discrete units in the metrical line is conducive to repetition and imitation, resulting in the formation of both formulae strictly speaking and other quasi-formulaic elements. These must, however, be described in formal, not material, terms as:)

> (2) the frequent recurrence of set phrases and variations on them in similar metrical contexts to express a particular idea and its variants;
>
> . .

and

> (3) the prevalence of looser sorts of mimicry--metrical, dictional, syntactic, and so on--in cases where verbatim repetition is not strictly found.

A Special Theory of Rhetoric

Because Odysseus's and Laksmana's speeches are found in the Iliad and the Rāmāyaṇa, they must persuade (or more correctly, convey the impression of attempting to persuade) within a context defined by discrete units. What opportunities does such a context offer for the operation of persuasional power? There

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Homer's hexameter and Valmiki's śloka actually correlates nicely with the differences between their two powers that I develop in the course of this study.

is a long history of applying Greek rhetorical theory to Homeric speeches, but for a variety of reasons, the results of applying native theories of elaborated speech--all of which postdate the Iliad and the Rāmāyana--to speeches in the poems are less than satisfactory.[1] As a result, scholars have recently begun to

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[1] For the application of Greek rhetorical theory to Homeric speeches in antiquity, see George A. Kennedy, "The Ancient Dispute over Rhetoric in Homer," American Journal of Philology 78 (1957): 23-35. More recent attempts include Marcel Delaunois, "Comment parle les héros d'Homère. La question de l'enchaînement des idées dans l'éloquence grecque," Les études classiques 20 (1952): 80-92; and Kennedy himself in The Art of Persuasion in Ancient Greece (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 36-39. When not simply anachronistic, these attempts are motivated by the understandable desire to uncover the roots of later Greek rhetorical theory and practice. Aside from assuming a rather superficial model of development, however, this procedure neglects altogether the defining characteristics of Homeric speeches.

The "classical" rhetorical theory was essentially a synthesis of the views of Aristotle, Isocrates, and Hermagoras, a "how-to" manual for successful performance, often competition, in specific settings (cp. Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, esp. p. 265; also Charles S. Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic [New York: Macmillan, 1924]). Rhetoric was used to sway large bodies of jurors and, to a lesser extent, assemblies of the body politic; to display elocutionary skill so as to attract students or to inflate one's reputation; and to set the necessary tone in formal laudations on state occasions.

By contrast, the typical Homeric speech is spoken by a hero addressing a small number of equals on matters of common concern. Obviously, nothing requires Homer to follow the recipes that later centuries guarantee will produce success in rhetorical situations that his heroes never quite faced. In fact, later rhetoric did not share the major formal restraint that Homer's medium imposed upon embedded speeches: it was not formulaic.

The Indian world never cultivated rhetoric as a distinct field of study. Nineteenth century Indologists, tempted by Indian theorists' intense fascination with figures of speech, labelled an entire branch of Indian thought "rhetoric," but today the preferred designation is "poetics" (see, in general terms, Edwin Gerow and A. K. Ramanujan in The Literatures of India: An Introduction, ed. Edward C. Dimock, Jr. [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974] and, in much greater detail, Edwin Gerow, Indian Poetics [Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz,

examine speeches in both the Iliad and the Rāmāyaṇa to determine their regularities empirically.

Dieter Lohmann has analyzed the "Komposition" (arrangement or organization) of speeches in the Iliad morphologically and functionally on three expanding levels: organization within individual speeches ("internal composition"), within groups of contiguous speeches ("external composition"), and within larger segments of the poem ("overarching composition").[1] At each level, he has found the same regularities: construction in "discrete units" ("Baukasten") in accordance with a consciously applied principle of mirroring which includes both exact repetition and reversal (as in the mirror image).

Inspired by Lohmann's work, Renate Söhnen has examined selected speeches and conversations in the Rāmāyaṇa.[2] Her very

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1977]). This entire tradition viewed "literature" (kāvya) as discourse that realized what other forms of discourse only implied, as "fully exploited expression . . . reflecting the authoritative status of the Sanskrit language" (Gerow, Indian Poetics, p. 220). It then attempted to determine wherein kāvya differed from other forms of expression, such as science (śāstra) and narrative (itihāsa, kathā). Two answers dominated: (1) ornaments (alaṃkārāḥ) of sound (śabda) and meaning (artha) which the kavi might employ; and (2) the "taste" or "flavor" (rasa) that literary works left with their audiences. (The two were later combined under a single head, dhvani, "echo," "hint.") The concerns of alaṃkāra-śāstra parallel to some extent my concerns here, but as J. L. Brockington has pointed out, Vālmīki lacks most of the more complex figures that fascinated later kavis. See "Figures of Speech in the Rāmāyaṇa," Journal of the American Oriental Society 97 (1977): 441-59, and, more recently, Righteous Rāma, pp. 32-36.

[1]Dieter Lohmann, Die Komposition der Reden in der Ilias (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1970).

[2]Renate Söhnen, Untersuchungen zur Komposition von Reden und Gesprächen im Rāmāyaṇa, 2 vols., Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik (Reinbek: Verlag für orientalistische

careful and precise work ranges beyond Komposition, but it is in some ways less serviceable for my purposes than Lohmann's. Moving from a typological morphology to a detailed examination of selected speeches to a discussion of general compositional principles, Söhnen displays neither Lohmann's zeal for a single, underlying principle nor his awareness of the wider contexts from which such a principle might derive.

Both Söhnen and Lohmann cast significant light on Homer's and Vālmīki's speeches, but my questions require me to modify what these scholars have done. Not only does their morphological functionalism avoid the deeper, structural issues that I hope to address by invoking patterns of activity conditioned by the nature of power; unlike both of them, I need to be able to compare: to express and account for the differences between Odysseus's speech and Laksmana's, between rhetorical praxis in the Iliad and rhetorical praxis in the Rāmāyana. I need a very basic model, grounded in poetry formally constituted of discrete units, that outlines the empirically possible rhetorical operations in a way general enough to allow me to distinguish the specific forms that the power of persuasion employs in each poem. At the same time, I am convinced that rhetoric is an actional totality: rhetorical activity may occur in any and every dimension of this particular communicative act, as Lohmann's work with organization indicates. Thus, I must also identify the arenas in which the

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operations of persuasive power may occur.

Arenas of Persuasional Activity

In an essay entitled "How, and What, Does Homer Communicate?" Joseph Russo details what he considers the five levels of "regularity" in "aural" poetry:

> (1) outer metrics--the given metrical structure; in Homer, the structure of the dactylic hexameter [cp. the structure of the *śloka* in the *Ramayana*];
>
> (2) inner metrics or rhythm--the regularized arrangement of caesurae and cola [cp. the Sanskrit *pada*] within the given metrical structure;
>
> (3) diction--the stock of sounds, words, and phrases from which a poet chooses;
>
> (4) theme--the basic narrative blocks which a poet combines to construct his composition; and
>
> (5) outlook--the vision of physical and social reality which a poet must accept if he is to use the traditional poetic resources.[1]

Within this graduated continuum, Russo highlights recurrence and structural tradition in an "esthetic of regularity." He finds in Homer a victory of the regular over the possible, "the triumph of the normative over the deviant."[2] Thus he conflates medium and message: surrendering *parole* to *langue* he locates what Homer communicates not in what Homer says but in the structural characteristics of the resources Homer uses.

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[1] Joseph A. Russo, "How, and What, Does Homer Communicate?: The Medium and Message of Homeric Verse," in Eric A. Havelock and Jackson P. Hershbell, eds., *Communication Arts in the Ancient World* (New York: Hastings House, 1978), pp. 39-52, esp. 43-46.

[2] Ibid., p. 47.

I cannot accept Russo's esthetic of regularity, but I find the five levels that he outlines in developing his views extremely helpful. Given my purposes, however, I must adjust Russo's levels to fit (1) an investigation of rhetoric embedded in poetry rather than poetry itself, and (2) the operation of discrete units (often regularized) rather than the operation of formulae.

Consider Phoinix's famous speech in Iliad 9. Rhetorical activity clearly occurs at the level of words or phrases and their various subdivisions. But metrics as such, whether "outer" or "inner" metrics, cannot be a regular part of Homer's embedded rhetoric. The requirements of poetry override any continual and distinctive use of meter for specifically rhetorical purposes. I use "diction," then, to refer broadly to all rhetorical activity at the level of words and phrases, including the occasional use of metrics and "colometrics" for rhetorical purposes. Thus, in Iliad 9.492 Phoinix underscores his point with two parallel phrases, beginning at the trithemimeral caesura: hōs epi soi ¦ <mala poll' epathon> ¦ <kai poll' emogēsa> (rather literally: so <I have suffered much> on your account, <and toiled much>). In line 487, a midline caesura separates two infinitive phrases, so that a similar parallelism embraces the entire line: <out' es dait' ienai> ¦ <out' en megaroisi pasasthai> (<you would not go . . . out to any feast,> <nor taste any food in your own halls>).

But of course, rhetorical activity does not occur only at the level of words or phrases. The next level contains the

rhetorical activity of subject and predicate combined, the rhetorically directed sentence or statement, not theme but the individual argument. Phoinix claims a special status as Achilles's elderly adviser; he points out that the gods, who are greater than Achilles, are nevertheless placable; he reminds Achilles that past heroes were assuaged by receiving gifts; and, relating the story of Meleagros, he points out the undesirable consequences of persisting in anger.

Above the level of argument or theme, Russo and I diverge. Russo's list includes only one higher level, in part because "theme" is a flexible category (a theme can unite many subthemes and find expression in poetic segments of varying length), in part because Russo's material concerns preclude identifying any non-thematic use of two or more themes except in terms of over-all, regularized vision. My concerns, however, require, two further arenas. On the one hand, speakers elaborate individual arguments in various ways. I have already mentioned Phoinix's extended account of the Meleagros paradigm. On the other hand, speakers who invoke more than a single argument must organize or arrange their arguments, whether logically or merely formally. Thus, Lohmann diagrams the major outlines of Phoinix's speech as follows:

I. 434-495: Relation between Phoinix and Achilles

A. 434-446: Inseparability of Phoinix and Achilles (before Troy)

B. 447-484: Digression: The earlier fate of the narrator (Phoinix)

A.′ 485-495: Inseparability of Phoinix and Achilles (in Achilles′s childhood)

II. 496-605: Appeal to Achilles to relent

A. 496-526: Two instances of appeal + exemplification forming a ring about an allegorical narrative

B. 527-599: The example of Meleagros

A.′ 600-605: Appeal to Achilles to relent.[1]

Lohmann extends his notion of Komposition to broader areas--äussere Komposition, übergreifende Komposition--and makes several important observations. But strictly speaking, his extended notions belong to the study not of rhetorical praxis but of the structures of the narrative in which the speeches are recounted.

Like Lohmann′s extended "compositions," Russo′s broadest category, outlook, cannot be an arena for rhetorical activity. It, too, transcends the bounds of the persuasive act. But inasmuch as the speeches in the Iliad and the Rāmāyana do all appear in the same poem, some category applying to the poetic totality is not inappropriate. Relegating particular opinions to the arena of argument and distinguishing "material" from "message," I give this category an actional twist and make it both (1) the actual and potential patterns of rhetorical praxis in each poem--the nature of persuasive power itself--and their connections with other modes of acting and thinking in the poem; and (2) the rhetoric of the poem itself and the speeches′

[1]Lohmann, pp. 245 & 252.

contribution to it. The first is the topic of the present study; a discussion of the second must await another occasion.

Lest it be feared that by modifying the views of a Homeric scholar and illustrating my modifications with a speech from Homer I have developed a one-sidedly Greek model of the arenas of rhetorical activity in formulaic epic, let us look briefly at the short speech in which Rāma tries to dissuade Sītā from accompanying him to the forest (Rām. 2.25). On the level of diction, Rāma underscores his points in a manner not dissimilar to Phoinix's:

> <giri>nirjharasambhūtā ¦ <giri>kandaravāsinām
>
> ([the roars,] amplified by <mountain->cataracts, of [lions] dwelling in <mountain->caves)
>
> Rām. 2.25.6ab;
>
> upavās<aśca kartavyo> ¦ . . . ¦ jatābhār<aśca kartavyo>
>
> (literally: fast<ing must be done> . . . skin-wear<ing must be done>)
>
> Rām. 2.25.8ac.

On the level of argument, Rāma appeals to Sītā's obligation to fulfill her dharma and lays before her the miseries (duhkha) of the forest. Elaborating these miseries at some length, he produces a speech whose organization might be diagrammed as follows:

I. 25.2-3b: Appeal to Sītā's svadharma

II. 25.3c-14: Argument based on sukha

  A. 3c-5: Injunction not to go to the forest because of its hazards

  B. 6-13: The miseries of the forest, distributed

over individual ślokas, most of which end with a refrain emphasizing the general claim

A.′ 14: Injunction not to go to the forest because of its hazards.

In formulaic poetry, then, diction, argument, elaboration, and arrangement offer four arenas in which Odysseus and Laksmana--and all others who engage in rhetorical activity--can and do attempt to persuade Achilles and Rāma. Within these confines, the characteristic differences between their two speeches--their distinctive rhetorical praxeis, their distinctive persuasive powers--emerge. But they only emerge in conjunction with the rhetorical activities possible in each arena.

Basic Operations

When rhetorical activity makes use of discrete units, the arsenal of persuasion is governed by the logically possible relations between these units: (1) a single unit may be repeated one or several times; (2) it may be significantly grouped with other units, most simply with another unit (the pair); or (3) it may be placed indiscriminately beside other units. But repetition, grouping, and "parataxis" do not wear the same costumes in every rhetorical arena.

Diction is not a simple category. Its rhetorical activity includes the phonetic, the semantic, the rhythmic, and the "verbal."[1] On this level, free association is not an option.

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[1]For example, in Il. 9.487, cited above, anaphora in out′ es . . . out′ en . . . is phonetic; the contrast between dynamic

Diction shares its field of operation with both the metrical requirements of poetry and the syntactic requirements of language. If no extraordinary, rhetorical activity occurs on this level, words and phrases are still not randomly juxtaposed. They exhibit metrical and syntactic regularity. As a result, diction offers only two basic operations to rhetoric, repetition and grouping. Within these operations, however, it permits extremely wide variety, a variety in which Lohmann's "mirroring" image reaches its limits. No hard and fast demarcation separates parallelism from opposition--no rigid limitation to positive and negative reflection--but instead a vast and indistinct territory of degree of difference based on a multiplicity of characteristics.

Formulaic poetry also makes a more subtle device of diction available. As a formula, a discrete unit is repeated remotely and in the process establishes an expected pattern whose violation may be utilized to rhetorical effect: a "remote" juxtaposition of a single, unexpected occurrence of A' to a multitude of expected, and ignored, occurrences of A. As Joseph Russo points out, the opening three words of the Iliad violate a Homeric colometric-syntactic regularity.[1] Similarly, Odysseus informs Achilles that Agamemnon has offered not aglaa dōra, resplendant gifts (the common expression), but ăxia dōra, worthy

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es . . . ienai and static en . . . pasasthai is semantic; the echoing of thought in the metrical bisection of the line is rhythmic; and the repeated particles, . . . -t[e] . . . -t[e], operate on the level of words.

[1]Russo, "A Closer Look."

gifts (Il. 9.261). If such devices are overly subtle, however, they are likely to be missed by their audiences, at least on the level of conscious perception.

Argument suffers the least from the empirical constraints of formulaic poetry. As itself a sort of discrete unit of sense, at least for poets accustomed to composing in discrete units, an argument stands apart from restrictions imposed on combinations of discrete units. Unlike diction, however, argument opens out not onto the limits of metrics and language but, as an element of speech, onto the limits of thought and expression. It opens the widest window to the unhindered operation of persuasive power and power's institutions, and as a result it provides a convenient arena in which to begin to consider the varieties of rhetorical praxis. But the window that argument opens onto the world of power is not untinted. It reveals the world as colored by the context in which arguments are invoked, the universal rhetorical situation of a speaker addressing a hearer or hearers.

An argument may be simply stated, but its persuasive force may also be amplified through some sort of elaboration. Greek and Indian formulaic epic, as discussed here, employs three major elaborative devices: comparison, recounting (listing and narrative), and the paradigm--the last broadly understood as including all narrative forms of comparison, whether exemplary in a positive sense or not. Free association is still not possible. The realm of the single argument stands under the constraints not of metrics and of syntax but of logic: two

unrelated instances of the same argument or a statement of what amounts to two different arguments belongs in the arena of arrangement, not elaboration.

Dieter Lohmann isolates three major forms according to which Homeric speeches organize their "building blocks:" ring composition, parallelism, and free association. In a comparative context, we can see that the first two of these are simply morphologically specific versions of more fundamental operations, repetition and grouping. But the level of arrangement also permits a rhetorical operation possible on no other level, free association. Arrangement shares argument's freedom from linguistic and poetic constraints; it is also free from the logical constraints that keep a single argument and its elaborations from fragmenting. Arrangement knows one constraint and one constraint only: arguments must occur within the same speech. Even here, however, it is difficult to know whether free association is actually a rhetorical operation or simply a failure: a failure on the part of the speaker to take rhetorical interest in the relations between arguments, or a failure on the part of the scholar, who lacks insight into the manner in which the poet has constructed his speeches.

Constraints and Conditions

The material constraints of the oral-formulaic theory have often been viewed as shackles, preventing individual poets from exercising virtually any artistic creativity whatsoever.[1] The

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[1]For the alleged creative constraints of oral-formulaic

formal constraints that formulaic poetry imposes on the operation of rhetoric exercise a much gentler conditioning. A poetry of discrete units makes available the basic formal operations of repetition, grouping, and free association, adjusted to the requirements of the arenas in which they appear: diction, argument, elaboration, and arrangement. Within the parameters of these empirical constraints, we may discern the differences between Odysseus's speech and Laksmana's. We may discern the distinctive characteristics of the persuasive power that each seeks to employ.

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composition, see especially Frederick M. Combellack, "Milman Parry and Homeric Artistry," Comparative Literature 11 (1959): 193-208. More recently, scholars who still take the oral-formulaic theory seriously have stressed the possibilities of creative accomplishment within the framework it provides. See, for example, J. B. Hainsworth, The Flexibility of the Homeric Formula (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), on the formula's variability; William Whallon, Formula, Character, Context: Studies in Homeric, Old English, and Old Testament Poetry (Washington, D.C.: Center for Hellenic Studies, 1969), on formulaic epithets as appropriate occasionally to narrative context but especially to character; Norman Austin, Archery at the Dark of the Moon: Poetic Problems in Homer's Odyssey (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1975), on the employment of formulae to express poetic themes and symbolism; Michael N. Nagler, Spontaneity and Tradition, for a full explanation of the generative notion that on the level of deep structure (Gestalt) all is traditional, while on the level of composition all is spontaneous; and, last but not least, Bernard C. Fenik, ed., Homer: Tradition and Innovation (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977), especially Fenik's own essay on pattern and innovation in four dramatic speeches in the Iliad.

CHAPTER TWO

PERSUADING ACHILLES AND OTHER HEROES

Agamemnon is desperate. Offended, Achilles sulks. Heartened, Trojans threaten. "Flee," he weeps. The rest resist: "Persuade Achilles."--Through Odysseus, Agamemnon offers his gifts.

Agamemnon attempts to extricate himself by invoking power, not hegemonic power, for as a leader of men he concedes total failure, but persuasive power. By now the idea that this power's distinctive traits emerge in its verbal application is at least no stranger. But power does not actualize *ex nihil* to vanish once spent. It is *energeia* as well as *dynamis*, potentiality as well as actualization. As a manifestation of power, rhetoric offers not one but two questions for discussion: (1) When and where does one have recourse to persuasion? and (2) How does one control interaction to achieve the desired results? The answer to the first is a study in "statics:" the interrelations that embody persuasive power in potential and the tensions that eventually erupt into action. The answer to the second is a study in "dynamics:" the means by which one effects or attempts to effect change.

Recourse to Persuasion

The characters in the Iliad attempt to persuade for a variety of ends: sexual favors, burial, bathing (after mourning), dining, and lulling to sleep, among others. Of course, any sort of undesirable interpersonal occurrence might seem capable of evoking persuasion in response, but no reader of the Iliad will deem any rhetorical ends more important to the poem than those connected with battle. The number and detail of such "persuasion events"--to fight or not to fight in general, to fight or not to fight a particular opponent, to do or refrain from a specific act, to spare, to encamp and, if so, where, . . . --insure that the poetic context of these events receives full elaboration. Naturally, the poet's interests and the events in his tale have skewed the imagined universe in which persuasion occurs.

In the Iliad, persuasion is a mode of normal human interaction, a vehicle for the normal operation of interpersonal power. Together with the deed, persuasion divides the Homeric universe of interpersonal activity in two, just as the poetic realizations of these two, the speech and the narrative, bifurcate the forms of Homer's poetic activity. Those to whom it is not possible to direct persuasion, those with whom it is impossible to cooperate, become (on contact) objects of antagonistic efforts (erga)--"enemies". Those who, for whatever reasons, are immune from the force of (antagonistic) "deeds" (erga)--"friends"--must be subjected to persuasive acts. The distinction between persons is not, however, quite so neat as I

have just stated. "Persuasion" and "deeds" bifurcate a universe of power-transmitting events, not a universe of persons. Hektor may fight Achilles, but he may also attempt to persuade him. Odysseus may command his serving maids, but when he finds them unfaithful, he may also slay them.

The important point is not that personal standing in these interactions is flexible; it is that personal standing is not arbitrary. The choice concerning the appropriate power to exercise--whether to address another with words or with deeds--is governed by established patterns of interaction, one of which is "vertical," the other "horizontal." "Vertically," Homeric heroes stand at the head of a social hierarchy, the oikos ("dwelling unit"). Interactions among members of the same dwelling unit are structured in such a way that the aristos (the "best man")--to look down from the top--may expect to control the actions of the rest. To resist would be dangerous, for by resorting to deeds the aristos can, in theory, enforce his will, mildly through coercion, fiercely through slaughter. To the extent that resistance carries no promise of success, recourse to erga ("deeds") within the household becomes infrequent.

"Horizontally," relations between households--and as far as the poet is concerned these relations are confined to interactions between aristoi--remain open. No hierarchy establishes "fixed" predominance. More ephemeral patterns grounded in common interest govern relations between "equals," patterns such as philotēs and enmity.

Philotēs, a relationship of mutual support between aristoi,

requires unanimity in practice. Sarpedon must not only agree to help Priam; he must agree with Priam on the means by which the common goal is to be obtained. Recourse to erga is generally not allowed. Hostile deeds directed to a philos in themselves violate mutual support and threaten to subordinate that philos within the hierarchy of the (extended) dwelling unit (cp. the position of Eumaios and his comment Od. 17.322-23). Such deeds cannot but meet with an antagonistic response. When unanimity among philoi is not immediately forthcoming, less violent means (words) are the only alternative to abandoning philotēs altogether. Interactional patterns confine erga between "friends" to a particular ritual setting, the games.

Aristoi who are not philoi are not, however, subject to attack on sight. Hiketai ("suppliants"), for example, expect friendly reception. Recall Zeus Hiketēsios, several formulaic expressions of themis, and the reception of Phoinix by Peleus and of Odysseus by the Phaiakians. But where interests conflict, an aristos would have to resist strong social pressures--kleos, timē, nemesis, and aidōs--not to pursue his interests to the detriment of those with whom his interests conflict. Both initial action and evoked reaction involve contests of words and of deeds. It is not entirely unthinkable for aristoi who are outside the bounds of philotēs to settle conflicts of interest with words. When the Achaians arrive at Troy, for example, they dispatch an embassy to Priam. But conflict of interest rarely allows verbal resolution that is not surrender, and most often words are only a prelude to the deeds

that will decide the struggle.

The patterned character of the use of words and deeds in these two situations (philotēs and enmity) constitute the attributes that define Homeric society's ideal, the true aristos: heroic aretē consists of excellence in counsel and excellence in military performance.[1] The split is echoed in the general if not razor-sharp division of the Homeric personality into two basic areas: the intellective or "phronetic" noos acts though words upon the (e)motive region responsible for the performance of valiant acts, that is, upon the thumos, in which, among others, menos--the warrior's rage--resides.[2]

To be sure, these patterns are neither entirely inviolable nor totally sufficient to account for even patterned behavior. They clearly manifest Homer's fascination with and idealization of the aristos. Homer cannot avoid hints that aristoi do not always dominate the oikos so totally. Relations among the

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[1]See, for example, Friedrich Solmsen, "The 'Gift' of Speech in Homer and Hesiod," Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 85 (1954): 1-15.

[2]The literature on Homeric psychology is vast. The classic work that fragmented the Homeric personality into several disjointed components was Bruno Snell's well-known The Discovery of the Mind, trans. T. G. Rosenmeyer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953). For two convenient, relatively recent expositions of significant aspects of Homeric psychology, see Arthur W. H. Adkins, From the Many to the One (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970), chapter 1, and James M. Redfield, Nature and Culture in the Iliad: The Tragedy of Hektor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 171-86. A recent attempt to synthesize early Greek notions concerning the soul that depends upon the Swedish tradition of the history of religions (A. Arbman, Å. Hultkrantz, and I. Paulsen) is Jan Bremmer, The Early Greek Concept of the Soul (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983).

divine household are not harmonious; Phoinix schemes with his mother against his father; Meleagros abandons his family because his mother expresses more affection for her brother than for her son. The Iliad's major narrative, however, presupposes aristoi whose oikoi obey (peithesthai: "are persuaded") without question, or at least it presupposes circumstances in which the authority of the aristos is not put to the test. For struggles within the oikos--and for struggles beyond the world of "aristos meets aristos"--we would have to turn to Homer's other epic, the Odyssey.

As for interactions between aristoi, the patterns I have sketched are typical and fundamental, but they are only rough guides to behavior. Not only are precise actions subject to the vagaries of circumstance and relations. "Finer tuning," patterns of greater subtlety, influence actual conduct. The leaders of the Achaian army besiege Troy as a group of relative equals, but patterns among them help determine detailed interactions. Each "equal" worthy of comment has his own particular province of superabundant power (aretē). Agamemnon is most royal, for he leads the largest contingent and is nominal leader of the expedition; Achilles is best at fighting; Ajax best at defense; Nestor best at counsel; and so on. These individual aretai all require appropriate recognition in action from the remaining aristoi.

Of course, more could be said about these finer patterns and the degree to which Homer imagines them affecting behavior. But the reason I have discussed even the broader patterns at all

is that these patterns do more than simply distinguish persons who are to be persuaded from those who are to be fought. Patterns governing human actions embody persuasive force themselves. Where patterned interactions produce expectations of obedience, speeches may be relatively unelaborated. Achilles expresses his desires to Patroklos, and Patroklos "obeys" without comment (Il. 1.345=9.205=11.616). The verb that I place in quotes is significant. Interrelations embody persuasive power in potentiality. The interactions they produce are marked by the passive peithesthai, usually in the perfect, "he has been persuaded," that is, "he obeys."

Where immediate assent cannot be expected, the onus for persuasion falls upon the acts of the speaker, the speech itself. Potentiality struggles for actuality; passivity yields to activity; peithesthai to peithein, "he obeys" to "I persuade." Speech becomes elaborated. The interests of the Iliad's poet certainly play down any "intra-oikal" need for elaborated persuasion, but perhaps with good reason. From the point of view of the aristos, the collapse of structures of peithesthai within the oikos amounts simply to insubordination. It demands erga in response. Active persuasion becomes a problem especially when aristos meets aristos, for erga, acts of war, cannot be entered into lightly, but the ephemeral relations between aristoi offer persuasion little reliable assistance.

The rhetorical burden--the need for persuasive power--becomes greatest when these relations are strained to the utmost, when the issue at hand threatens to break philotēs

altogether, but when the loss of the philos is a blow that the speaker cannot, or believes he cannot, survive. With erga countermanded, the effects of patterned interactions set aside, and aristos suspended between ally and enemy, the speaker is thrown back upon the force of words alone. The elaborated verbal activity that results taxes persuasion to the limit and shows its true color. This extreme state of affairs describes, of course, the Iliad's central poetic subject, the rhetorical context of Achilles's implacability.

Achilles Implacable

Achilles is not chronically implacable. More often than not speeches attempting to persuade him succeed. Antilochos demands second prize, "and . . . Achilles rejoiced, taking delight in [him], because he was his dear companion (philos hetairos)" (Il. 23.555-56). In most cases, relations of philotēs, even if they must be invoked, hold firm.

But when speeches to Achilles fail, they mark serious social threats. These unsuccessful speeches address two events: Achilles's refusal to fight after Agamemnon's insult, and his relentless pursuit of battle following Patroklos's death. The first marks a seemingly irreparable failure of philotēs when philotēs is absolutely essential to survival. The second poses a drastic need to establish relations of philotēs when every sign and expectation leads one to surmise that philotēs is impossible. Priam must redeem Hektor's corpse from an enraged and indomitable enemy.

To meet these threats, speakers invoke a power of persuasion that I will eventually characterize as social, systemic, relational, and economical. Odysseus's speech offering Agamemnon's gifts illustrates the characteristic ways in which speakers "manipulate" the resources provided by the formulaic medium to invoke this power. For reasons mentioned in chapter one, operations in the arena of argument provide a fitting place to begin.

Argument

Agamemnon has designated Odysseus, Phoinix, and Ajax to offer his gifts. When Ajax "winks" and Odysseus grabs his chance, his mission determines his strategy: "Agamemnon offers you worthy recompense if you change from your anger." But the offer will not work, and Odysseus knows it. Agamemnon's gifts are loathsome. They still stand at the center of the argument, for Odysseus really has nothing better to offer. But they do not stand alone. Renowned for cunning, Odysseus opens with another argument altogether. In an attempt to divorce gifts from giver and provide a more palatable context, he begins with relations of philotēs.

The beginning is only a hint: feasts are fair (equal, "eisē") for you, Achilles, in Agamemnon's hut and your own. But--Odysseus gets down to business quickly--we're in trouble, and if you care for the Achaians at all, you'll act now. Abruptly, Odysseus turns, with a new vocative, to invoke a relation that is presumably solid both because it is remote from

the disputing aristoi at Troy and because it forms (pace Phoinix--and Oidipous) one of the surests bonds within the oikos, patterned interaction between father and son. Peleus himself had told Achilles, "Keep from the bad complications of quarrel (eris), and all the more for this the Argives will honor (tiōsi) you" (Il. 9.257-58).

Odysseus has carefully prepared for the introduction of Agamemnon's gifts. Achilles's reaction to Nestor's speech in Iliad 1 (254-84) had shown clearly that any expectations based upon Agamemnon's standing as basileus have been entirely shattered. By mentioning Peleus, he places the gifts in a different context altogether: paternal instructions on winning timē, the very timē that Agamemnon now offers. The list follows in detail, but when it is complete, Odysseus seems to recognize the ultimate impossibility of his rhetorical attempt. Gifts and giver cannot be completely divorced. Agamemnon had concluded his version of the list with an impossible demand that showed characteristically little understanding of the events that had transpired: let Achilles be tamed and yield, since I have higher standing as basileus (Il. 9.158-61). Odysseus concludes by distancing not gifts from giver but timē itself as far as possible from Agamemnon: if you fight, you will win a god's timē from all the other Achaians.

Two arguments intermingle in Odysseus's speech, the same two arguments that appear whenever speakers address Achilles. In general, one argument appeals to patterns of behavior and

occurrences, the other to the consequences of activity or inactivity.

The most common argument from pattern invokes interpersonal relations directly, as Odysseus does: Peleus is your father, the Achaians are your friends. Actually, it is Priam who makes the boldest use of this argument. He recalls Peleus, too, but he himself plays no part in that relationship at all. He appeals only to the most tenuous of analogies--I am a father, too--and the treatment of Hektor's corpse would seem to indicate that Achilles is incapable of the sympathy for Trojan emotions that would make Priam's analogy work. Yet precisely here Priam plays not upon structured relations that Achilles has rejected but upon the emotions and anxieties that--the audience already knows[1]--weigh heavily upon Achilles's thumos: the fateful implications of his double destiny and of the choice which, in avenging Patroklos, Achilles has already made. In doing so, Priam invokes the father-son relationship much more vividly than Odysseus had: not the words of the father as sanctions for other structured interactions, but the acts and emotions of the father-son relationship itself.

As in Priam's case, invoked relations often refer to the person of the speaker, if only by analogy. Other patterns address more directly the remaining dimensions of the rhetorical situation. These patterns are either subject or not subject to human volition. If volitional, they aim at the person

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[1]Cp. Iliad 9.410-16 and 19.420-23.

addressed; if non-volitional, they address the nature of the events at which persuasion aims.

At Thetis's command, Achilles sits beside his ships apart from battle, for Hektor wears Achilles's armor. Iris approaches and speaks: Get up! Let sebas (awe?) enter your thumos that Patroklos becomes food for Trojan dogs; lōbē (shame?) for you should his corpse be somehow defiled (Il. 18.170-80). In similar vein, Ajax closes the delegation to Achilles by anticipating the cry he raises when the Trojans swarm the ships: feel aidōs (self-respect?) (Il. 9.640). The precise "psychological" content of sebas, lōbē, aidōs, and other terms--awe? shame? respect?--is not really important here. Whatever the psychological states, these terms clearly govern volitional acts. The thumos of the aristos responds to specific situations and occurrences in ways that ordinarily lead to specific acts. As a result, speakers may directly address the persons of aristoi simply by pointing out that present situations or occurrences are of the sort to produce what, eschewing the "thumological," I call simply "patterned volitional acts."

Other patterns govern events that occur quite apart from any volitional intent. No remedy is possible if the ships are destroyed (Il. 9.249-50); hungry men cannot fight all day long (Il. 19.162-63). These appeals by Odysseus are general statements of "the way things are" that, expressed in specific form, would be informative, not imperative: your death is not fated yet, Poseidon tells an Achilles who is battling the river

(Il. 21.191). Given the right conditions, "patterned non-volitional results" will inevitably occur, or not occur. The locus of the argument lies in the situation at hand. The speaker merely urges the person addressed to resign himself to the inevitable, whether good or bad, and to act accordingly.

The invocation of various patterns provides a significant argumentative resource to speakers who attempt to persuade Achilles, but it does not include the kind of argument that Odysseus pursues at such length in offering Agamemnon's gifts, or in mentioning timē from all the Achaians, or even in describing the disaster that waits the assembled ships. Under the broad label of "consequences," this second argument takes shape especially from the preeminence accorded the aristos as head of the oikos. Superiority and tangibility are two of the primary characteristics of that preeminence. In the world of Homer's aristoi, intra-oikal superiority has designs on superiority plain and simple. Fathers instruct their sons:

> aien aristeuein kai hyperochon emmenai allōn
>
> (to be always best in battle and pre-eminent beyond all others)
>
> Il. 6.208=11.784.

But aristoi have designs on a superiority of actuality, not potentiality. After all, the relations between aristoi are ephemeral. They seek a superiority not of status but of fact--demonstrable, tangible. Positive consequences of action may include kleos--"reputation," public memory down through the ages--but the centrality of Achilles's material injury seems to

indicate that at least for this poet, for this plot, merely verbal "possessions" are secondary. What good does it do, Achilles asks, to stay and win kleos aphthiton, unperishing kleos, if there is no especial timē in it for me? Timē is what Achilles wanted--at one time. Timē, tangible aglaa (and axia) dōra (resplendent--and worthy--gifts), are what those who attempt to persuade him offer.

Other arguments from consequence center on speakers or those on whose behalf they speak. Odysseus pleads with Achilles to act lest all the Achaians perish. In doing so, he appeals to no altruistic bent in Achilles's disposition. Achilles is hoped to have a personal interest in these others, as in all others on whose behalf such an appeal is made. An aristos defends his oikos because it is an inseparable part of his own superiority. An aristos defends philoi because relations of philotēs, too, contribute to the preservation of superiority. If the Achaians perish with their ships as well, what chances does Achilles himself have of surviving? Odysseus's implication is clear, but Achilles is unimpressed. In conflicts between aristoi, it requires extraordinary aretē to reject the claims of philotēs, of assistance, entirely: I will not fight until fire comes to my own ships.

In attempting to persuade Achilles, then, Odysseus, like other speakers, uses two chief arguments: arguments based on patterns and arguments based on consequences. In brief, the first attempts to invoke various patterns that govern normal social operations, operations in which persuasion routinely

occurs. Such arguments attempt to actualize the power of persuasion, latent in normal social interactions but not directly manipulated there, by specifically bringing these relations to consciousness, thus strengthening or reestablishing them. Using the second argument, speakers attempt to manipulate the visible marks of power--personal consequences of action and inaction--for their own ends. They hope that by offering social power (timē) or pointing out the actions needed to maintain social power (the Achaians must not perish) they themselves will be allowed to exercise persuasive power (Achilles will act or not act as desired) in something of a reciprocal exchange.

Elaboration

"Agamemnon offers you worthy gifts if you change from your anger." That is what Odysseus argues; but that is not all he says. "Listen to me, while I count off for you all the gifts." The length of the list is exceptional. In this regard, Odysseus's later, brief reference to the timē Achilles might have from all the Achaians is more typical. In several other respects, however, the elaboration of Agamemnon's offer is representative of elaborative techniques that one finds generally in speeches addressed to Achilles.

First, comparisons are, as mentioned briefly in chapter one, limited in scope. Gods, women, Helen, Orestes--typically, whatever is a human person or the superior analogue of a human person is a fit object for comparison. Natural objects--sun, moon, wind, earth--are not. Only once does a natural

comparison, or rather, somewhat more than a comparison, find its way into speeches addressed to Achilles, and that exception is pointed:

> "Pitiless: the rider Peleus was never your father
> nor Thetis your mother, but the gray sea bore you
> and the towering rocks, so sheer is the heart in you turned
> from us."
>
> Il. 16.33-35

To Patroklos, Achilles's relentless behavior, his implacability in the face of the ultimate need for philotēs, sets him outside the realm of normal human society by his very nature, by his birth.

In addition to the classes of objects chosen for comparison, comparisons in Agamemnon's list assume this device's most common rhetorical form: you will be honored like a god; the seven women Agamemnon will give you exceed the races of women in skill; you may choose the most beautiful after the most beautiful of all, Helen; Agamemnon will treat you like his own son. In persuasional speeches addressed to Achilles, speakers compare with extreme representatives of a class. Along this model, Phoinix points out that inasmuch as the gods are placable, Achilles should be, too.

A second point at which the list of Agamemnon's gifts is typical of elaboration in speeches addressed to Achilles concerns the manner in which the various items are combined. Except on the smallest of scales, the various forms of recounting shun repetition and juxtaposition and seek relation. Agamemnon's list is not an arbitrary collection. Its broad,

chronological outlines are certainly clear. The classes of gifts mentioned, too, display a definite organization: immediately: plunder--nonhuman, then human (women); when Troy falls, plunder--nonhuman, then human (once again, women). Upon return home, the gifts change, for one does not plunder one's own household: marriage (in other words, a woman again, but now in a different relation), then marriage gifts (cities--societies--entire, no longer plundered).[1] Never is an item repeated per se, and only when individual gifts in a class are listed one by one is arbitrary juxtaposition evident: Kardamyle, Enope, grassy Hire, Pherai, Antheia, Aipeia, and Pedasos. When lists extend to any length, the Iliad's speakers find them more effective if they recount parts whose relations to each other and to a whole are clear.

Although absent from Odysseus's speech, narrative recounting actually permits greater length and appears more

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[1] I have not yet drawn entirely the distinction I wish to make between the realms of machesthai and peithesthai, but it should be apparent that the Achaians' journey home is a transition from the realm of fighting and plunder to the realm of "obedience" and persuasion. The basic division of the Homeric world is thus reflected in the cities and women that appear in the list of Agamemnon's gifts.

The reversed order of the gifts from the two realms could be significant, too. The realm of persuasion is an interpersonal realm that begins with and centers on the relation of husband and wife in the oikos and the relations between aristoi that can be established by marriage. In the realm of fighting, objects (including persons) have value only as tangible property, to the extent that they can be looted (concubines, slaves) or simply destroyed (killed). Thus, physical objects plundered come first in the list of gifts from the realm of machesthai; the offer of one of Agamemnon's daughters comes first in the list of gifts from the realm of peithesthai.

frequently than the extended descriptive list. In the delegation's next speech, for example, Phoinix treats the audience to two extended narratives. The first recalls his flight from his father, his reception by Peleus in Phthia, and his close relationship with the young Achilles. As narratives by the aged Nestor often do, this account tells at length of events from the speaker's life that have placed him in a particular relationship with Achilles, a relationship that demands Achilles's "obedience."

The second narrative is the well-known Meleagros paradigm. The underlying elaboration, of course, is comparative, but apparently extreme comparison alone was not enough here. The speaker desires a more powerful means to say what he wishes to say. He elaborates the comparison at great length by coupling it with narrative, just as Agamemnon does when he claims that Zeus, too, was deceived by Ate. What can I, a mere mortal, do if "once even Zeus was deluded, whom they say to be the aristos of gods and men?" (Il. 19.95-96). Let me tell you the story; then you will see my helplessness most clearly.

The arguments that these devices elaborate give a clue as to precisely what it is that elaboration seeks to accomplish. Speakers devote the greatest amount of elaboration to emphasizing interrelations between parties to the rhetorical act. A list of the better men whom Nestor has persuaded points to the "obedience" that his words merit from lesser lights (Il. 1.263-65). A narrative of the events that led to the special interrelation between Patroklos and Achilles makes Patroklos's

need for burial imperative (Il. 23.85-90). Comparisons between the patterns of recompense that Achilles ignores and the same patterns operating in more significant interrelations--"even the gods are placable" (Il. 9.524-26)--and in more strained interactions--even for the slaying of a brother or a child . . . (Il. 9.632-36)--attempts to render Achilles's rejection of social demands less than justifiable. Elaboration of arguments from consequence is not nearly so frequent. Arguments from patterned volitional acts are not elaborated at all.

This last group, arguments from patterned volitional acts, depends for its success entirely upon the person being addressed. Like a joke that must be explained, appeal to aidōs (shame? respect?) that is not immediately felt loses its effect. Either Achilles would feel lōbē should Patroklos's corpse be defiled, or he would not. Extended elaboration would be beside the point.

Other arguments, however, allow the speaker more control. Patterned non-volitional results can be elaborated, but it is not often necessary to amplify a statement as obvious as "hungry men cannot fight all day." Consequences of action or inaction can be detailed, too. But above all, arguments based on personal interrelations require the assistance that elaboration can provide. Presumably Achilles already knows that Phoinix is his elderly friend. Presumably Achilles and Agamemnon already know that Nestor is an aged and respected orator. Merely to remind them of common knowledge when it is precisely the commonly known relationships that have now been called into

question is to do very little indeed. Elaboration allows the speaker to call to mind the events responsible for establishing the relationship in the first place (narrative) and to minimize threats to social relations by setting them within a broader, more extreme context (comparison). In doing this, elaboration allows the speaker to evoke, or to attempt to evoke, the persuasive power that resides in normal social activities.

On a more abstract level, we begin to see that persuasive power in the Iliad resides in systemic webs--in interrelations that fit together like the strands of an elaborately but irregularly woven net. The web-like character of normal social interrelations is mirrored both in the manner in which single arguments are amplified ("recounting," that is, lists and narratives) and in the broader contexts to which speakers appeal (the objects of comparison). Even when the arguments recounted are not based on patterned interrelations, their magnitude is increased when they are incorporated into a system. The size of Agamemnon's gifts becomes fully apparent not when they are listed randomly but when they combine to constitute an ordered whole. Alternately, when the possibilities of the individual argument have been exhausted by recounting, argumentative force can be increased by invoking broader systemic webs, that is, by setting the argument in its broader context. On this model, we can account for the propensity both to extreme comparison and to "social" similes. On the one hand, if comparison is meant to increase an argument's force by setting it within a web-like system, the most forceful means of doing so is to invoke the

extreme instance of that system. It might be equally true, for example, that a man will receive a gift in recompense for an inadvertently slain ox, but Ajax is probably better off with the comparison he has chosen, a slain son or kinsman. On the other hand, the extent of the webs or systems available to the Iliad's speakers sets limits on the extreme instances to which appeal can be made. In the world of the Iliad, gods and humans interrelate and interact. Gods and humans participate in similar and overlapping social systems. As a result, gods form suitable subjects for rhetorical comparisons. By contrast, sun, moon, wind, and earth do not share in the personal. Lying outside appropriate webs of power, they are not available for rhetorical appeal.

Diction

Persuasional praxis is a total praxis. Persuasive power is actualized not only in arguments and their elaborations but in the other dimensions of the communicative act, diction and arrangement. Because we cannot know precisely how a line of Homer's poetry actually sounded in ancient Greece, it is impossible to discuss questions of diction with absolute certainty. We must rely upon the analysis of formal metrical and colometric regularities and upon the appearances of orthography along with its presumed realization. The close relation between diction and the requirements of both poetry and language simply compounds the difficulty. The less complex activity at this level is, the less sure we can be that it has a definite rhetorical application.

When Odysseus offers Agamemnon's gifts, for example, several devices that utilize sound alone are tempting but rhetorically ambiguous: repeated e/i (and ei) + s in teisei de se ison Orestēi (Il. 9.284); internal (half-)rhyme in <enikōn> phula <gunaikōn> (Il. 9.272); repetitions of unvoiced dentals and labials in tauta men autika panta paressetai . . . (Il. 9.277); and of t and l in tauta ke toi teleseie metallēxanti choloio (Il. 9.299). If such devices do more than charm the ear, the interpretation remains speculative. Does repetition of sound contribute to some vague sense of self-evidence? Do "will honor," "you," "equal," "Orestes" belong together? Do repeated t's in line 299 underscore both the things to be accomplished (tauta) and the person to be benefited (toi); does repetition of l emphasize the condition to be met--relent from anger (metallēxanti choloio)--if the gift is to be received (teleseie)? Examples of similar operations at the level of diction abound.

Similarly ambiguous are devices based on the repetition of meaning. In describing the current situation, Odysseus states that it is uncertain whether the Achaians will saōsemen ē apolesthai (save or lose) the ships (Il. 9.230); that Trōes huperthumois tēlekleitoi t' epikouroi (haughty Trojans and their far-famed allies) are near the nēōn kai teicheos (ships and wall) (Il. 9.232-33). Similar devices are used in arguments from consequences (ēmen neoi ēde gerontes--both young men and old [Il. 9.258]) and from patterned volitional acts (ē t' andrōn ē te gunaikōn--of both men and women [Il. 9.276]). These pairs

appear to lend a sense of completeness to statements and arguments, but again rhetorical effect is not overly pronounced.

Homer does, however, portray his speakers as engaging in more complex dictional activity that elaborately combines devices of meaning and sound. Here the rhetorical effect is more certain. Several instances in Odysseus's account of Agamemnon's gifts bear close scrutiny.

(1) hai ke met' Argeiēn Helenēn kallistai eōsin.
ei de ken Argos hikoimeth' Achaiikon outhar arourēs

(who are the loveliest of all after Helen of Argos.
And if we come back to Achaian Argos, pride of tilled land
. . .)

Il. 9.282-83.

The effect of these two simple but striking lines is lost on the reader without Greek. Odysseus is switching from gifts to be had at the fall of Troy to those to be had on return to the Greek mainland. The flexibility of the formula helps make for a smooth transition. The first foot and a half of the new set of gifts echoes the same syllables in the last line of the preceding set.

(2) nēa halis < chrusou ¦ kai chalkou > nēēsasthai

(. . . and load [your ship] deep as you please with gold and bronze)

Il. 9.279.

Dictional activity centers on the pair, "gold and bronze," bracketed on either side by a quadrisyllabic unit of differing length. Each four syllable unit begins with nē- followed by a vowel. The middle two nouns, marked by alliteration (ch-) as

well as by rhyme (-ou), form a succession of five long syllables, thesis-arsis-thesis-arsis-thesis. The penthemimeral caesura occurs after the first of the two, so that the last half of the line reproduces the first, but chiastically according to the units marked out by the central group and with a long syllable added to both the second element describing the goods and the second quadrisyllabic bracket. (Does the initial sound of kai serve to anticipate the full alliteration that follows?) The rhetorical effect emphasizes both the material goods and the ships that contain--bracket--them.

(3) pēgous athlophorous, hoi aethlia possin aronto.
ou ken alēïos eiē anēr hōi tossa genoito.
oude ken aktēmōn eritimoio chrusoio,
hoss´ Agamemnonos hippoi aethlia possin aronto.

(. . . strong, race-competitors
who have won prizes in the speed of their feet. That man would not be
poor in possessions, to whom were given all these have won him,
nor be unpossessed of dearly honored gold, were he given
all the prizes Agamemnon´s horses won in their speed for him.)

Il. 9.266-69.

An elegant way to emphasize the value of the horses Agamemnon offers. The prizes that they have won bracket--verbatim: (-oi) aethlia possin aronto--the expanded unit. Each of the bracketing lines refers to the animals under discussion: (hippous) pēgous athlophorous, hippoi. The value of the prizes to the horses´ owner is highlighted in the middle two lines. That these two lines are identical in purport is marked at both their beginning and their ends: ou[de] ken + a-privative,

followed by virtual rhyme in genoito and chrusoio. Aleios and aktēmon are, moreover, virtual synonyms.

Nor are devices of diction in Odysseus's speech limited to the list of gifts. The following lines mark extremely nicely an argument based on patterned non-volitional results.

(4) autōi toi ¦ metopisth' ¦ achos essetai, ¦ oude ti mēchos
rhechthentos ¦ kakou est' ¦ akos heurein: ¦ alla polu
prin

(It will be an affliction to you hereafter, there will be no
remedy
found to heal the evil thing when it has been done. No,
beforehand . . .)

Il. 9.249-250.

The effect centers on the identical metrical placement of the nearly homonymous antonyms, achos (grief, affliction), and akos (remedy). Phonetic similarity is confined to the neighborhood of the virtual homonyms: both are preceded by a syllable containing a short, front vowel followed by a sibilant and a dental, aspirated where the following guttural is aspirated, non-aspirated where the following guttural is not aspirated. In both lines, elision bridges the penthemimeral caesura, the lost vowels completing an e-i pair with the vowel in the preceding syllable. Both near homonyms are followed by a verb that begins with epsilon (one in a diphthong), but now aspiration is reversed. Ch is followed by smooth breathing, k by rough breathing. Colometrically, the lines are identical: trithemimeral and penthemimeral caesurae and bucolic diaereseis. Both phrases after the diaereseis are enjambed quite necessarily, and both begin new clauses. The only metrical

difference is in the fourth foot: the verb in the first line is dactylic, in the second, spondaic. Close metrical and phonetic parallels link the two centers of the argument--grief and remedy--while the differences, governed by the phonetic differences between the two key nouns, emphasize the contrast that marks the impossibility of the one given the other: future achos from present failure to act will preclude any akos.

Odysseus's speech does not amplify arguments based on interrelations through complex dictional means, but other speeches addressed to Achilles use similar devices in connection with this argument. Consider Nestor's speech to Achilles and Agamemnon.

(5) hoi peri men boulēn Danaōn, peri d' este machesthai
alla pithesth': amphō de neōterō eston emeio.

(you, who surpass all Danaans in council, in fighting.
Yet be persuaded. Both of you are younger than I am . . .)

Il. 1.258-259.

In these lines, Nestor acknowledges that the aretē of the squabbling heroes is preeminent in word and deed, but he presses at the same time his own "right" to be persuasive on the grounds of his greater age. The two lines emphasize unity through metrical (but not colometric) identity; contrast is announced semantically, however, as soon as the second line begins (alla). The first line shows some assonance in its final two feet: the arsis in both feet falls on an e followed by a sibilant and a dental mute (one aspirated, the other not). The second line, however, immediately gives assonance a new twist. The arsis of

the second foot repeats exactly the arsis of the previous line's sixth foot and binds two "opposites" closely together: machesthai, pithesthe. For the hearer, opposite placement in the metrical line results in as close a collocation of the two verbs as possible. The first two syllables of the first line's fifth foot are duplicated even more strikingly in the same foot in the second line. The very same verb is repeated, second person plural in line one, second person dual in line two, the change in number apparently due to metrical requirements. Verbal identity has already been anticipated for a foot and a half: Dana-/de nē-, -ōn peri/-ōterō. Identity commingles with reversal. The "younger men" in the second line are in the same position, socially as well as metrically, as the Danaans in the first: subordinates called upon to recognize greater aretē. Yet the metrically identical comparatives--the adverb peri and the suffix -terō (final ō read short by correption)--serve opposite purposes. The adverb indicates preeminence, the suffix subordinance, and the repeated verb emphasizes that it is the same persons who participate in both comparative situations: Achilles and Agamememnon are both superior in word and deed and younger, hence called upon to obey Nestor. The superior subject in the second relationship is not specified until the final word, emeio, the speaker. It stands at the opposite extreme from the subordinates, indicated by the relative pronoun at the head of the entire group. The persons involved bracket a system of two patterned relationships, one recognizing aretē (a relationship the heroes acknowledge by squabbling), the other

the persuasiveness of greater age. Dictional identity binds both patterns into a single overarching social structure: to be superior, Achilles and Agamemnon must at the same time be inferior.

The contrast is not lost once spoken. Having elaborated the second patterned relationship with an extended narrative that gathers added force through the device of extreme comparison (verses 260-73), Nestor resumes with an exact quote from line 259: alla pithesthe. He follows again with a pattern, this time with a patterned volitional act: epei peithesthai ameinon. Again, arsis falls on -esth-, but now the quantities of the three prior syllables are just the reverse of those at the beginning of the line. Both forms of peithein in line 274 are followed by three syllables, short-long-short, the first three particularizing and descriptive (kai hummes--"and you"), the last three generalizing and evaluative (ameinon--"better"). Then, relationships established, Nestor details recommended behavior. Once again, devices of identity and contrast dominate, but there is no need to detail them here.

Instead, let us identify the patterns according to which diction is used for rhetorical purposes in speeches to Achilles. First, verbatim repetition of the same word or compounded unit in close proximity--say, the same line--is generally avoided. Exceptions are, rather trivially, correlative particles whose entire syntactic effect is based on repetition (. . . te . . . te) and, somewhat less trivially, certain adverbials stressing magnitude--polurrēnes poluboutai (rich in cattle and . . . in

sheepflocks) (Il. 9.296)--and verbs stressing existence--esti toi . . . chrusos polus, esti de chalkos kai probat´ (there is abundant gold in your shelter, and there is bronze . . . and animals) (Il. 23.549-50). In the case of arguments based on patterned interactions, repetitions at one level of diction--phonetic, metrical, semantic--couple with differences at other levels to express and, as a result, to help establish the relationship involved. When the issue at hand is not patterned relations but the consequences of activity or the situation that sparked rhetorical activity, devices of diction that do not repeat verbatim make for a greater and more impressive whole by elaborating and relating the parts. In this context, adverbial and verbal repetition is no anomaly. It works toward the same elaborative end as the second sort of dictional activity just mentioned, that is, the construction of a greater whole.

Second, complex operations at the level of diction are not found continuously. They are limited to certain arguments and certain kinds of elaboration. For example, arguments based entirely on patterned volitional acts lack rhetorical activity on the level of diction, just as they lack argumentative elaboration (Il. 18.178-90; 24.503), and probably for the same reason. Narratives used to elaborate, too, generally display little rhetorical activity at this level. In narrative, devices of diction, especially complex ones, occur only in a narrower context. They occur only in that portion of the narrative that establishes relations between actors (Il. 9.529-32) or lists

various items (Il. 1.263-65). The general model of dictional practice sketched in the preceding paragraph accounts both for the general avoidance and for the specific appearances of complex devices of diction in narrative. Diction's uses are generally alien to sequential narration, for such narration does not express relation nor does it directly increase the magnitude of a whole by creating a more impressive assembly of parts, except in the special cases mentioned.

Finally, rhetorical activity at the level of diction is not an indepdendent but a supplementary activity. It does not wield persuasive force on its own, nor is it a necessary part of every speech. Some speeches, such as Priam's to Achilles in Iliad 24.486-506, contain few if any intricacies at the level of diction. A residual amount of phonetic and metrical activity, when not virtually accidental, may derive from the poetic medium and the poet's own store of formulae. Many adjective-noun combinations, for example, exhibit a degree of assonance that may have helped fix them as formulae in the first place.[1] Moreover, complex dictional activity does not always occur where we might expect it. For example, one relatively common means of

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[1]Consider, for example, the adjectives that accompany the seven cities which, Agamemnon promises, will honor Achilles like a god:

> Kardamylēn Enopēn te kai Hirēn poiēessan
> Phēras te zatheas ēd' Antheian bathylemon
> kalēn t' Aipeian kai Pēdason ampeloessan.
> Iliad 9.292-94

On the appropriateness of epithets not to sound but to a topic of more customary interest to Homeric scholars, the characters of the poet's personae, see Whallon.

introducing an argumentative alternative or complement is rather crude from the point of view of the rhetorical use of diction: the alternative or complement is placed, almost as an afterthought, at the head of the next line in an instance of unnecessary enjambement (e.g., Il. 9.522-23, 544-45; 16.33-34, 34-35; 19.81-82).

In sum, urgent situations in the Iliad may move speakers to engage in rhetorical activity on the level of diction as well as on the levels of argument and elaboration, particularly when the speaker has decided not to elaborate by means of sequential narration. But even when devices of diction are most common, they are never more than occasional supplements to the force of arguments and argumentative elaboration.

Arrangement

Like amplification at the level of diction and unlike argument and argumentative elaboration, the arrangement of arguments transcends the bounds of the individual unit. Characteristic arrangements in speeches addressed to Achilles bear certain significant similarities to activity at the level of diction in the same speeches, for the speaker attempts to actualize the same persuasive power in two somewhat similar arenas. But the peculiar characteristics of arrangement produce differences as well. Unlike diction, arrangement cannot be an occasional supplement to argument. Whenever a speech includes more than one argument, the arguments must be arranged. Again unlike diction, arrangement cannot discriminate among the arguments it

will touch. Arrangement's similarities with diction are very real, but they are confined to the forms that arrangement assumes, or actually to the operations that underlie the concrete forms.

Odysseus's speech assumes one possible arrangement, but the balance leans so heavily to the first appearance of each argument that the overarching ring composition is almost obscured.[1] The fulcrum of the speech rests--where else?--squarely with Agamemnon's gifts. The innermost ring asserts the timē that Achilles might obtain from all the Achaians, elaborated in its first appearance by the narrative of Peleus's advice (Il. 9.252-59; 302-3). The next ring consists of remarks about what must be done: save the ships, since there is no future remedy for harm done now/act now and you will win great kudos (247-51; 303). The outermost ring appeals most specifically to the situation that demands action: Hektor threatens to cut off the prows and set fire to the ships/Hektor rages near the ships and boasts that no Achaian is his match (229-46; 304-6). The first appearances of the three rings occupy a combined total of thirty and two-thirds lines; the

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[1]Ring composition is, of course, a widely recognized stylistic device in early Greek literature. In addition to Lohmann, see, among many possibilities, W. A. A. van Otterlo, Untersuchungen über Begriff, Anwendung, und Entstehung der griechischen Ringkomposition, Mededeelingen der Nederlandsche Akademie van Wetenschappen, afd. Letterkunde, n.s. 7, no. 3 (Amsterdam, 1944), and, more generally, B. A. van Groningen, La composition littéraire archaïque grecque. Procédés et réalisations, Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, afd. Letterkunde, n.s. 65, no. 2 (Amsterdam, 1958).

mirroring second appearances occupy a mere four and a third.

Notice the subtle transition that occurs in the direction of the arguments. Before Odysseus recites the list of Agamemnon's gifts, arguments had been directed toward the speaker, his friends, and the benefits they hoped to receive from Achilles. Even Peleus's advice, allegedly for Achilles's benefit, had taken the form of restraint framed in rebuke. With Agamemnon's gifts, the rhetorical focus shifts to Achilles and the benefits he will receive, and there it remains. Timē from the Achaians leaves rebuke and restraint behind and now parallels Agamemnon's gifts (302-3). The raging Hektor is no longer so much a threat to the assembled armies as a personal challenge to Achilles. A similar transition in focus from the speaker to the person addressed occurs more starkly in Ajax's brief speech as the last of Agamemnon's legates, a speech that also exhibits ring composition:

A. Command (to Odysseus): We must go back and report even though it's unpleasant (grounded in social relations) (Il. 9.625-28)

B. Current state (to Odysseus): Achilles is immovable; he has forgotten how we friends honored (etiomen) him (628-32).

C. Extreme, paradigmatic case: Recompense is received for a slain kinsman (632-36).

B.′ Current state (to Achilles): You, Achilles, are immovable, even though we offer the woman and more besides (636-39).

A.′ Command (to Achilles): Have a propitious thumos; respect your best friends (grounded in social relations) (639-42).

Notice, too, that even in the repetitive mode of ring composition, precise repetition never actually occurs. When a general theme (timē) or argumentative type (command, description, paradigm) recurs, the speaker uses the hinter side of the ring to explore new, previously unmentioned aspects of that theme or argument. The effect is a full and integrated speech. A further consequence of the lack of precise repetition is the absence of other repetitive modes of arrangement, such as the refrain.

Dieter Lohmann has pointed out that, besides the widely recognized ring-composition, another mode of arrangement, this one based on grouping, is also prevalent in Homeric speeches, including speeches to Achilles.[1] For example, Hektor wishes to preclude the mutilation of his corpse. His speech balances two warrants based on parental relationship and two requests for proper treatment:

I. A. I beseech you by your parents (Il. 22.338)
   B. Don't throw me to the dogs (339)
II. A. Accept gifts from my father and mother (340-41)
   B. Return my body for proper treatment (342-43).

Simple examples of parallelism also include Thetis's first speech in Iliad 19:

I. A. Let Patroklos lie (8-9)
   B. tamed by the gods (9)

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[1]Lohmann, pp. 30-40.

II. A. Put on these arms (10-11)

B. the like of which has never been seen (11),

and the river Skamander's address to Achilles:

I. A. You are preeminent (Il. 21.214-15)

B. If you must kill Trojans, do so somewhere else (216-17)

II. A. I am choked and can't flow to the sea (218-20)

B. Quit killing incessantly (221).

If ring composition groups several arguments about a common center, parallels are built about a relation between two sides of the same general argument: don't throw me to the dogs, return me to my family; let Patroklos lie, take up your arms and fight. In both cases, arrangement's general task is to highlight relations between arguments and various aspects of argument, just as diction helps mark relations between parts and integrates them into a greater whole. These concerns with relations largely preclude, in turn, any rhetorical use of free association. Not only do most speeches contain some amount of parallelism or ring composition; the "rhetorical movement" found in almost every speech provides order for the marshaling of arguments. As addressed to Achilles, the suasory speech ends, by preference, with a positive, imperative reference to Achilles himself. Movement may be from speaker and associates to addressee (e.g., the speeches of Odysseus and Ajax in Iliad 9), from negative to positive command (e.g., Hektor in Iliad 22 above)--never from positive to negative--or, most commonly, from

some reference to the present situation, whether descriptive, imperative, or generalizing, to an imperative related to future action (e.g., Thetis's speech in Iliad 19 outlined above). Only very infrequently does general movement run from addressee to speaker, as when the river Skamander gives final place to his own interests, not Achilles's, perhaps because he is divine.

Like diction, then, arrangement shuns repetition. Once stated and elaborated, an argument does not gain force by being stated again, or elaborated in the same way. Likewise, arrangement shuns juxtaposition. The full force of a speech is not much amplified simply by juxtaposing other arguments of similar stature. Full amplification occurs by highlighting relations between parts and integrating them into greater, encompassing wholes. In joining arguments by parallelism if their relation is binary, by ring composition if they somehow surround a center, speakers highlight the overtones of the basic argument.[1] They thus provide fuller and more forceful statements of the argumentative resources at their disposal, culminating by preference in a final, pointed statement of their requests or commands.

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[1]An analogy, not entirely inappropriate given later Greek interest in the mathematics of pitch, expresses nicely the effects of rhetorical arrangement in speeches to Achilles. Organ stops, operating as discrete units, produce a fuller sound not so much when different stops of the same pitch, say, three or four 8′ stops, are combined indiscriminately--diapason, reed, flute, and bourdon--as when they highlight overtones appropriate to the initial stop, say, 4′, 2′, 2 2/3′, and 1 3/5′ stops, alone or in combination, and various mixtures. The arrangement of arguments addressed to Achilles is much the same. Speakers avoid merely juxtaposing arguments of similar rank and highlight qualitative relations instead.

Hektor and Agamemnon

Before I weave together the isolated strands of argument and elaboration, diction and arrangement, it is necessary to know the pattern according to which to weave. Are these strands peculiar to attempts to persuade Achilles, or do they constitute a broader cloth? Is Odysseus's speech typical of rhetoric in the Iliad as a whole, or is it merely part of an extraordinary and unique verbal activity evoked by the extremities surrounding Achilles's character? Persuasional speeches addressed to Achilles's Greek and Trojan adversaries, Agamemnon and Hektor, suggest that rhetoric in the Iliad is homogeneous, that speeches designed to persuade Achilles do essentially what other persuasional speeches do, although matching the extremity of the situation, they do it on a larger scale.

The situations that move companions to try to persuade Agamemnon and Hektor are not generally so extreme as those resulting from Achilles's implacability. Not that there is less danger. In some ways these speeches address threats that are more immediately pending. For example, Priam and Hekuba plead with Hektor as he is about to fight Achilles in single combat before the very gates of Troy. But underlying relationships--philotēs, parent-child, husband-wife--are not themselves threatened. The relative stability of these relationships, coupled with emotional urgency, actually seems to allow harsher words than the ticklish conundrum that Achilles's behavior poses. Compare Odysseus's and Diomedes's remarks to Agamemnon (Il. 14.83-102 and 9.32-49, respectively) and

Poulydamas's and Glaukos's remarks to Hektor (Il. 12.211-29 and 17.142-68). But harsh words are ambiguous: apparently grounded in the solidity of philotēs, they may also signal its disintegration. That, at least, would seem to be the lesson of the abuse that Achilles and Agamemnon level at one another (Il. 1).

But although relationships hold firm, communication does not result in immediate obedience. There is still room for dispute about, for example, the best means to meet common ends: should the Trojans be so bold as to sleep outside the walls when Achilles no longer holds himself from battle? Speakers do not engage in a "rational" discussion of pros and cons. They invoke values and ideals, and they seek to persuade by actualizing the power of peithesthai in much the same way that persons addressing Achilles do. No persuasional speech to Hektor or Agamemnon rivals Phoinix's 172 lines (Il. 9.434-605), but the differences are largely differences of quantity. Aside from more overt expressions of anger, rhetorical activity follows the familiar patterns.

Nestor's first speech to Agamemnon in Iliad 9 is a convenient example. Diction is not overly ornate. We find, for example, the familiar "unelaborated" pairs constructed by reserving second elements for the beginnings of subsequent lines in instances of unnecessary enjambement (53-54, 55-56). But more careful activity on the level of diction is not lacking, either. Lines 69-70 balance commands and warrants about the trochaic caesura:

Atreide, su men arche: ¦ su gar basileutatos essi
dainu daita gerousin: ¦ eoike toi, ou toi aeikes.

(do you, son of Atreus, take command, since you are our kingliest.
Divide a feast among the princes; it befits you, it is not unbecoming.)

The second warrant also shows both metrical and semantic symmetry about ou, along with a great deal of phonetic echoing. And then, Nestor indicts that person who stirs up internecine strife with an almost curse-like repetition:

aphrētōr athemistos anestios estin ekeinos

(Out of all brotherhood, outlawed, homeless is that man)

(63; translation slightly altered)

Successive a-privatives occupy every possible metrical position, just as "that man" cuts himself off from every possible social relation. Repeated "st," preceded by e/i, emphatically unites the three central words.[1]

The arguments that Nestor advances rest squarely on patterned interactions: speech as related to age; governing and hosting as related to socio-political status (basileutatos) (69). But these arguments receive noticeably little elaboration. Perhaps since patterned interactions are not threatened, Nestor feels it is sufficient merely to recall, not

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[1]Similarly, ē repeated at every arsis emphatically marks denial in Agamemnon's oath:

mē pote / tēs eun/ēs epi/bēmenai / ēde mi/gēnai

(that he never entered into her bed and never lay with her)
Iliad 9.133=275.

to reestablish them. Still, comparison with the previous speaker does underscore Nestor's status, and that position gains further support by a fleeting but not insignificant hint of another patterned interaction, the interaction between father and son (57-58). For its part, the mandate to host finds backing in what amounts to a "proto-narrative" (71-72).

More elaborate is activity in the arena of arrangement. There is a general movement from the situation of speaker to the situation of audience, paralleled by a shift in the person addressed from preceding speaker (Diomedes) to representative of the audience (Agamemnon). The first section of the speech establishes the rhetorical context by linking two parallel sets through an elaborate contrast:

1. Diomedes, you surpass your age-mates in battle and in counsel (53-54);
2. No one will find fault with your speech (55-56);
3. But (atar) your speech doesn't run to its end (telos) (56);
4. You are young; you could be my youngest son (57-58);
5. Still (atar) you argue well (kata moiran) (58-59);
6. But I will speak out, who am older (60-61);
7. No one will dishonor my speech, not even Agamemnon (61-62).

The relations between the extremes are parallel (1:2::6:7), but the contrast between the two sets is effected by an elaborate series: 2 contrasts with 3, 3 with 5, 5 with 6, and as a result, (1,2) contrasts with (6,7). The focus of the contrast,

age, stands at the very center of the section in a sentence that stands outside, but in the middle of, the series of contrasting members and encapsulates within itself the contrast between the two extremes: you are young, I am old (4).

The remainder of the speech consists of an overarching ring-composition whose details are organized in binary groups:

A. Internal Situation (63-66)

1. Statement--destructive overtones, gnomic
2. Command--integrative overtones, present situation

B. Commands--present situation (cp. age distinction in preceding section) (66-73)

1. To young men
2. To Agamemnon, on behalf of old men (with argument in ring composition)

A.′ External Situation--impending (74-78)

2.′ Command--constructive response
1.′ Statement--destructive overtones, immanent future.

Of course, we might expect a polished performance from the old man whose speech flowed sweeter than honey (Il. 1.249), especially when that old man announces he will outdo a younger speaker who has spoken well for his age. But rhetorical activity in the mouths of unaccomplished speakers is of similar stamp. In Iliad 11, the two sons of Antimachos plead for their lives. Their brief, and unsuccessful, five lines show a budding ring composition: addresses to Agamemnon bracket the speech, the first an honorific that establishes the rhetorical situation, the second the specific request--movement from present description to future-directed imperative that is

typical. The middle, although brief, presents in nuce an argument from consequences worthy of any that, for example, Agamemnon himself directs to Achilles. That argument, bracketed by apoina at the end of initial and final lines (131, 135), shows the normal devices of diction: d´ axia dexai (131), keimēlia keitai (132), chalkos te chrusos te ¦ polykmētos te sidēros (133). Line 133 elaborates the argument with a modest list.

Speeches that aim to persuade Hektor are similar. Consider, for example, Sarpedon´s battle speech in Iliad 5. Arrangement is according to ring composition, and once again the speech moves from description of past and present to future-oriented command:

A. Hektor and Trojans (472-76)

1. Once you boasted not to need allies
2. Now your troops are nowhere to be seen

B. Allies (477-84)

1. We allies fight, who come from afar
2. Lykia, the location of all we hold dear, is far away

1.´ Even so, I urge my men on

A.´ Hektor and Trojans (485-92)

2.´ You do nothing and command no one
1.´ Commands:
   a. Don´t be taken as spoils
   b. Keep these things in mind constantly and avoid reproach.

Actually, in this speech diction is relatively under-developed. I find nothing more elaborate than parallel verbs before midline caesura and line end (pheroien, agoien) (484), or two successive

lines with similar beginnings that connect two sides of the same coin (the two parts of A.´1.´): hoi de (trochaic) and soi de (spondaic) (489-90).

What is interesting in this speech, however, is its argument, as well as its argumentative elaboration. Arguments are based in part on consequences, in part on patterned interactions. The patterned interactions may have a social basis, but they have become especially applicable from statements made elsewhere by the person addressed. Boast at the beginning and insult at the end point to a world of interactions that is peculiarly Hektor´s--peculiarly Hektor´s, that is, in the events of the poem. Achilles´s concerns are material (timē, geras). In the case of Achilles, patterned interactions are the concerns of society and the gods (his destiny). Hektor´s concerns are more verbal and interactional: kleos (fame, report) and aidōs (shame, respect)--compare Hektor´s own speeches in Iliad 6.441-65; 7.67-91, 288-302; 17.220-32. These concerns motivate him in turn to impose on himself, through public (verbal) and private (psychological) activity, certain behavioral expectations, expectations that in the end he cannot meet. His failure is his death.

To elaborate this argument, the device of extreme comparison is put to good use. Because the speaker himself is the casus extremus, the effect must be especially pointed for a person concerned above all with "what people will say." Comparison directly confronts Hektor with what he dreads most. Listing helps emphasize the dearness of distant Lykia (480-81).

Most remarkable, however, is an elaborative device found only one other time in persuasional speeches addressed to Achilles, Agamemnon, and Hektor (see Il. 2.800). Here there are not one but two similes, one from the animal world, "as dogs in the presence of a lion" (476), another from the human world, "as if captured in the mesh of an all-catching net" (487). These similes seem to violate what had been a rather neat pattern of argumentative elaboration, a pattern that limited comparison almost entirely to other social interactions and interrelations, in a word, to social comparisons and paradigms.

Actually, Sarpedon's similes are genuine exceptions. Aside from abuse that degrades one's opponent in subhuman terms--"dog-face," "deer-hearted," and so on--extremely few natural similes are set in persuasional speeches, including those speeches addressed to other heroes than Achilles, Agamemnon, and Hektor. For example, of the great number of natural similes constructed with hōs, "as," only eight appear in speeches other than Sarpedon's, and of these eight, only two occur in the context of persuasion (Il. 12.167-71 and 18.438 [=18.57, non-persuasional]). Natural similes in speeches that aim to persuade require not an altered general model but an explanation of peculiarities--if, in fact, they do not simply represent an infection of the speech by the style of narration that the poet uses elsewhere.

One might suggest several possible explanations. None of the similes appear in persuasional speeches spoken by Greeks, but the differences in practice between Greek and Trojan

rhetoric are not so pronounced or so consistent as to justify identifying here hints of a "proto-Asiatic" oratorical style. The force of several similes seems to derive from a desire to express the fact that normal human orders have been violated or transcended, a sentiment often more appropriately expressed (from a Greek audience's point of view) by Trojans referring to Greeks than by Greeks referring to barbarians: a host the like of which has never before been seen may well resemble leaves or grains of sand (Il. 2.799-800); an army's unexpected success may be compared to wasps swarming from a nest (Il. 12.167-71); fighting men who shrink from battle resemble cowardly dogs (Il. 5.476). Does the same explanation hold good when Thetis refers to nurturing Achilles like a young tree that shot up quickly (Il. 18.437-38)? Whatever one makes of Sarpedon's admonition to avoid being taken as if caught in a net, by itself this simile hardly overthrows an otherwise general pattern that limits rhetorical comparison to social interrelations and interactions, except where the violation of patterned interrelations and interactions is precisely the point. Here, as elsewhere, persuasional speeches addressed to Hektor and Agamemnon follow patterns familiar from persuasion addressed to Achilles. In weaving together strands that were previously isolated, we confront nothing less than a rhetoric that characterizes the Iliad's vision of Achaian society in its entirety.

Persuasion in the Iliad

Power effects change. The ability to effect change--power in

potentiality--characterizes sets of interrelations. The effecting of change--power in actuality--operates within sets of interactions. The means of persuasion in a given case actualize, or attempt to actualize, that form of power appropriate to the rhetorical situation.

Within Homeric society, the prime medium of power is the spoken word. Persuasion is both the mark and the source of social order. Operating smoothly, the units of Homeric society--both the oikos and larger, more tenuous associations--stand under the sign of the verb peithesthai--"to do as someone has spoken," "to 'obey.'" The occurrence of immediately successful persuasion demonstrates concretely the interrelations that exist, the abstracted potentialities that constitute social structure. "Thus spoke Achilles, and Patroklos 'obeyed' his dear companion (philoi hetairoi)." But communication preliminary to social activity is more than the mark of social structure. "Peithesthai" itself creates the total set of interactions that constitute society in actuality. The centrality of this constituting activity is indicated by reactions to that realm where immediate persuasion does not and cannot occur, the realm of the inimical. The inimical threatens the orders of persuasion and the existence they foster. The threat evokes a reaction in kind: machesthai, not peithesthai; violence in deed, not power in word; destruction of the threatening other, not application of the effective power of persuasion.

The power marked by peithesthai is social power. Its

effects extend only to human beings in interaction and to those who are capable of interacting in the manner of human beings, that is, to personal divinities. The power of "peithesthai" is also systemic. Individual occurrences are of little value in isolation. They gain significance only as they combine to form a web of occurrences, the core of a society whose fringes are more or less frayed. Third, the power of peithesthai is relational. Persuasion only alters persons insofar as they participate in social interactions; it cannot of itself create or destroy them. Finally, the power marked by peithesthai is economical. Repeated actualizations may result in repeated performance of the same act, but when a society operates smoothly, a single act requires no more than a single actualization of "peithesthai." Achilles does not need to ask Patroklos more than once.

The economy of peithesthai in actuality is replicated in the structures that it produces. Positions of prominence--those persons who unite in potential (aretē) systems of relational power coextensive with webs that define social units--are designated by the superlative. There is and can be only one true aristos for every oikos; there is and can be only one anax, only one basileutatos, just as there can be only one aristos with respect to a particular aretē (cp. the games).

It is in this context that attempts at persuasion must be understood. When tension erupts, peithesthai yields to peithein, "he 'obeys'" to "I persuade." In attempting to induce social actions that ideally result from mere communication, the

speaker resorts to communicative activity to establish or re-establish the patterns and activities that in their present form have proved insufficiently persuasive. The speaker attempts, that is, to actualize the potential power of peithesthai. Within the formal constraints of the communicative medium, the nature of this power determines the results.

Homeric speakers adopt two main strategies. First, they attempt to shore up interactional patterns that demand desired behavior. Alternately, or concurrently, they attempt to make persuasion profitable in the economics of power: to exchange an increase in potential persuasive power for a particular capitulation to power in actuality. Of the dimensions of communication, meaning--argument--is that dimension most suited to serve as a vehicle for these rhetorical efforts: by virtue of the property of reference, meanings can define the actions that constitute the telos of rhetorical activity and describe both the persons who take part in those actions and the webs of potentiality in which those persons stand. As a result, manipulations of meaning--arguments--stand at the center of the Iliad's rhetoric.

The variety of arguments that fortify interactional patterns corresponds to the various dimensions of those patterns. Patterned volitional acts relate to the interactional standing of the addressee; patterned nonvolitional results relate to the events at which persuasion aims; while patterned interrelations relate to the speaker or to those who, like the speaker, stand in the position of Other to the addressee: "we

are your friends." Arguments from consequence, for their part, generally attempt to readjust the economics or power, either directly--by promising gifts or invoking positive benefits that will accrue to the addressee through "obedience"--or indirectly--by pointing to the harmful effects of "disobedience" on those who occupy places in the addressee's webs of power, on those, that is, in whom the addressee has an interest.

But the active, explicit statement of that which operates implicitly under the sign of peithesthai has its limits. The stature of an interactional pattern can be increased by recounting the previous occurrences of peithesthai--the past events--that produced this particular pattern (narration). Consequences can be detailed to the extent that the audience's toleration will allow (listing). But once an argument has been stated and amplified, the economical nature of power intervenes. Repeated, identical occurrences within the same speech add no further persuasive force. When greater power is desired, speakers take recourse to power's systemic character. They attempt to invoke not isolated patterns or simple transactions but entire webs of potentialities that lend persuasiveness to their claims.

Still within the context of argumentative elaboration, speakers may set the claims at issue within broader, generic contexts (comparison). The need for fuller power gives preference to extreme statements of the broader pattern, instances that may, as may any single patterned instance, be further amplified by narration (the paradigm). Here, too, is

the reason for the relative dearth of the natural simile. The extrapersonal realm stands outside power's reach. Natural similes can in general be put to good effect only when speakers wish to place the topics at hand outside the social realm.

Since the purpose of invoking more than a single argument is to call into play an interconnected web of power, true parataxis is less than satisfactory as a way of arranging arguments. To harness the specific web's full effect, the speaker needs somehow to convey the impression that these various arguments are indeed related, that they all surround the same point. Moreover, the sound of words need not be neglected altogether. In itself, diction may not be able to refer to interactions and interrelations directly, but it can contribute to the cause. Activity at the level of diction can help convey the impression of an interconnected systemic web, an impression essential to the persuasive power of all expansions of the simple argument except one, the narrative.

These rhetorical activities remain squarely within the bounds of personal interaction. Two components of the Homeric personality, noos and thumos, provide the windows into the personal agent that make persuasion possible. Whatever the details of their operation--Homer is somewhat vague--these deliberative and (e)motive faculties direct the activity of the individual hero. Open to the effects of verbal perception, noos and thumos mediate between the rhetorical activity of the speaker and the resulting activity of the hero addressed. Just as the activity of persuasion marks the actual bounds

externally, the operations of noos and thumos mark internally the potential bounds for the effects of social power.

Rhetoric, then, attempts to actualize and to direct for specific ends the power implicit in the interactions of Homeric society. But as portrayed in the Iliad, rhetorical practice presents us with an apparent paradox. The longest and most fully developed speeches frequently fail; shorter speeches have a better record of success. This observation leads us away from rhetoric discussed as a general praxis to the poetic--to the dramatic and, if you will, to the tragic. The Iliad confronts the power of peithesthai not with the inimical but with a force that destroys within society as well as without, achos (grief) and cholos (anger), a force embodied, in fact, in the person of the aristos most indispensable to the continuation of the society (of Greeks) constituted by peithesthai, Achilles. The Iliad reveals, and in doing so in some sense actualizes, the "awe-ful" character of power, of society, and of the non-human persons inhabiting this world, the gods. But this line of reasoning leads to a separate study, to the rhetoric of the poets themselves. I have not yet finished with the portrayal of rhetoric within the poems; I have not yet finished with epic persuasion. The distinctive character of the Iliad's power is seen most clearly if we contrast it with quite a different style of rhetorical practice, persuasion in the Rāmāyana. Once we have contrasted the powers of persuasion in the two epics, we will then be in a position to see that in both epics the power of persuasion is a fundamental, religious reality.

CHAPTER THREE

PERSUADING RĀMA AND OTHER BEINGS

Destruction reigns. The ruse has worked. Rāvana holds Sītā. In anger Rāma lashes out, first at Laksmana, then the world. The threat? "I will annihilate the universe" (Rām. 3.60.52d). "Laksmana speaks with folded hands and shriveled face."

Immediately we move in a world different from Homer's. Persuasion works, sometimes. The universe, after all, is still here. Verbal action initiated by one person (Laksmana) is still able to alter self-controlled interactions and interrelations on the part of another (Rāma). But the context and content of rhetorical praxis--what in the preceding chapter I called its statics and dynamics--have changed. Speakers persuade in a different key, a key whose signature is a different sort of power: natural, individual, creative/destructive, and repetitive. Again I turn first to statics, the context of persuasion.

The Word as Act

Unlike the Iliad, the Rāmāyana does not bisect the universe of interactions and interrelations into words and deeds. The universe of deeds--karmāni, "things done"--is broader here than in Homer.

The Iliad assigns "deeds" to encounters in which the standing of an aristos is threatened from without. Aristoi parry dangers to their households because the significance of the oikos renders such dangers threats to the aristoi themselves. In the Rāmāyaṇa, even the distinctive actions of the kṣatriya (the "warrior") are not solely or even primarily antagonistic. According to classical formulation, the kṣatriya must "protect the people, bestow gifts, offer sacrifices, study, and abstain from attachment to sensual pleasure."[1] When Rāma slays Vālin while Vālin is fighting Sugrīva, Rāma tries to justify an act that the Indian tradition has generally found morally perplexing. His attempts at justification show the extent to which even "antagonistic" acts differ from those in the context of the Iliad. As an emissary of the "earth-lord" (pārthiva)--whose realm, unlike the oikos, knows no "outsider"--Rāma must act, he says, on behalf of and in accordance with dharma. He must punish dharma's infractor as prescribed, and he must remain truthful to his promise to Sugrīva (Rām. 4.18.4-39). There is no personal gain as motivation here, no timē, no kleos. The "warrior" --paradigmatically, the king, "protector of men" (nṛpa), "lord of the earth" (mahīpati), and "relative of the world" (bandhur lokasya)--acts to further the flourishing of his subjects, the universal offspring (prajā) and above all to preserve the universal principle of order, dharma. Acts of violence, whether

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[1] Mānavadharmaśāstra 1.89.

directed to other (morally competent) beings (battle) or to nature (sacrifice), are only some of the actions by which dharma is preserved and flourishing secured. The others include words (e.g., satya); for in the "orthodox" Indian tradition, the word is the act par excellence.

To make sense of these differences requires a brief excursion into metaphysics and morality, the latter explicit in the Rāmāyaṇa, the former only implicit.

In the Iliad, power resides in actual social interactions. The aretē that defines the aristos is excellence in actuality; the hero has aretē only when he has succeeded vis à vis others. By contrast, the Rāmāyaṇa locates power not in the social hero actualized but in the great "individual" (mahātmaṅ).[1] That

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[1]Let me be absolutely clear on what I do and do not mean by using the word "individual." What I mean to say is that power is individuated; that power is found in discrete entities of potential, what I refer to very shortly as distinct "pockets of being." Several points are pertinent.

First, I am referring to power as potentiality, power as it precedes action, not as it is revealed in action. I will suggest below that the relations between potentiality and actuality in the Rāmāyaṇa are just the reverse of what they are in the Iliad. For Vālmīki, potentiality is prior; for Homer, actuality is prior.

Second, this power is found in discrete entities. Perhaps only when Brahmā identifies Rāma himself as the highest puruṣa (Rām. 6.105) does Vālmīki display any hints at all of a universal Brahman. More generally, power is confined to individuated ātmānaḥ.

Third, and most important, such an individuation of potential precludes "individuality" in the realm of the actual. It is well known that Indian literature generally lacks any sense of the unique, individual personality, and the Rāmāyaṇa would be a most unlikely place to search for exceptions. The concern for manifesting individual--individuated, if you prefer--bhāvāḥ ("pockets of being," but also "characters") gives to Indian literature a preference for depicting persons who exemplify these potentials to the greatest extent possible: an ideal king, an "ideal" demon, an ideal wife, an ideal brother.

individual is preeminently an invisible, and to that extent, "potential," "pocket of being" (bhāva) that precedes and conditions any particular occurrence. In the Rāmāyaṇa, great acts do not constitute and establish one's preeminent nature; they demonstrate or manifest it.

The Iliad's interest in actuality directs attention to distinguishing the major modes of actual social interaction: words and deeds. Again by contrast, the Rāmāyaṇa places any encounter of being with being under the same sign, but a sign with two dimensions, active direction (kṛ: karman) and passive reception (bhuj: bhojana, "enjoyment," "experience"). Whenever one being impinges upon another in any way, action occurs. Words, then, cannot be entirely distinct from deeds; the word is instead a type of act. But words are more than just acts like any other act. Other acts must employ other beings as instruments; in words, being addresses being apart from the mediation of any other being. Thus, the word is the preeminent act.

Of course, Homer and Vālmīki are poets, not metaphysicians. The closest the Rāmāyaṇa comes to stating the priority of the potential explicitly is the conversation with Jābāli (Rām.

Individuality becomes possible only where, as with Homer, that which actually occurs defines who a person is.

As I am using the term here, the antithesis to "individual" is not "typical" but "systemic." The notion of a plurality of individuated bhāvāḥ or ātmānaḥ is not altogether unlike Sāṃkhya's notion of an infinite number of distinct puruṣāḥ, as opposed to Vedanta's subsumption of all individuals into a pervasive substrate (brahman). But, as the following note indicates, Vālmīki has no interest in Sāṃkhya's recounting of characteristics (saṃkhyāna).

2.100-101), and Jābāli's views are designed to be merely heterodox, not metaphysically profound. But although the Rāmāyana stands at the fount of Indian belles lettres (kāvya), it does not precede formalizing reflection on values and practices. Metaphysics may, like its subject matter, be hidden in speech and action; morality is manifest. Vālmīki clearly depicts interactions and interrelations within the context of the familiar trivarga, dharma, artha (success), and kāma (pleasure)--not altogether inappropriate in a work that has been called a dharmaśāstra in kāvya guise--and in working this triad he has the major opposition between sukha (well-being, happiness) and duhkha/śoka (ill-being, misery) in view.

Properly speaking, sukha is the aim of both kāma and artha. To the extent that these two are valid ends of life, the pursuit of sukha cannot be gainsaid. But the Rāmāyana's plurality of values is not smoothly integrated in actuality. The excessive pursuit of sukha--lobha, "grasping"--inverts either kāma or artha. "Virtues," if you will, become vices. The Rāmāyana abounds in noteworthy examples. Not only is excessive kāma one of Rāvana's distinctive characteristics. Rāma essentialily declares kāma the chief of vices when he reflects upon his father's motives in banishing Rāma (Rām. 2.47; esp. ś. 9). Vālmīki never disguises the desire for artha that motivates Kaikeyī's demands. In general, duhkha and śoka are to be avoided, but as far as kāma and artha are concerned, it is definitely possible to have, or rather, to wish to have, too much of a good thing.

The limits of kāma and artha are established by the third member of the triad, dharma. Here the relation to sukha--I confine my observations to the ksatriya of highest rank--is more complex. "Happiness," in the sense of the sukha of others, is one of dharma's aims. The king must act for the benefit of his subjects. But as the entire Rāmāyaṇa emphasizes, from Rāma's banishment to the final renunciation of Sītā, one's own sukha may be a necessary casualty of the performance of dharma. Oddly enough, dharma may even require a king to abandon the sukha of his subjects. Despite all pleas, Rāma insists on retiring to the forest to insure the truth of his father's word. His decision reflects the competing dharmic interrelations in which the heroes of the poem participate, relations with family, with subjects, and with the venerable ancestors.

There is no fixed rank among these relations. Interests of family do not always precede those of subjects. In the end, Rāma attempts to reject Sītā. Nor are there formal, recognized methods for adjudicating conflicting requirements of dharma, such as Indian grammarians possess for applying conflicting grammatical sūtras: nityatvādi ("for example, permanence," the principle according to which the sūtra that applies everywhere is applied first). The preferred choice, however, seems to be governed by an inverse relation to sukha, a principle we might call "asukhatva" ("non-sukha-ness"). By this principle, that option is preferred that least threatens to confound dharma with sukha, that maximizes the distance from the self-directed ends of artha and kāma and thus removes the agent as far as possible

from the threat that action apparently motivated by dharma will actually result from kāma and artha. In abandoning the interests of his subjects, Rāma abandons his own artha, too, in order to dwell in Dandaka forest. If preserving his father's truthfulness had resulted in great prosperity for Rāma himself but misery for his subjects, it is not clear that performing the command--or even the command itself--would have accorded with dharma.

The notion of asukhatva invites comparison once again with the Iliad, for although the Iliad precedes Aristotle's selection of "flourishing," eudaimonia, as the ultimate end of life, values expressed in the Iliad are consonant with that end, if not entirely with Aristotle's definitions. Given a choice between helping Agamemnon and personal timē, Achilles will choose the latter; Rāma, mutatis mutandis, the former.

But a comparative vision can range more widely here. The Rāmāyaṇa's broad notion of karmāṇi, like the Iliad's division of words and deeds, is mirrored in both the sociology and the psychology of the poet's imagined universe. Psychologically, the Iliad's living personality divides roughly about two poles, noos and thumos. The former is the source, although not always the recipient, of words, the latter the proximate source of deeds. India, of course, knows elaborate psychologies, but Vālmīki does not work them systematically. He attributes all acts, verbal and non-verbal, to a single active personality, the invisible ātman.[1] Sociologically, the Iliad's two forms of

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[1]Vālmīki shows no interest in subdividing the person into

interaction, words and deeds, correspond roughly to interactions within and outside society. In the Rāmāyaṇa the king's rule extends, in (the king's) theory, to all creatures. Conflict in the Iliad reflects the plurality of societies, of both oikoi and alliances. In the Rāmāyaṇa conflict reflects plurality not so much of agents as of values within a single society, within a single world: Kaikeyī as deluded in the pursuit of artha; Daśaratha as deluded in the pursuit of kāma.

We are swimming upstream. In India, the nature of being manifests itself in society and psyche, and asukhatva is metaphysics masquerading as moral principle. A being's character (bhāva) is not manifested by what a being is privileged to enjoy but by what it itself does, quite apart from any consideration of what it might receive from other beings. Dharma, the ideal that governs karman, which in its turn makes visible the invisible (actualizes the potential), dominates sukha, that is, kāmārthau, the visible that a being experiences and that has reality only to the extent that it is actual and experienced. Asukhatva does not allow the circle to close: when in doubt, proper action, karman governed by dharma, must distinguish itself from sukha; the nature of kartṛ must not be

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puruṣa (in Sāṃkhya immune from action [karman] and experience [bhojana]) and prakṛti (in Sāṃkhya the locus of both action and experience). Nor does he express any interest in the three guṇas (sattva, rajas, and tamas) and the other intricacies of psychology and metaphysics that so delight the poets of the "Great Epic." Thus, the contrast between Vālmīki's "psychology" and that of the Mahābhārata parallels the contrast between his unified poetic vision and the Mahābhārata's own, convoluted style.

confounded with the pleasures of bhoktṛ. In the Iliad, of course, relations between values are just the other way around. Aretē--"excellence in actuality" that makes for personal flourishing--takes priority over the rules and customs of social interaction, over themis. To echo Aristotle again, in the Iliad, actuality precedes potentiality.

There is, of course, some sense in the Iliad that good birth, high potential, is necessary if one is to be an aristos, just as there is some sense in the Rāmāyaṇa that pāpa, evil-doing (poor performance in actuality), can obscure one's true form, one's true being (svarūpa, svabhāva). But even this concession is instructive: it points to a contrast in primacy between the potential and the actual without denying reciprocal influence between the two in either poem. The aristos is what he is primarily because, good birth presupposed, he has actually succeeded. Failing, he becomes, like Eumaios, a slave, a person who has lost half his aretē. In the Rāmāyaṇa, alpavīryatva--"slight-heroic-ness"--characterizes not the kṣatriya who has failed but another order of being entirely, the yakṣa ("sprite") (cp. Rām. 1.24.2a). The potential that limits artha and kāma at the same time defines one's position in the universe of beings and as a result the modes in which artha and kāma will be pursued. And here we encounter one of dharma's enigmas. Stated most bluntly, violating dharma is, for some beings, "dharma." Rāvaṇa is kāma-ridden by bhāva. Being a rakṣas, a demon, it is, in some twisted sense, his bhāva, his svadharma, to be driven by kāma (cp. Rām. 5.18.5).

What have morality, metaphysics, and the ground between to do with persuasion? Clearly, persuasion in the Rāmāyaṇa is not what it was in the Iliad. In the tenuous relations between aristoi the need to actualize the power of peithesthai is so acute that it becomes the subject of the Iliad's central narrative. Deeds provide the background to the poem's plot, the need for effective words. In the Indian tradition, the word may be the act par excellence, but the Rāmāyaṇa, celebrating doer (kṣatriya) rather than speaker (brāhmaṇa), makes the word the backdrop to the deed: the ultimate victory of Rāma over Rāvaṇa. Those in search of sukha employ persuasion when the accomplishment of their kāma or artha is dependent upon the actions of another. For example, Sītā persuades Rāma to fetch the disguised Mārīca, dead or alive. Alternately, persuasion can be used in calling those succumbing to lust or greed to observe dharma, as in Vibhīṣaṇa's unsuccessful speech to Rāvaṇa. In both cases, speeches merely set the stage for future action. They determine who will act on behalf of whom for what motive.

But "merely" is deceptive. Persuasional practice in the Rāmāyaṇa does not assume "second" place. "Plot" in the Iliad and "action" in the Rāmāyaṇa are two different species. In the Iliad, plot determines future interrelations and interactions--actuality precedes potentiality--but in the Rāmāyaṇa action is the dramatic expression of that which already exists. The real turning points of the poem are verbal, not actional: will Rāma resolve to inhabit Daṇḍaka, will he resolve to slay Sītā's abductor? Is Rāma's bhāva what we all believe it

to be? Resolves resolved, the poet's task is to present in pleasing form action about which there is no longer any ultimate doubt--not a minor task, although one quite different from Homer's. Poetics aside, we may say that in the Rāmāyaṇa rhetorical elaboration marks the transition from the potential to the actual; it signs being in the process of becoming. In the Rāmāyaṇa, persuasion is one being's attempt to intervene as another being comes to actuality.

Rāma the Resolute

Rāma's pursuit of dharma is unswerving. He is deterred neither by his own misery nor by that of his father, mother, brothers, subjects, or wife. But unlike Achilles's relentlessness, Rāma's resolution carries a positive, not a negative, valorization. Resolution as such does not pose a rhetorical problem. Persuasion poses a "resolutory" problem: a threat--or an apparent threat--to break the bonds that define Rāma's very being, his ātman as dharma. Of course, like implacability, resolution is not deafness. Sītā accompanies Rāma to Daṇḍaka forest, despite Rāma's initial wishes. Instead, resolution discriminates among rhetorical aims. Those that accord with dharma find assent; those that violate dharma encounter resistance.

Because Rāma is resolute, not relentless, the greatest rhetorical activity takes place in different sorts of speech in the Iliad and in the Rāmāyaṇa. In the Iliad, elaboration occurs in speeches that fail, in speeches that attempt the necessary

but impossible task of persuading Achilles. When addressed to Rāma, however, typical unsuccessful speeches are countersuasional. Kausalyā, Bharata, Laksmana, and Sītā attempt to dissuade Rāma from acts that he has already promised to do. The poet's need to portray Rāma's resolution will not allow these speeches to be fully convincing. It is Rāma who must reveal persuasion at its ultimate. In opposing efforts that seek to alter the results of actualization, Rāma asserts most effectively the ātman that manifests itself in action. Vālmīki takes pains to mark Rāma's rhetorical effectiveness clearly. Vālin's death may look like cowardly, cold-blooded murder, but once Rāma speaks, the overwhelmed Vālin recants and begs for protection (Rām. 4.18.41-44)! If we seek persuasion at its highest, we cannot exclude speeches spoken by Rāma himself from our scrutiny.

Argument

Most arguments in the Iliad cluster about two heads, patterned interrelations and consequences of action. Arguments addressed to Rāma for the most part fall into somewhat similar groups, dharma and the "fruits" of action.

Dharma recalls Homer's themis in sound (but not in etymology) and, to a limited extent, in meaning, for both refer to order that we in the West conceive of as both natural and moral. But there is little similarity in their rhetorical usage. The term themis appears infrequently in persuasive speeches, and when it appears it refers to action that has

already occurred: "I did not commingle (migēnai) with her, although even that is themis for males and females" (Il. 9.133-34). In speeches addressed to Rāma, by contrast, a speaker will quite frequently invoke dharma prior to action. Not only does dharma's high value make it an eminent rhetorical goad; it can encompass all other values. Sītā reminds Rāma that artha and sukha arise from pursuing dharma, not from pursuing sukha itself (Rām. 3.8.27).

Invocations of dharma themselves present a dazzling variety. Persuasional ends generally center on the interests of the speaker: requests for prasāda ("mercy"), protection, truth, impartiality to sukha and duhkha, endurance of śoka, and the proper attitude toward fate (daiva). In addition, the dharmas invoked run the full range of applicability and effect from the dharma of all times and all places (sanātana) through dharmas of the non-commoner (aprakṛta), the kṣatriya, king, and lineage to personal dharma (svadharma), as well, of course, as the dharma governing the stages of life (āśramas): Rāma, Lakṣmana protests, is too young to enter the forest-dwelling stage (Rām. 2.20.21). It would be hard, then, to separate dharma entirely from personal interrelations, but to invoke dharma is to do something quite different than to invoke such interrelations.

Assuming activity and relationship to be fundamentally identical, speakers in the Iliad attempt to (re)establish relationships. Speakers in the Rāmāyaṇa do not plead, "But we are your friends (brothers; mothers; . . .)! In the Rāmāyaṇa, relationships are taken for granted as establishing the

parameters for activity. Within those parameters, dharma's multiplicity permits a variety of acts, so that the connection between relationship and activity is far from airtight. The focus is on the individual agent, at times not even so much on the dharma that pertains to him or her in the situation at hand as on his or her personal qualities--the virtues (gunas) and vices (dosas)--that would lead to the observation or infraction of dharma. You see, Rāma, it is your family-dharma: every first-born son in your lineage, dating back to Marīci son of the grandsire Brahmā himself, has been king. You, too, must receive the kingdom (cp. Rām. 2.102.1-31). You've always been steady before. Why fly off the handle now? (Rām. 3.61.4-16).

Of course, it is not totally unthinkable for a speaker to invoke his own relation to the auditor as deserving a specific sort of treatment. There are three gurus, Vasistha points out, father, mother, and teacher. I am your father's teacher as well as your own. You ought to do what I say (Rām. 2.103.2-7). But speakers in the Rāmāyana may invoke their relationships with Rāma in the service of quite other aims. We have lived together since youth, Sītā pleads. From such a long acquaintance you must know by now that I am pure (Rām. 6.104.10, 16).

Rāma does know, he avers later (Rām. 6.106.11-19), but the hiddenness of the real poses a rhetorical problem nonetheless. Sītā must persuade the people of her virtue. Words fail; she enters the purifying fire. And not only must the speaker be able to reveal his or her hidden nature. Knowledge of the true nature of others may indeed alter the actions one performs or

recommends. Here, too, there is a hitch. As Hanumān notes, great skill is needed to learn the real bhāva, the internal svabhāva, of another on first encounter (Rām. 6.11.52). The invisibility of the real compels the speaker to resort to other, "logical" means of discerning the truth, such as conjecture (Rām. 6.2.8) and inference (Rām. 6.12.6). By contrast, the Homeric thumos is transparent, and the Homeric code of valor allows no Vibhīsana-like defectors. Achilles threatens to go home, not to switch sides. Deception, when practiced in the Iliad, is a social act of surprise, the ambush.

Self-consciously systematized logical reasoning is not put to use in Homeric speeches for the simple reason that it did not develop in ancient Greece until several centuries later,[1] and then it responded to quite a different threat, sophistic, with a different sort of reasoning: dialectic in Plato, and then in Aristotle two forms of knowledge (epistēmē, phronēsis) characterized by two distinct rationalities (dialektikē, the rhetorical enthymeme).

In addition to bhāva, dharma itself may be hidden. As a result, persuasion about action may be transmuted into persuasion about dharma. Achilles never argues about whether to help a philos. If a person is philos, he is to be helped; if he

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[1] I do not mean to imply that archaic Greece had no implicit conventions of reasoning prior to explicit systematization. On rationality in archaic Greece in general, beginning with several brief observations on Homeric epic, see G. E. R. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966).

is not to be helped, he is not philos. But when faced with countersuasional efforts grounded in dharma, Rāma frequently switches argumentative fields; for, as he explains to Vālin, "dharma is subtle and difficult to be known, even by the good" (Rām. 4.18.15ab). He confronts his rhetorical partners with his absolute devotion to truth as the highest dharma and to the protection of suppliants regardless of their personal character, that is, regardless of the threat they pose to him. It is not dharma to slay rākṣasas, Sītā points out, because there is no enmity between you and them. Rāma's reply? I have given my word to protect the ṛṣis; what else can I do?

When the issue at hand centers on dharma, Rāma abandons society and artha and in isolation devotes himself entirely to dharma (Rām. 2.16.46). But he is not totally inured to the apparent, to the pleasureable, for the golden deer Mārīca charms him. Indeed, a high proportion of argumentation in the Rāmāyaṇa centers on the fruits of action, sukha and śoka. But sukha, like dharma, is individual-oriented. Consequently, the Rāmāyaṇa's fruits differ from the Iliad's consequences of action. Timē and kleos are social categories. Timē is not the personal enjoyment of wealth but the social effectiveness that results from acquiring and possessing wealth. While it may be possible to enjoy timē personally, it may in fact be impossible to enjoy kleos personally. Certainly, Hektor cannot enjoy the kleos that he imagines will be his after death, except perhaps in a minimal sense in the rather unpleasant environs of Hades. Sukha, by contrast, refers specifically to personal pleasure.

To the extent that pleasure or pain may determine any agent's actions, sukha may provide argumentative resources. "Take me along. I won't cause any duḥkha" (cp. Rām. 2.24.2-18). "You'll live in bliss if I'm there with you" (cp. Rām. 2.28.6-10).

Rāma's dharma, of course, makes the sukha and duḥkha of others, too, relevant arguments. "Show prasāda to me, your mothers, and your subjects (Rām. 2.97.5-13). The requirement to insure others' flourishing results, in fact, in a peculiar threat--peculiar, that is, from the Iliad's point of view: the threat of self-imposed duḥkha. In desperation, Bharata sits down. He vows not to eat until Rāma returns to Ayodhyā (Rām. 2.103.13-14). Close female relatives invoke self-imposed duḥkha in even more drastic form. Kausalyā threatens to die if Rāma goes to the forest, Sītā if she is not allowed to accompany Rāma to the forest (Rām. 2.18.17-24, 26.2-19). Where the ultimate goal is one's own flourishing, as it is in the Iliad, a threat of such self-imposed destruction would be ludicrous. An Agamemnon who wept, "If you don't fight, I'll kill myself," would cut an even more pitiful figure than the black-watered spring of Iliad 9 and 14.

Not surprisingly, then, "gifts" in the Rāmāyana do not promise to increase socially effective wealth but to contribute to the accomplishment of personal aims. In exchange for a pyre, Kabandha promises the name of one who will know Rāvana's dwelling (Rām. 3.67). Sugrīva and Vibhīsana promise aid in recovering Sītā by force (Rām. 4.5 and 6.13). Similarly, good verbal accounts appear more frequently not as references to

future fame (although yaśas, "reputation," is not entirely unknown) but as elaborate forms of flattery. Flattery seems designed not so much to establish a relationship with the person addressed as to acknowledge his nature verbally and, of course, to acknowledge the dharma appropriate to that nature. The most elaborately developed flattery actually reveals nature that has been hidden from Rāma himself. Rāma states, "I think that I am a human being, Rāma, Daśaratha's son." Brahmā replies,

> "You are the god Nārāyaṇa, the blessed discus-weaponed sovreign;
> You are the blessed one-tusked boar that conquers past and future ages.
>
> . . .
>
> The shutting of your eyes is night; the opening of your eyes is day.
> Your samskāras are the Vedas; there is nothing apart from you."
>
> Rām. 6.105.10, 12, 22

If sukha and śoka mirror dharma's personal focus, they diverge from it in the matter just touched upon, hiddenness. Dharma may be subtle and difficult to discern, but sukha and duhkha are apparent. They reside at the surface of personal experience. It is, in fact, "surficiality" and visibility that make invocations of sukha most vulnerable.

On the one hand, appeals to sukha and its kin invite refutation on the basis of the invisible. Laksmana may point to the ability that he and his brothers possess to overcome the world, but Rama replies that the dharma of truth forbids such action (Ram. 2.17). The most crass attempt to circumvent this

refutation denies that the hidden exists altogether. Jābāli, the Nāstika (one who asserts that the visible does not exist: na asti), in urging Rāma to receive the kingdom, advocates the visible at the expense of the invisible, the actual at the expense of the potential, sukha at the expense of dharma. Rāma's reply simply reasserts the dharma that appears (on the surface) to be adharma.

On the other hand, the way circumstances appear is never entirely unaffected by the (hidden) personality to whom they appear. Sukha cannot, then, simply be what it appears to be on the surface. Here, too, resides a refutation of arguments based solely on appearances alone. To diminish Sītā's desire for wandering, Rāma details the hazards of the forest. Sītā replies that to her the forest's hazards will be virtues, its miseries pleasure, so long as she, in her affection, remains in the presence of her husband (Rām. 2.26.2). Without him, all pleasures are simply śoka.

In the Iliad, arguments adapt to the power they invoke. Arguments based on patterns seek especially to stengthen or reestablish interrelations wherein power resides; arguments based on consequences seek to readjust the economics of power.

In the Rāmāyana, the most powerful form of speaking is neither the argument nor simple communication. The most powerful form of speaking is active expression: blessing or curse. In blessing or cursing, an ātman of immense power acts directly upon another ātman to create or to destroy. Persuasion, however, since it is not coercion, closes the door

to this preeminent power, which resides solely in the being of the speaker (in the hearer as bhoktṛ). It turns instead not to the actual interactions that subsist between individuals--as Homer's speakers do--but to the individuated being who controls his or her own action, to the ātman as kartṛ. Persuasion attempts to manipulate that kartṛ's power over its acts by addressing the aims that govern any being's application of power, the ideals of dharma (and the sukha for others that those in authority, such as king or husband, must foster) and one's own sukha, by addressing the two dimensions of the individual's encounter with the world (karman, bhojana).

But because power resides not in the manifest but in the hidden, the locus of power and the ideals that govern it demand special knowledge. Special knowledge requires in turn special techniques, such as inference. Any claims to special knowledge, however, are always subject to contention, especially when the topic is the hidden as found in someone other than the speaker. Sītā can always reply: that would not be duḥkha to me!

Elaboration

It's not dharma, Laksmana argues, for you to annihilate the world; kill only the guilty party. But those are not his precise words. "Formerly you were gentle, restrained, devoted to the welfare of all creatures, ..." Like Odysseus, Laksmana elaborates. But Laksmana's elaborations are not like Odysseus's. They differ on all counts: in specific forms (descriptive and narrative recounting, comparison), in the

limitation of elaboration to certain arguments--or, rather, in the case of the Rāmāyaṇa, the lack of such limitation, and, most fundamentally, in the deeper patterns underlying elaborative activity.

Laksmana's speech, for example, does not narrate; then again, neither does Odysseus's. But the speakers of the Iliad show a marked inclination to use extended narrative rather than extended description. As noted earlier, Agamemnon's offer is something of an exception. In speeches addressed to Rāma, the inclination is reversed. Laksmana's speech is not elaboratively unusual at all. Laksmana, Sītā, Kausalyā, and others all show a marked preference for one particular mode of extended description: the list. Extended narrative is, by contrast, extremely rare.

If we discount Kaikeyī's brief account of Daśaratha's vow (Rām. 2.16.21-22), the only instance of extended narration in speeches centering on Rāma occurs when Sugrīva relates how he has suffered at his brother's hands. This narrative does none of what the Iliad's narratives do. It is not a paradigm. It does not attempt to reestablish endangered relationships. It does not establish the speaker's own prowess. It simply outlines a situation to which the addressee's dharma requires a clear response, and it provides personal information about a newly found ally, a newly introduced character.

How, then, does Laksmana elaborate his argument? "Charm in the moon, radiance in the sun, blowing in the wind, patience in the earth . . . ": Vālmīki's speakers show none of Homer's

reticence toward using the world of nature as a rhetorical upamāna (the object to which comparison is made). Of course, social comparison is not unknown to Vālmīki, too: "Why do you speak to me as a common man speaks to a common woman?" (cp. Rām. 6.104.5).[1] And the use of social comparison results in embryonic, but only embryonic, paradigms: single ślokas referring to Kāśyapa, Yayāti, Vasistha (Rām. 2.18.20; 3.62.7) and a mythological tale about an unnamed ascetic (Rām. 3.8.13-19). Still, comparisons with the world of nature are thrown out so offhandedly that they almost seem unconscious--or formulaic: I will destroy duhkha as the sun destroys darkness (cp. Rām. 2.18.15); I will rage invincible like a rutting elephant (cp. Rām. 2.20.15); the brilliance of his sword is like lightning (cp. Rām. 2.20.27); and so on. Divinities, too, may be upamānas: Rāma is like Yama (Rām. 2.28.9), and, if he goes to the forest, Kausalyā asserts, he will acquire hell as the lord of rivers acquired brahminicide (Rām. 2.18.24). More strikingly still, Laksmana actually reverses the comparison, so that the world of human ritual serves as upamāna for natural and divine beings: "streams, oceans, and mountains, gods, Gandharvas, and Dānavas cannot act to displease you, as sādhus cannot act to displease their initiator." Clearly, the bounds of the Iliad's web-like systems have burst. But more has burst

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[1]Even this social comparison violates Homer's convention, for the upamāna is not an extreme but a mediocre instance, as if Achilles would reply to Ajax: for an inadvertently slain ox an owner will receive recompense; but I refuse to treat Briseis as a mere ox (or rather, a cow)--hardly a likely rejoinder!

than these bounds.

India is a land of lists, and Laksmana obliges: ocean, mountains, forests, caves, lotus ponds, streams (to cite only one list). Like this example, lists are often brief, confined within the limits of the pāda, half-pāda, or śloka. "I wish to see rivers, hills, pools, and forests" (Rām. 2.24.13); "I will devour this human woman, without beauty, unvirtuous, dreadful, with prominent belly" (Rām. 3.16.23); "I have abandoned Laṅkā, friends, and wealth; you have become my kingdom, life, and pleasures" (Rām. 6.13.5). But even here the reader senses, beneath the surface, a virtually interminable series threatening to erupt. When the series does erupt, the poet treats his audience to a descriptive orgy. Recall Hanumān's praise of Rāma and Laksmana on their first meeting (Rām. 4.3.4-16), itself far surpassed by Vasistha's recital of Rāma's genealogy, extending all the way back to Brahmā himself (Rām. 2.102.1-31), and Brahmā's own description of Rāma as purusottama, the highest "person" (Rām. 6.105.11c-28).

The Rāmāyana differs from the Iliad, however, in more than just a propensity to lists. The reader of smaller lists is tempted, Iliad fashion, to institute an economy of the list: relations of meaning or of sound that lend dignity, fulness, and completeness to the list. Larger lists, however, overwhelm any such attempts, except in smaller units that are dwarfed by the expanse of the list as a whole. Vālmīki's lists find signifiance not in the relation of the parts but in the act of extended repetition itself. Relation is found just where it is

absent in Homer, on the most minute level. For the rest, juxtaposition reproduces endlessly. The longer the list, the greater the object described. The more ancestors Vasiṣṭha can recite, the more venerable Rāma's kula-dharma; the more characteristics Brahmā can cite, the greater Rāma must be as the fulness of being. The dissipation of the poet's stamina and the audience's toleration impose, of course, some eventual terminus to even the longest of lists: the taxing of both is, indeed, precisely the point. But the temptation to elaborate through such an easy, additive procedure is difficult to resist. Successive generations of bards have responded by adding to the lists "Vālmīki" had already begun, as the numerous additions noted in the critical text demonstrate.

In the Iliad, argumentative specialization points to deeper patterns operating in elaborative activity. In the Rāmāyana, there is no argumentative specialization. Lists and similes apply equally well to the hidden and the visible, to dharma and sukha. There is a good reason why elaboration is so distant from the characteristics of argument, and it applies equally well to other dimensions of the rhetorical act. A list repeated long enough becomes persuasive by the very act of repetition, regardless of argument. That is, elaboration itself has become a means of persuasion. The immediate encounter of individual being with individual being in speech depends not on the property of reference, in contrast to the Homeric need to refer to the social patterns existing between speaker and audience, but on the very act of ātman opening onto ātman in speech.

Every dimension of speech is a part of this act, every aspect of communication is a possible vehicle for persuasive power. Speakers in the Rāmāyana do not neglect their opportunities.

In addition, the encounter of individual with individual, or rather the individual as locus of power, accounts for the different forms that elaboration assumes. Power, located not in systemic webs as in the Iliad but in individuals, is increased by adding individual localizations of power together. Consequently, the paradigm is not so useful. Not only does it tend to establish relations, and relations are not the locus of persuasive power, as they are in the Iliad; being part narrative, paradigms share in narrative's own disadvantage. On the whole, narrative is a relatively uneconomical way of persuading, as the Rāmāyana takes account of such things: it requires many words but in the end it contributes only a single "individual" to the cause. Much to be preferred are the list and comparison. And, of course, comparison is no longer bound to systemic webs, although extremity still does not hurt in contributing magnitude. Systemic limits gone, the social simply cannot compete. More impressive individual beings present themselves. Who, after all, are Orestes and Helen of Troy when one can invoke sun and moon and wind and earth?

Diction

In the rhetorical arenas most influenced by the formal constraints of the poetic medium, the Iliad prefers operations that further relations expressed in and between arguments, but

the Rāmāyaṇa prefers repetitions together with randomly additive series (like the list) that are capable of independent rhetorical action. Consider the arena of diction. Like elaboration, activity at the level of diction shows no preference for any particular arguments. Metrics and syntax do not allow diction more than occasional appearances as a rhetorical device, but when diction is so used, it is relational in the Iliad, repetitive in the Rāmāyaṇa, supplementary in the Iliad, at times independently persuasive in the Rāmāyaṇa. Of course, dictional activity is not entirely distinct in the two poems. It converges in pairs of two virtually identical members: achos/akos in Odysseus's speech, pati/gati in Rām. 2.24.4. But even when appearances are so similar, the actual usage displays characteristic differences.

On the level of diction, repetition for rhetorical purposes is rare in the Iliad. Of course, it does occur occasionally: ē resounds throughout Agamemnon's oath (mēpote . . . : "never . . . " [see page 78, note 1]). Nevertheless, as soon as the forest sages approach Rāma, they address him in tones foreign to Homer:

> Tvam Iksvākukulasyasya . . .
>
> (You of the family of Iksvāku . . .)
>
> Rām. 3.5.7a.

Not even Nestor's "quasi-curse"--aphrētōr athemistos anestios estin ekeinos (out of all brotherhood, outlawed, homeless is that man . . .)--has such a high density of repeated phonemes.

In the Iliad, precise repetition is limited to phonemes that, when their rhetorical purpose in unambiguous, are ancillary to other operations that establish relations, and to verbatim repetition of adverbs and insignificant verbs.. Vālmīki, by contrast, does not shun repetition. Brahmā lauds Rāma as puruṣa puruṣottama (puruṣa, the highest puruṣa) (Rām. 6.105.14b), and Bharata laments that he cannot punish his mother as she deserves:

> dharma<bandhena baddho> ´smi | tenaˆimām naˆiha mātaram
> hanmi tīvreṇa <daṇḍena | daṇḍārhām> . . .
>
> (I am bound by dharma; therefore, I do not now kill that mother of mine, deserving of punishment, with sharp punishment . . .)
>
> Rām. 2.98.47

But Bharata is simply excusing himself, rather forcefully. Persuasive repetition of a single word reaches a pinnacle, but not an isolated summit, with the distraught Kausalyā:

> Dharmajñā, yadi dharmistho | dharmam caritum icchasi
> śuśrūṣa mām iha sthas tvam | cara dharmam anuttamam ||
>
> (Dharma-knower, if you who are most dharmic wish to do dharma . . . do the highest dharma.)
>
> Rām. 2.18.19

Nor does Vālmīki stop at repeating words and roots. Brahmā´s praise rings changes on a pāda:

> nimeṣas te ´bhavad rātrir | unmeṣas te ´bhavad divā
> saṃskārās te ´bhavan vedā . . .
>
> (The shutting of your eyes is night; the opening of your eyes is day.
> Your samskaras are the Vedas . . .)
>
> Rām. 6.105.22a-c

Rāma, emphasizing the dangers of the forest, begins three successive ślokas with the vocative, "Sīte, . . . ," then follows with an extended refrain that hammers home his point again and again:

. . . duḥkham eva sadā vanam
. . . duḥkham ato vanam
. . . tasmād duḥkhataram vanam
. . .
. . . tato duḥkhataram vanam
. . . (-d)ato duḥkhataram vanam
. . . (-m)ato duḥkhataram vanam
. . . sarvam duḥkham ato vanam
. . . tena duḥkhataram vanam
(. . . bahudoṣataram vanam)

(roughly: thus the forest is full of duḥkha)

Rām. 2.25.5-14.

Not only are all these forms of repetition entirely alien to the rhetoric of the Iliad; repetition and addition are so pervasive in speeches addressed to Rāma that they infringe upon the domain of significant groupings, such as the pair. Attempting to induce Rāma to bring her to the forest, Sītā invokes two pairs: na mātur na pitus(tatra) . . . puṣpāṇi ca phalāni ca (Rām. 2.27.15ad). Gender lends a certain comprehensiveness to the first--"neither father nor mother"--as generation does to the second: flowers begin, fruits end the plant's reproductive activity. Metrics contributes to closure, especially in the second pair, which occupies an entire pāda, but it is tenuous closure. Not only has the same speaker already listed for Rāma . . . pitā mātā | bhrātā putras tathā snuṣā (father, mother, brother, son, and daughter-in-law) (Rām.

2.24.2ab; cp. 4ab); in this case, mother and father are not the verb's only object. "I will not remember father, mother, or home there." Further additions to the second pair from the botanical realm may also not be far off.

Pairs achieve a greater degree of immunity from the additive list (but not from repetition) when a relation, generally oppositional instead of complementary, marks them off as a single unit. Occasionally such a pair expresses an alternative: Bharata's inauguration and Rāma's exile (Rām. 2.47.14bd). But unlike Homer's world, which is constructed from a genuine plurality in which a great variety of associations is possible and in which quality is determined by one's performance vis à vis others in society, Vālmīki's world is organized in terms of two non-personal dualities: manner of presence (hidden and visible), and evaluation (good and bad, positive and negative). The most concise pairs express just these dualities: pratyakṣam yat tad ātiṣṭha ¦ parokṣam pṛṣṭhataḥ kuru (what is visible, do that; put the invisible behind you) in Jābāli's minority opinion (Rām. 2.100.16); ādhyo vāpi daridro vā ¦ duḥkhitaḥ sukhito 'pi vā ¦ nirdoṣo vā sadoṣo vā (whether wealthy or poor, whether in duḥkha or sukha, whether possessed of faults or faultless . . .) (Rām. 4.8.8a-c)--in which we see the possibility of an interminable series of comprehensive pairs; yas tvayā saha sa svargo ¦ nirayo yas tvayā vinā (what is with you is heaven, hell what is without you) (Rām. 2.27.17cd); <guṇataḥ> saṃgraham kuryād ¦ <doṣatas> tu visarjayet (on account of virtue let him be received; but on account of vice renounce

him) (Rām. 6.11.32cd); yathā mṛtas tathā jīvan (the same dead as alive) (Rām. 2.98.42c); or, in dvandva compound, samām sukhaduḥkhayor--"the same in sukha and duḥkha"--as an expression of Sītā's indifference to entire realm of the "visible" (Rām. 2.26.18b; cp. d). Perhaps the most elegant, and certainly the most repetitive, of these pairs contain an a-privative that has virtually disappeared through saṃdhi: arthānarthanimittam (Rām. 6.11.44a); śubhāśubhe (Rām. 3.62.15d); and even yathā 'sati tathā sati (alike in evil and in good) (Rām. 2.98.42d).

Clearly, rhetorical activity in the arena of diction does not always work independently in the Rāmāyaṇa. In almost all of the preceding examples, devices of diction supplement arguments. Pairs amplify opposition through concise expression. Repeated words or phrases repeatedly press pertinent individuals, their characteristics, and their ideals on the listener's ears, as do dharma, "you" (te 'bhavad), and the vana's duḥkha in the examples above. Diction can even be used to effect transition. However, the differences between this sort of transition and what one finds in the Iliad are instructive.

In the Iliad, diction serves at times to relate arguments by making for smooth transition. For speeches centering on Rāma, the problem of movement, conditioned by emphasizing the power of individuation at the expense of relation, is different: how to prevent the metrical terminus from terminating one thought and leading inevitably to another; that is, the problem is one of continuity, the maintenance of individual identity. In Sugrīva's narrative, "roaring" in one śloka (nardati) is

followed in the next by reference to the sound roared (nardita) (Rām. 4.9.5c, 6b). Later, a locative absolute in one śloka resumes the previous śloka by echoing its verbs:

> asuro jātasaṃtrāsaḥ | pradudrāva tadā bhṛśam ||
> tasmin dravati saṃstraste . . .
>
> (the asura, overcome with trembling, then ran mightily. With that trembling one running, . . .)
>
> Rām. 4.9.9c-10a

In both cases, devices of diction enable the narrative to continue smoothly; they help preserve the narrative's integrity. Similar devices may be used when an argument must continue beyond the śloka's bounds. In Rāmāyaṇa 2.98, two successive ślokas appeal to the son's duty to redress his father's transgression, the first in particular, the second in general terms:

> tātasya yad <atikrāntaṃ> | pratyāharatu tad bhavān ||
> pitur hi sam<atikrāntaṃ> | putro yaḥ sādhu manyate . . .
>
> (what of [by] our father is <transgressed>, restore that. The son who is thought good, . . . the <transgression> of the father.)
>
> Rām. 2.98.52c-53b

Toward the front of the speech mentioned earlier for its elaborate refrain, Rāma seeks to establish his personal interest in the argument he has just advanced, and in doing so, repeats its final verb:

> bahudoṣaṃ hi kāntāram | vanam ity abhidhīyate ||
> hitabuddhyā khalu vaco | maya^etad abhidhīyate
>
> (the wilderness is filled with hazards--therefore it is called [abhidhīyate] "forest."

> This word is related [abhidhīyate] by me who knows what is beneficial . . .)
>
> Rām. 2.25.4c-5b

Thus, activity on the level of diction in speeches centering on Rāma supplements persuasive power in ways that recall the individual as power's locus. On the one hand, arguments supplemented center on individuals, not on interactions and interrelations. "You, Rāma, are . . . ." Even the pair, when it avoids the threat of becoming simply the smallest additive list, highlights individuality through opposition: a, not not a; or else, both a and not a. On the other hand, dictional operations uniting two otherwise discrete ślokas serve not to link the end of one argument to the beginning of the next but to maintain individual identity across the śloka boundary.

Yet activity at the level of diction is capable of being persuasive more or less independently of (semantic) arguments, and that in three ways. First, extensive repetition produces an orgy of sound similar to the list's orgy of description. Does it really matter what "Tvam Iksvākukulasyasya" means, outside of being addressed to "you"? Meaning also seems to defer to sound when Hanumān unites repetition on the level of diction with a list in praising Rāma and his brother. Dual case endings are, of course, a syntactic requirement, but metrics transforms them into something more:

> Rājarṣidevapratimau | tāpasau saṃśitavratau |
> deṣaṃ katham imam prāptau | bhavantau varavarṇinau ||

. . .

padmapatreksanau vīrau ¦ jatāmandaladhārinau ¦
anyonyasadṛśau vīrau ¦ devalokādivāgatau ¦¦

. . .

viśālavaksasau vīrau ¦ mānuṣau devarūpiṇau ¦¦

Rām. 4.3.4, 10, 11cd.

Second, in the Rāmāyaṇa, as in much Indian thought, sound and meaning are not wholly distinct (pace de Saussure). Diction may operate independently of semantic argument because diction may, in fact, be the argument. Sītā appeals to more than convention when she pleads that a husband is a woman's refuge: a woman's pati, she says, is her gati (Rām. 2.24.4). Later, she avers that she will live in the forest as if it were her father's home: in vane as in bhavane (Rām. 2.24.9). These assertions do not require argumentative vindication. They stand on their own as a fact of language, a fact of diction.

Finally, exact repetition of a word can be used to bridge the gap between the object of persuasion and the person to be persuaded. It becomes self-evident that what is asserted is included in the character of the person addressed: "those who know dharma say, o dharma-knower, that . . . " (ahur dharmajña dharmajñāh) (Rām. 2.98.58); hear from me, Rāma, "the truth, you whose strength is truth" (satyam satyaparākrama) (Rām. 6.105.11d).

Arrangement

Like argumentative elaboration, amplification in the arena of diction is predominately repetitive and additive, conditioned in

various ways by an underlying, pervasive individuation and capable of being rhetorical effective on its own. The same general characteristics and the same differences from the Iliad continue, appropriately transformed, in the arena of arrangement.

In speeches centering on Rāma, arrangement maintains the forcefulness of the individual, an emphasis on repetition, and a corresponding disregard for intricate relations in an arena devoid of the logical constraints that restrict elaboration and of the metrical and syntactic constraints that operate on diction. First, the incidence of free association is fairly high, in terms of both the juxtaposition of individual ślokas and the collocation of arguments within the same speech. Second, at times repetition produces, often in conjunction with two poles of a pervasive, non-personal duality (dharma/sukha, hidden/manifest), a rough alternation throughout the course of an entire speech. Finally, between juxtaposition and alternation there intervene looser forms of organization that, in contrast to Homer's intricate mazes, corral individual ślokas into appropriate fields of activity or--to shift metaphors--channel the force of individual ślokas into a single rhetorical current.[1]

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[1]Any assertion of free association is risky, and for the Rāmāyana the danger is compounded. The assumptions that guided the construction of the Baroda critical edition could have resulted, in an entirely oral tradition, in the fabrication of speeches that actually appeared for the first time with the critical edition itself (cp., e.g., Hopkins, Great Epic, p. 60). Free association would then simply be the result of scholarly butchering. For this reason, Renate Söhnen has preferred to

The śloka remains the fundamental unit with which arrangement operates, for even when successive ślokas develop the same argument, they are largely independent. Each is capable of standing more or less on its own. Sītā is eager to go to the forest, for even when she was a girl in her father's house it was foretold that she would dwell in the forest:

> Then, formerly, oh you of great wisdom, from brahmans in my father's house,
> I heard truly about my residence in the forest.
>
> Having heard at home the word from auspicious twice-born ones,
> I have always been eager to dwell in the forest, oh you of great strength.
>
> I must accomplish the forest-dwelling that has been commanded;
> I will go there with you, oh dear one; it shall not be otherwise.
>
> I will accomplish the command; I will go with you.
> This time has come. Let the dvija's word be true.
>
> Rām. 2.26.6-9

There is some progression here, but it is a progression of starts and stops, not a continuous, uninterrupted argument. In

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work with the southern recension (Bombay edition), for it provides speeches that definitely appeared in the epic tradition as opposed to the scholarly text (Söhnen, pp. 3-4). But this approach has drawbacks as well as obvious merits. A devotional transformation of the poetic tradition is, all told, fairly obvious, and that transformation, bringing with it a new style of religious power, potentially coupled with developments of various sorts (political, social, and so on), could itself have produced new styles of rhetorical arrangement. For philological arguments in defense of the critical edition, see the writings of J. L. Brockington, especially Righteous Rāma; on later devotional transformations of the Rāma story, see Frank Whaling, The Rise of the Religious Significance of Rāma (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980). I choose to stand with the critical edition, but not without reservations.

a continuous discourse, one sentence assumes what the preceding has asserted: Agamemnon has promised worthy gifts; come, then, listen while I tell you the gifts he has promised: seven tripods, ... In the speech quoted from the Rāmāyana, however, śloka seven is half occupied with restating what has already been stated in śloka six, but restating it in a way that allows further assertion. Likewise, the first half of śloka nine merely repeats what was said in śloka eight, but repeats it in half the space.

Another indicator of the halting nature of the śloka is the use of vocatives. Nouns in the vocative case interrupt the flow of a statement to address the listener directly. In the Iliad, a vocative or a collection of vocatives at the beginning of a speech--"Son of Atreus most glorious, lord of men Agamemnon"--attracts the listener's attention for the entire speech. Occasionally a vocative will appear when a specific statement touches directly upon the hearer: "from the time when you, Zeus-born, led Briseis from the hut of the enraged Achilles" (Il. 9.106-7). Otherwise, a vocative marks an abrupt change in argument, as in Odysseus's ō pepon (Il. 9.252). In the Rāmāyana, vocatives appear more randomly. They often complete pādas and contribute to the śloka's self-sufficiency as a unit of composition. When Laksmana attempts to dissuade Rāma from destroying the world, for example, he begins not with a vocative but with a statement in the second person singular. When vocatives appear, they are dispersed throughout the speech:

This place, trodden by hoofs and marked by wheels,
sprinkled with drops of blood,
this place is the site of a very violent struggle, now
complete, o earth-lord's son.

This was a struggle of one, not two, o best of speakers;
I do not see the track of a great army left behind.

. . .

You have always been the refuge of all creatures, their
highest resort.
Who would consider the destruction of your wife good,
o Rāghava?

. . .

By whom, o king, Sītā has been taken, that one you ought to
seek,
with me as second, bow in hand, with paramarsis for
companions.

. . .

But if the thirty lords do not surrender your wife
voluntarily,
then, o Indra of Kosala, afterwards you will act at
the appropriate time.

But if virtuously, voluntarily, properly you
do not receive Sītā prudently, o Indra of men,
then destroy with golden-shafted
rains of arrows, resembling Indra's thunderbolts.

Rām. 3.61.7-8, 10, 12, 15-16

The śloka's self-sufficiency may even result in the random juxtaposition of meanings, each contributing in its own way to the same argument. Consider Rāma's disquisition on the hazards of the forest. Prior to each statement of the refrain, "thus the forest is most full of duḥkha," Rāma details the hazards themselves: roars of lions; beds of leaves; the wearing of skins; winds, gloom, hunger, and fear; reptiles; snakes; birds and insects; trees and plants--summed up by the general

conclusion: there are many dosas in the forest (Rām. 2.25.6-14). Here there is no development based on relation, as in Agamemnon's offer: right now I'll give you . . . ; when we take Troy, . . . ; and when we finally get back home, ... Rāma's speech permits insertions and deletions almost anywhere (see the starred passages in the critical edition!). Aside from a brief introduction on Sītā's duty to her husband, this list constitutes the entire speech. In the Rāmāyana it is not so important to relate parts to each other as to invoke a panoply of parts themselves, the more, and the more elaborated, the better.

At times, the arrangement of speeches that contain several distinct arguments is similarly loose. Sītā's second, successful reply to Rāma's account of the forest's hazards begins with an assessment of the effects of Rāma's "fear" on his reputation; it shifts to Sītā's total devotion, a devotion that would make it criminal to dismiss her; then Sītā illustrates how the duhkhas of the forest will be sukha to her, and finally closes with the assertion that without Rāma she will die. The last assertion sets the forest's duhkhas in perspective, but in quite a different perspective than when they were themselves the subject of discussion. No longer perceived as sukha, the duhkhas of the forest are, compared with other possibilities in the universe of value, not worth troubling over. The tendency of the arguments is clear, but no more elaborate organizational pattern, such as the Iliad provides with ring composition or parallelism, is apparent.

Yet arguments are not always unrelated, not always open to random listing. Once again, the dualities that pervade Vālmīki's world resist the list. Jābāli's point is the priority of the visible. His speech is divided between two "arguments:" (A) forget dharmas based on relations, especially with the dead; (B) take the kingdom, be happy yourself, and make those who are living happy. The speech as a whole alternates from one pole to the other, but the alternation is not argumentatively balanced or systematic. The two sides may be developed in contrapuntal interchange, and each interchange may add something new, but the repetition is still random; it does not develop in a predictable order:

A. No one owes anyone anything (2-6)

B. Relinquish duhkha; take the kingdom (7-9)

A. You've nothing to do with Daśaratha (10-11)

B. Those concerned with dharma and artha should be pitied; they receive duhkha (12)

A. Forget about śrāddha (the ceremony for dead relatives) (13-14)

B. Go for the manifest; take the kingdom (15-17).

No devices of parallelism, elaborate or simple, mark the alternations from A to B and back again, nor is there any balance with respect to length. Jābāli might have confined A to a first group of ślokas, B to a second, and echoed A in B, whether directly (parallelism) or inversely (ring composition). Or he might have discovered some other relationship between parts of the argument by which to order his speech. Homer's

characters probably would have, and after all, the tenor of the argument is not entirely un-Greek! (Recall, for example, Socrates's interlocutors in Republic 1.) Jābāli might have, but he did not. Instead, he seems to let the arguments come as they will. Some alternation between the first and the second argument is only natural. Jābāli does not wish to confine himself to one or the other point entirely. But in alternating, he presents no deliberate, balanced interchange that derives its force from integrally relating the arguments to one another.

Sugrīva does much the same when he wishes to stir Rāma to action at the beginning of the Yuddha-kānda. He makes essentially two points: (1) it is neither fitting nor beneficial for you to grieve; (2) we monkeys are eager and able to overrun Rāvana's stronghold. These two points alternate, somewhat erratically. The effect of the speech in which they occur is, nonetheless, profound (Rām. 6.2.2-21).

Between free association and alternation lie what we might consider two intermediary forms of arrangement. It is not fitting, Laksmana states, for Rāma to go to the forest. We shall seize the kingdom by force (Rām. 2.18.2-7, 8-15). Stay and do dharma, Kausalyā pleads. If you go, I'll die (Rām. 2.18.17-21, 22-24). In these speeches, ślokas that present arguments of the same tenor do what Jābāli's and Sugrīva's ślokas do not: they all appear in a single group. The other way around, one might say that in the shorter speeches, such as Kausalyā's, alternation has not had enough space to develop.

Whatever the perspective on the groups, the relations between śloka*s* in a single group are still not smooth:

> That Rāghava should go to the forest, abandoning the kingdom's prosperity--
> this does not please me, noble one--that he should go by the power of a woman's word.
>
> Backwards and old, dominated by the objects of sense,
> what would the king *not* say, petitioned when infatuated?
>
> No sin on that one's part do I see, nor even such a fault,
> that as a result Rāghava should leave the kingdom for forest-dwelling.
>
> I do not see any in the world, nor is there even one unseen, who
> though an enemy or one exiled, might declare his fault.
>
> A son like a *deva*, straight, restrained, dear even to his enemies--
> who, observant of *dharma*, would abandon such a son without reason?
>
> This word, spoken by a king who has approached childhood again--
> what son would take this word to heart, recalling the king's conduct?
>
> *Rām*. 2.18.2-7

Parallels and relations are hardly absent altogether. In the list, too, we have seen a certain amount of grouping on the smallest levels. But parallels and relations do not make a tightly stitched unit. The boundaries of the arranged "group" simply gather together several śloka*s* tending in the same direction.

Even speeches that lack more or less well-defined group boundaries may not be entirely without order. Somewhat haltingly, śloka*s* may make their way toward a general rhetorical end. The entreaty of the sages (*Rām*. 3.5) is a good example of

the type of movement that I have in mind, although in that speech groups of *ślokas* are perhaps a little too well-defined to illustrate the type of speech precisely:

7-8 Rāma's greatness

9-11: Rāma's *dharma* to help the sages as suppliants

12-13: Benefits (fame, heaven, rewards of *muni*'s *dharma*) that Rāma will receive from helping the sages

14-17: Specific need: destruction wrought by rākṣasas.

The last *śloka* of the speech, a summary statement, abruptly stands apart from the general movement in order to articulate the sages' request most clearly:

18: Help us!

The same sort of general movement can be seen in Sītā's first request to be taken to the forest (*Rām.* 2.24.2-18), but without the sages' clearly marked stepping stones. The speech progresses from the abstract requirements of *dharma* to the delighted manner in which Sītā will experience the forest, provided she is with Rāma. Again the last verse stands apart from the rest: it articulates Sītā's request clearly and concisely.

In the *Iliad*, rhetorical arguments are arranged like blended stops on an organ or like the lines of a detailed maze, as on a Geometric vase. The rhetorical activities in speeches clustering about Rāma require different metaphors. The vehicles of argument, the individual verses, are like individual,

powerful horses that run together in a herd (the speech). At times the speaker finds it advantageous to split the herd and corral it in several different fields of activity. At other times, the horses run more or less in succession. Again the analogy becomes strained. Shall I say that, like Gaṅgā flowing to her lord, the verses move irresistibly, by stages, to their rhetorical end? Analogies aside, persuasive power in the Rāmāyana becomes actual in the individual expression. The aim of arrangement is not to supplement the power of the individual argument by demonstrating its broader web of argumentative relations; the aim is to group expressions together in such a way that each can exercise its power to the fullest.

Relentless Rāvana

Rāma and Rāvana stand at opposite poles of the dualities that define Vālmīki's world. Rāma, bound by the orders of dharma, manifests the hidden. Rāvana, devoted to sukha, is thrall to the visible. The rhetorical situations that both provoke differ accordingly.

Rāma is resolute. He resists persuasion in the interests of dharma. Rāvana resists persuasion, too, but in the interests of pleasure. He is relentless. As a result, failures to persuade that center on Rāvana are multiplied by two. Not only do those who attempt to persuade Rāvana fail; Rāvana himself, unlike Rāma, is not persuasive, either. Even if the audience in the poem occasionally assents to his speeches, the audience of the poem cannot. To make the image of Rāvana as relentless

work, the poet must portray powerful, ultimately incontrovertible, persuasional attempts addressed to a Rāvana who speaks lame speeches in reply.

Vālmīki marks the contrast between the two speakers with the reaction of their brothers. Both Laksmana and Bharata attempt to dissuade Rāma, but they encounter irresistible rhetoric in reply. Laksmana decides to accompany Rāma to the forest himself, while Bharata returns to Ayodhyā, although not to the throne. Similarly, Vibhīsana tries to dissuade Rāvana. Advancing the claims of dharma, he demands Sītā's immediate return. But although Rāvana attempts to refute the argument, his reply is not persuasive. Vibhīsana abàndons Rāvana to fight on the enemy's side.

Thus, the situations of rhetorical activity and the persons who speak most persuasively change; still, Vālmīki's world remains the same. Persuasion attempts to invoke the same power. Persuasional speeches take the same forms. They often display more urgency, more passion, more elaboration, greater length. For example, no speech centered on Rāma reaches quite the repetitive heights of Sītā's rejection of Rāvana's solicitations. But Sītā's rhetorical arsenal has not changed. She is simply more emphatic, more desperate, perhaps.

Much of the rhetorical impact of Sītā's speech derives from elaborative repetition and extreme comparison. She opens by describing Rāma's resplendant qualities, concluding each śloka with identical assertions of unshakeable resolution: aham Rāmam anuvratā, "I am wholly devoted to Rāma" (Rām. 3.45.29d=30d=31d).

After a brief interlude, she then finds a new rhythm. Every half-line from 34cd to 39cd, with only one exception (36ab), ends with an infinitive followed by icchasi, "you wish." A barrage of images highlights the grandiosity of Rāvana's desires.

> You wish to seize a fang from the mouth of a viper.
>
> You wish to carry Mandara, best of mountains, in your hand.
> You wish to continue in prosperity after drinking the poison Kālakūṭa.
>
> You wipe your eye with a needle; you lick a razor with your tongue.
> You wish to carry off the beloved wife of Rāghava.
>
> . . .

and so on. A shift in meter brings a shift in particular convention, but not in style. Each of the next three stanzas (Rām. 3.45.40-42) balances three lines beginning yad antaram ("the distance that . . . ") against a common refrain: tad antaram Daśarathes tavaˆeva ca: "that is the distance between Daśaratha's son and you." What is that distance? The distance between lion and jackal, creek and ocean, jujube fruit and divine nectar, gold and lead, sandal-water and mud, elephant and cat, ...

Vālmīki takes special pains when he introduces Rāvana to his audience. The more impressive he can make Rāma's chief adversary, the more impressive Rāma's eventual victory. Furthermore, if action is the manifestation of the hidden, the moment of actualization, the first appearance, becomes crucial for revealing any being's character (bhāva), impressive or not.

Persuasion reaches its climax just as the fatal disposition begins to act. When the wounded Śūrpaṇakhā places the seeds of lust in her brother's heart, the smitten Rāvaṇa attempts to enlist the aid of the raksas Mārīca in his amatory venture.

No other speech quite matches in length Mārīca's attempt both to decline Rāvaṇa's request and to deter Rāvaṇa himself: seventy verses that extend over three sargas (Rām. 3.35-37). Not without reason has Vālmīki called Mārīca skilled in words (vākyaviśāradaḥ) (Rām. 3.35.1). In most respects the speech is a model of the operations already discussed. For example, the familiar repetition dominates rhetorical uses of diction. As Mārīca begins, he advances five successive questions introduced by api:

> Would it be good (svasti) for all rākṣasas on earth?
> Might not Rāma, enraged, make the world devoid of rākṣasas?
>
> Might not the daughter of Janaka have been born for the purpose of ending your life?
> Might not great misfortune arise, with Sītā as its cause?
>
> Might not Laṅkā city be destroyed with you and the rākṣasas, having acquired for its lord you whose conduct is kāma, you who are uncontrolled?
>
> Rām. 3.35.4-6

Mārīca uses even the sound of words to reinforce his point. "Words (nouns, names) beginning with the sound ra, o Rāvaṇa, such as jewels (ratnāni) and chariots (rathāḥ), provoke terror in me, terrified of Rāma" (Rām. 3.37.18). The hint is unmistakeable. Even the name of Rāma's would-be conqueror succumbs to the sound of Rāma's name![1]

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[1]Of the examples given, only the initial syllable of

As we would expect, arrangement contributes little on its own to rhetorical effect. In fact, the hinges that link the three sargas together almost seem to introduce afterthoughts: "Furthermore, hear this best word, suitable and fitting;" "Now hear, too, what happened after that" (Rām. 3.35.23, 37.1). All fits together loosely to overcome, in one way or another, Rāvana's ignorance by revealing Mārīca's privileged--or not so privileged--acquaintance with the nature of the newcomer ("you do not know Rāma;" "I know the power [prabhāva] of that one;" Rām. 3.35.3a, 37.19a).

Mārīca's arguments and the manner in which he elaborates them are of greater interest. In the person of Kaikeyī, Vālmīki has shown the harmful consequences of the unbridled pursuit of artha. Mārīca's speech reveals the ambiguity of artha between the opposite poles of dharma and kāma, between Rāma and Rāvana. The first sarga of the speech clearly contrasts Rāma's bhāva with Rāvana's in just these terms. But now, says Mārīca, sukha, kingdom, life will all be lost if Rāvana pursues Sītā. Of course, it is Rāvana's dharma as king to seek the prosperity of the kingdom. But Mārīca is asserting more. Questions of Rāvana's svadharma aside, the search for pleasure requires success, and it seems evident that if Rāma is dharma incarnate and Rāvana lust-ridden, Rāvana simply cannot compete. As Sītā has already told her husband, the true root of artha lies in

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"Rāvaṇa" is identical with the initial syllable of "Rāma." Despite Pāṇini's final sūtra, Mārīca/Vālmīki seems to have no qualms about treating a and ā as truly savarṇa (of the same "quality").

dharma (Rām. 3.8.27).

Thus, the argument in the first third of Mārīca's speech drives us firmly back to the inner nature of the characters. Both the second and third sargas show a form of elaboration that we did not find at all in speeches addressed to Rāma; the rhetorical use of narrative. Sarga 36 recounts Mārīca's fateful interference with Viśvamitra's sacrifices. The sage enlists the help of a lad not yet sixteen (in some traditions, twelve), whose arrow promptly knocks Mārīca unconscious, hurling him a hundred yojanas into the sea. The second narrative seems designed to delight the analytical mind. Loosely joined to the rest of the speech, the narrative recounts an incident in which, like the one that is to follow, Mārīca harasses Rāma the ascetic, together with Sītā and Laksmana, in the form of a deer. Death would seem inevitable, and Mārīca's two companions were in fact slain, but somehow (kathamcit) Mārīca himself preserved his life. Now he wanders as a frightened ascetic, seeing Rāma at every turn, hearing Rāma with every noise.

Mārīca's use of narration to elaborate his argument is distinctively Valmikian. In Homer, elaborative narration was used to recall and in a sense to recreate the events that established relations in which persuasive power normally resides. Mārīca's narrations establish no relations whatsoever. His aim is to reveal Rāma's true nature, Rāma's true self. Mārīca recounts for Rāvana two previous occasions when he had encountered that nature, two previous occasions on which Rāma's supreme power had been actualized at Mārīca's expense. That the

two narratives themselves are loosely juxtaposed simply illustrates further the pattern with which we are already familiar. In the Rāmāyaṇa, persuasive force increases not from relating various manifestations of persuasive power but from repeating them.

Just as in the Iliad persuasional speeches addressed to Achilles were typical of rhetoric in general, speeches addressed to Rāvaṇa suggest that in the Rāmāyaṇa persuasional speeches centering on Rāma are similarly typical. The sharp contrast between the two types of practice--Homeric and Valmikian--becomes apparent when rhetoric in the Rāmāyaṇa is concisely systematized in terms of persuasive power.

Ramayanic Persuasion

Power effects change. In the Rāmāyaṇa, the ability to effect change--power in potentiality--characterizes individual beings and classes of beings. The effecting of change--power in actuality--operates among beings as patients and agents, among changed and changer. The means of persuasion in a given case actualize, or attempt to actualize, that form of power capable of changing another being qua agent.

Rāma, Laksmaṇa, Sītā, and Rāvaṇa inhabit a world of individual beings. Quite unlike Plato's eidea, which locate the real in universal names and forms, these beings are particular, discrete "pockets of being"--bhāvāḥ, ātmānaḥ--and they participate as such in the realm of the visible. But the visible constitutes a world; that is, beings progress and act in

the presence of other, similar beings. In the realm of the potential, acts impinging on others are structured (dharma). In the realm of the actual, the individual being is primary; ideal structures may or may not be realized. Participation in the world is itself reciprocal. Individuals affect and are affected; they act (kr) and they "enjoy" (bhuj). Both dimensions of participation, karman and bhojana, are governed by the ideal, by dharma, but the true measure of a being is what it does, not what it is privileged to experience. Dharma tout court is the ideal of action; enjoyment lies more specifically in the realm of sukha. The principle of "asukhatva" does not allow the circle to close. A being should act as dharma requires, regardless of the consequences that redound upon itself.

In the world of the Rāmāyana, power is natural. Its effects extend beyond the human to anything that exists under any form. There is no sharp distinction between human and animal (monkeys, bears, and people all fight on the same side), non-personal nature and personal divinity (sun, fire). Power is also individual. It is applied by individuals to individuals in isolated "spurts." Its greatness is measured by the amount of change that occurs: the number of beings affected, the radicalness of the alterations. Third, power at its most radical is, or may be, generative and destructive. It affects and effects actualization. Power can, under the best of circumstances, call beings or particular forms of being into existence. It can also destroy them. Rāma's threat to

annihilate the universe is not idle. Finally, power is repetitive. Repeated invocations for the same aim increase an individual's stores until power is released. The lesson of the paradigmatic generative act is not lost on ascetics. Repetition and endurance are central to the performance of austerities (tapas). The central human repository of power points out concisely the differences from the Iliad. In Homer, the king is anax andrōn, "sovereign of men;" in the Rāmāyana, he is nṛpa, "protector of men," but also mahīpati, "lord of the earth," and bandhur lokasya, "relative of the world."

Speech--language in actuality--operates within these structures, but it holds a privileged position. Unlike Rāma and Laksmana, for example, words are not themselves individual beings. In addition, they do not operate by direct contact of one individual upon another. Words are special, non-substantial instruments of mediation and communication, peculiar vehicles for the operation of power. They are so not by virtue of their property of reference, but by the very act of speech itself, by the opening of one ātman onto another. Verbal effect is not confined, then, primarily to meaning, demoting other dimensions of speech to meaning's adjuncts. Every aspect of the verbal act is a possible vehicle of power.[1]

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[1]The power of the word forms a pervasive theme in Indian culture, beginning with the Vedic hymns on vāc and the ritual use of syllables such as om. On devices in the Vedas similar to those I have discussed here, see especially Jan Gonda, Stylistic Repetition in the Veda, Verhandelingen der koninklijke nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, afd. Letterkunde, n.s. 65, no. 3 (Amsterdam, 1959).

Spoken by the right beings in the right circumstances, words are able to mediate the transition from potential to actual directly. They impinge upon individuals in their capacity to experience, to "enjoy" (bhuj). Ritual formulae call into existence. Curses disfigure or destroy. Both vehicles of power conform to the nature of power itself. Each aspect of the verbal act--sound, meaning--bears power. Speakers attempt to increase their efficacy by stringing spurts of power together, by repetition.

In a world of countless individuals, tensions, and conflicts, it may not always be permitted, possible, or even desirable to approach other beings directly as objects of action. The sages harassed by rākṣasas, for example, approach Rāma for help not because they do not have the power requited to defend themselves but because they do not wish to dissipate their arduously accumulated tapas (Rām. 3.5; cp. Sītā in 5.20.20). The alternative is recourse to persuasion. Persuasion is more subtle than blessing or curse. It seeks to impinge upon other beings as actors, not as "enjoyers." Through communication, persuasion seeks to intervene in the process by which another individual actualizes itself in deed (karman). But the power behind this intervention is not peculiar to persuasion. The Rāmāyaṇa knows no unique power with which to approach another being as kartṛ rather than as bhoktṛ. Indeed, Sanskrit has no separate word for persuasion at all. Those who persuade simply speak (uvāca), reply (pratyuvāca), ask (papraccha), or occasionally command (nidideśa). A single form

of power underlies them all. Thus mantra is both "ritual formula"--verbally impinging on another being as bhoktṛ--and "counsel"--verbally impinging on another being as kartṛ--while mantṛ, probably mantra's denominative, simply means "to speak," "to relate." Within the formal constraints of the poetic medium, then, power--the natural, individual, repetitive power of generation and destruction--determines the shape of rhetorical praxis.

Speakers who wish to persuade may adopt two argumentative strategies. The choice of persuasion rules out the attempt to alter bhāvas or actually to generate and destroy. Speakers must focus instead on the situation of the kartṛ. On the one hand, they may appeal to the ideals governing the class of individuals to which the addressee belongs (dharma). On the other, they may point out the personal benefits that the individual addressed will receive (sukha). Of course, dharma's plurality and obscurity make arguments based on it susceptible to counterclaim, while even arguments from sukha are not immune to the effects of the hidden.

Naturally, it is in the speaker's best interest to make each argument as powerful as possible. When all is said and done, an extended narrative is generally an uneconomical way to amplify an argument. It uses many words but contributes relatively little: only a single, excessively drawn-out "spurt." Utilizing power's repetitive character--invoking as many different instances as possible (listing)--is much better. Repetition, continued long enough, would seem irresistible. But

the locus of power is the individual, so that it may also be worthwhile to magnify the individual addressed as much as possible by comparing that individual with others. Here the world, the "triple world," is literally the limit, for all beings, personal or not, participate in the dynamics of power. "Charm in the moon, radiance in the sun, ..." The social paradigm is at a distinct disadvantage. The phenomena of nature and the realm of myth provide much more impressive upamānas than the realm of the human, a realm so negligible that Rāvana forgot to include human beings in his request for invulnerability.

Comparison and repetition are not, however, the only ways to set off the individual as bearer of persuasive force. One can also distinguish an individual from its opposite: sukha from duhkha, pratyoksam from paroksam, and so on. In the case of coupled words and phrases we shift from elaboration to adornment at the level of diction. Here, of course, devices of sound may supplement those of meaning, but they may do more, for ātman opens onto ātman through a total speech act. Sound, amplified through identity, repetition, and opposition, can itself contribute persuasive force.

All these operations do not, however, alter power's individual character. The powerful comes in units, and in rhetorical praxis the basic unit is most often, but not invariably, the śloka. Intricate constructions establishing relations between ślokas would be of little use. Power is individual and repetitive, not systemic and economical. If the speaker wishes to avoid pure parataxis, the most he or she needs

is a few fences to corral statements into some semblance of order, to keep, for example, that which repeats in close proximity with what it repeats. Any further elaboration would be wasted effort.

But is not all rhetorical effort wasted effort? Rāma is resolute, virtuously resistant to persuasion. Rāvana is relentless, viciously resistant to persuasion. When it appears that persuasion finally has occurred for the better, Rāma's steadfast virtue calls persuasion itself into question. Rāma, so he says, was not fully aware of Sītā's (internal, hence hidden) intentions in the matter of forest-dwelling. The sages in Dandaka forest should not beseech so, for Rāma fully intended to help them anyway. Rāma seeks Sugrīva's friendship even before the latter's envoy solicits it. Hanumān is correct in recommending that Vibhīsana be received, but Rāma teaches the correct reasons for receiving him. Rāma's resolution--the character of his being--stands solid against every possible persuasive threat.

We should not assume too complacently that resistance to persuasion on the part of the righteous--the inability of others to intervene between a dharmic kartr and his karman--is entirely good. Perhaps Rāma was able to extricate himself from the debacle with Vālin too easily, for the poet treats us to one final incident. Concerned for dharma, adhering to "asukhatva," Rāma renounces the rescued Sītā. The people swoon, the gods--the ordeal-fire itself--cries out, and Rāma receives Sītā back. "I knew she was pure all along, but my subjects needed dramatic

demonstration. Otherwise I would have appeared devoted to kāma." The authors of the Uttarakāṇḍa--the Indian audience--knew better. Such an excuse could not be the end of the story.

CHAPTER FOUR

EPIC PERSUASION IN GREECE AND INDIA

The *Iliad* and the *Rāmāyana* exhibit two different rhetorical *praxeis* that implement two different persuasive powers. In the *Iliad* power is social, systemic, relational, and economical. Persuasion is centered on arguments, using various adjuncts to meaning to strengthen the argument by means of systemic and economical relations. In the *Rāmāyana* power is natural, individual, generative/destructive, and repetitive. Persuasion employs every dimension of the individual speech act to intervene between *kartr* and *karman* with repeated or added verbal spurts.

Power and persuasion are not, however, isolated phenomena in Greece and India. I am not asking here the entirely valid questions of generation and cause: why did power and persuasion in the *Iliad* and the *Rāmāyana* take the forms that they did? I am still asking what those forms might be. In both epics power and persuasion are firmly grounded in the religious. It may be easier to see the religious character of power than of persuasion, especially in India. In recent years power has become part of the stock in trade for the student of Indian religions. But at the same time we should not exaggerate the distance between rhetoric and religion. After all, the only

persons able to persuade Achilles without fail are the gods. In what follows I go so far as to suggest that rhetoric is a variety of religious practice, if a variety of a rather peculiar kind.

Power and Religious Power

Power is no newcomer to the study of religions, certainly not to the study of the religions of the northern Mediterranean and India. In the middle of the twentieth century, the widely read H. J. Rose discussed the earliest religion of Greece in terms of both spirits and impersonal power. He also placed power as numen (sc. mana), with its ancillary sacer (sc. tabu), at the center of the early Roman religion. Somewhat before Rose, John Abbott described Indian religious practices at great length in terms of śakti (again sc. mana) manifested in the positive and negative forms of punya (usually translated "merit") and pāpa (usually "evil"). Both Rose and Abbott were, of course, reaping the heritage of the British school of dynamism.[1]

Dynamism arose at the beginning of the twentieth century. Earlier theories, searching for the origin of religion, had

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[1]For a more complete discussion, with full bibliography, see my article "Dynamism," in The Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Mircea Eliade et al. (New York: Macmillan, forthcoming). The views of H. J. Rose are probably most readily accessible in his Ancient Greek Religion (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1946) and Ancient Roman Religion (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1948). John Abbott's lengthy study is The Keys of Power: A Study of Indian Ritual and Belief (reprint ed.: Seacaucus, N.J.: University Books, 1974). For notions of preanimism, animism, animatism, and anthropomorphism applied to Homer, see Erland Ehnmark, The Idea of God in Homer (Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksells, 1935).

emphasized ideas of personal souls or spirits, mistakes in causal reasoning, and a step by step progression from magic to religion. In response, the dynamists envisioned religion as a body of collective emotional acts, religio-magical in character, that centered on the experience of an impersonal, pervasive power, most commonly called mana.

The theorists conceived of mana differently. In Britain, R. R. Marrett pointed to the experience of awe in the face of the extraordinary and inexplicable, that is, the undifferentiated supernatural.[1] In Germany, K. Th. Preuss dreamed about the primal stupidity (Urdummheit) of a humanity just at the point of transcending the bonds of instinct, and in transcending those bonds, confusing subject and object when it confronted undifferentiated instances of natural, non-mystical efficacy.[2] In France, Marcel Mauss identified mana with society's unconscious, relative values and differences in potential, values and differences that originated in collective impulses and emotions.[3] Still, the evolutionary perspective dominated everywhere. In looking for survivals of the earliest

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[1]R. R. Marett, The Threshold of Religion (London: Methuen, 1909). Later, faced with criticism that no notion of a completely impersonal, diffuse power had ever been found, Marett advocated something of a mediating position that he called animatism. On this view, primitive peoples treat nature as if it were animated, but without ascribing to it the indwelling of special souls.

[2]Above all, K. Th. Preuss, "Der Ursprung der Religion und Kunst," Globus 86 (1904): 321-27, 355-63, 375-79, 388-92, and 87 (1905): 333-37, 347, 380-84, 394-400, 413-19.

[3]Marcel Mauss, A General Theory of Magic, trans. Robert Brain (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972).

religion or manifestations of religion's logically most primitive form, no one paid attention to historical differences between powers. Soon, even theoretical nuances were lost, and mana became, in the common scholarly imagination, simply a reified, autonomous, efficacious, quasi-substantive power residing in all objects and standing at the center of the earliest or most essential religious acts and beliefs. It is in this form that Abbott and Rose applied mana to the Indian and "classical" worlds. It is also in this form that mana entered into reflections in the history of religions proper, such as Nathan Söderblom's Werden des Gottesglaubens and Gerardus van der Leeuw's Religionsphänomenologie.

The dynamists' approach to religious power stands open to criticism on several counts. At the time when the theory was current, criticism began with the linguistic and the historical. In 1914 Paul Radin suggested that ethnologists like Boas, who made impersonal, nonindividualized magical power fundamental to all North American religions, had misread the native American's lack of concern for a supernatural being's precise form. In fact, Radin said, North American religions were nothing short of "Tylorian animism."[1] In the same year, A. M. Hocart criticized theorizing about mana as misinterpreting Oceanic data, asserting that in Polynesia mana was "out and out spiritualistic."[2]

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[1]Paul Radin, "Religion of the North American Indian," Journal of American Folklore 27 (1914): 335-73, esp. 351.

[2]A. M. Hocart, "Mana," Man 14 (1914): 97-101 (entry 46), esp. 100.

Others, such as Wilhelm Schmidt and A. Capell, used historical means to demonstrate the untenability of mana's claim to stand at the "threshold of religion." Mana, they alleged, actually belonged to the youngest Oceanic cultural stratum.[1]

Combined with appropriate theoretical self-consciousness, historical and linguistic criticism could have pushed toward serious questions about power and religious power, but these questions were never asked. Theoretical interests turned elsewhere. First, structural-functionalists objected to the dynamists' assimilation of religious acts to technically effective acts. They preferred to see rituals as serving not an overt purpose but a hidden function. Rituals were, in Bronislaw Malinowski's phrase, the "cement of the social fabric."[2] Then came the resurrection of the symbol in Europe's search for meaning after World War I. Once again, dynamism's purposive side was suspect. Adolf Jensen, for example, felt that religious acts arose as semantically full expressions; only when symbolic contexts waned did conservatively preserved rituals become misunderstood as purposive acts.[3] More commonly,

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[1]The views of Wilhelm Schmidt are approached most conveniently through The Origin and Growth of Religion: Facts and Theories, trans. H. J. Rose (1931; reprint ed.: New York: Cooper Square, 1972). See also A. Capell, "The Word 'Mana:' A Linguistic Study," Oceania 9 (1938-1939): 89-96.

[2]Bronislaw Malinowski, Magic, Science, and Religion and Other Essays, selected with an introduction by Robert Redfield (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1948), p. 50.

[3]Adolf E. Jensen, Myth and Cult among Primitive Peoples, trans. Marianna Tax Choldin and Wolfgang Weissleder (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).

however, questions of power and religious power were simply left in reflective backwaters. Mircea Eliade was something of an exception, for he spoke of hierophanies that were at the same time kratophanies.[1] Nevertheless, the notion of "kratophany" contributed little to the structure of his thought. The powerful was simply a by-product of the manifestation of Being in its fulness. It had no direct affect on the dialectics of the sacred.

But questions of power could not remain submerged forever. A radically synchronic, semantic orientation, epitomized in the abstractions of structural anthropology, left too much of human life and experience untouched. Anthropologies of praxis and other "post-structuralist" trends have once again begun to take power seriously, now not the quasi-substantive mana but power characterizing the struggles and expressions of human beings living in society and societies. Provincial intellectual concerns echoing a cultural optimism devastated by "World" [that is, culture-wide] War seem to be yielding to the influence of the struggle for coexistence and economic subsistence in a post-colonial world. Students of particular religions, too, find it impossible to ignore religion's involvement with power. Wendy O'Flaherty, for example, has found in "power" (tapas) a key--one of many--to Indian mythology.[2]

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[1]See Mircea Eliade, Myths, Dreams, and Mysteries: The Encounter between Contemporary Faiths and Archaic Realities, trans. Philip Mairet (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), esp. chap. 4, "Power and Holiness in the History of Religions," pp. 123-54.

[2]See, for example, Wendy D. O'Flaherty, Women, Androgynes,

For historians of religions--scholars interested not simply in power as it appears in particular cultures but in a dialectic between particular instances of religious power and models of religion as a whole--a renewed interest in religious power raises questions that the earlier dynamism saw no need to address. In the dynamist view, religion was defined as concern for a particular kind of power. Today, differences between mana and orenda, for example, are too readily apparent. It is no longer possible to define religious power as a reified, autonomous, quasi-substantive, nonpersonal efficacy. That is, it is no longer possible to delimit religious power simply on the basis of "content" ("nonpersonal substantiality"), manner of working, or scope of effect. Furthermore, it is no longer possible to assume that power is the definitive characteristic of religion. Lacking evolutionistic dispositions, we face the task not of reconciling conflicting views of the "origin" of religion but of integrating different sorts of religious power into different religious complexes, complexes that may include power in distinctively different ways.

Certainly, the first question that dynamism's demise leaves us, then, is, "What counts as religious power?" It is not simply enough to reply, in the manner of "descriptive circumscription:" "power found as an integral part of commonly recognized religious traditions."[1] Why are these traditions

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and Other Mythical Beasts (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980).

[1]"Descriptive circumscription," a technique of

commonly recognized? What implicit criteria operate in the minds of those who recognize them? So much recent thought on religion has been done under the sign of meaning, a sign opposed to questions of power, that adopting common ideas of what counts as religion and their implicit general models may very well blind us to new insights that a shift in "paradigm" from meaning and symbol to event, praxis, and power might be expected to produce. Because we must always begin where we find ourselves, I suggest that it might be more profitable to begin to answer the question of what counts as religious power by transforming several current notions of what counts as religion in the direction that my shift in perspective seems to require.

A good deal of (relatively) recent writing on the definition of religion has been devoted to methods by which definitions are and should be formulated.[1] When definitions themselves are offered, their contents, stripped of elements

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"circumscribing" religion by compiling a list of its common characteristics, is a phrase popular especially among European historians of religions. See especially Th. P. van Baaren, "Science of Religion as a Systematic Discipline," in Religion, Culture, and Methodology: Papers of the Groningen Working-Group for the Study of Fundamental Problems and Methods of the Science of Religion, ed. Th. P. van Baaren and H. J. W. Drijvers (The Hague: Mouton, 1973), pp. 35-56.

[1]See, e.g., Robert D. Baird, Category Formation in the History of Religions (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), esp. pp. 17-27; Th. P. van Baaren; Ugo Bianchi, "The Definition of Religion: On the Methodology of Historical-Comparative Research," in The History of Religions (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), pp. 201-20, and "Current Methodological Issues in the History of Religions," in The History of Religions: Retrospect and Prospect, ed. Joseph M. Kitagawa (New York: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 53-72; and Kurt Rudolph, Historical Fundamentals and the Study of Religions (New York: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 45-49.

that limit religion to the semantic and symbolic, fall into three classes: religion's place in human life, religion's effects, and commonly observed religious features. These three classes can provide in turn preliminary criteria for distinguishing religious power.

Paul Tillich's popular idea of religion as "ultimate concern"[1] places too great an emphasis on personal valuation. Rote participation in Christianity may be lamentable to a theologian, but it is still an aspect of empirically given Christianity. Avid participation in the stock market is only an obsession, although an obsession that theologians find useful to label "idolatry." Where Tillich errs with the individual, Joachim Wach errs with the typical. In thinking of religion as "response" to the "experience" of "Ultimate Reality,"[2] he attaches too great an importance to a particular type of religion. Limiting Wach's "experience" to mystical psychological encounter unnecessarily compounds the error. Nevertheless, it is impossible to ignore mystical romanticism as the proximate and German Pietism (via Schleiermacher) as the

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[1]Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 11-15.

[2]Joachim Wach, The Comparative Study of Religions, ed. Joseph M. Kitagawa (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 30-32; cp. Wach's "Universals in Religion," in Types of Religious Experience: Christian and Non-Christian (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 30-47, esp. p. 32. See also Joseph M. Kitagawa, "Primitive, Classical, and Modern Religions," in The History of Religions: Essays on the Problem of Understanding, ed. Joseph M. Kitagawa, Mircea Eliade, and Charles H. Long (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 39-65, esp. p. 40.

ultimate source of Wach's concern with "expressions" of religious "experience."

These points aside, however, Tillich, Wach, and others who speak similarly point to one of religion's prime characteristics, its significance (in a logical, not psychological, sense). Granted, religion does not always carry great urgency in the minds of its practitioners. Still, religion does deal with what is most fundamental to human life as its practitioners live it and see it, regardless of the degree of vigilance and attention that the fundamental requires. Religion's fundamental character provides one criterion by which power can be deemed religious: religious power stands at the heart of the processes and events of human life as a whole, or else is implicated in particular events and processes that are themselves singled out as most fundamental to human life.

As a human phenomenon, however, religion is not simply the existence of the fundamental. Religion is human participation in, action on, or response to the fundamental. Reaping the heritage of Herder's opposition to rationalistic faculty psychology, Wach asserted that the religious experience evoked a total response of the total, integrated personality.[1] Working more strictly within symbolic anthropology, Clifford Geertz has noted that religion includes a response to symbols in moods, motivations, and concepts that are deemed "uniquely factual."[2]

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[1]Wach, Comparative Study, pp. 32-35, and the other citations in the preceding note.

[2]Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System," in

Wach's total response of the total person is unnecessarily stringent, especially once we admit rote participation to the realm of the empirically religious. We would make a better point by saying that the religious is not limited to one particular sphere of activity; we may--but not must--see the religious in any--but not every--dimension of human life. Still, we must see the religious. Phenomena oriented toward the fundamental must somehow be distinguishable from ordinary human phenomena. Otherwise, religion simply merges with life, religious power with every sort of power. A second criterion for religious power might read: religious power is subject to invocation, manipulation, and response of any sort beyond that which is given in the (to us) simply utilitarian acquisition and application of power between individuals and groups.

The same transformation that I applied to Wach shifts an "and" in my summary of Geertz's definition to "and/or"--"moods, motivations, and/or concepts"--with consequences that are not unimportant. When religion is conceived as a set of symbols, it is impossible to deny that those symbols are cognitively recognized in some way.[1] Religious power, however, may be more a mode of activity than a precise or imprecise concept. It may not even be named as such. Indeed, neither sort of persuasive

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Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion, ed. Michael Banton (London: Tavistock Publications, 1966), pp. 1-46; reprinted in Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 87-125.

[1] Cp. Geertz's precise formulation: "a system of symbols which acts . . . by formulating conceptions . . . " (Anthropological Approaches, p. 4; Interpretation, p. 90).

power discussed in chapters two and three was ever mentioned as such by Homer or Vālmīki. In discussing "religious power," I am not explicating meanings that appear to religious persons themselves. I am attempting to make sense of the totality of religious life--religious practices as well as religious thoughts--in my own terms.

There are some definitions of religion, however, that simply identify features that often appear to the Western investigator. For example, Melford Spiro ostensively defines religion as "an institution consisting of culturally patterned interactions with culturally postulated superhuman beings."[1] Kurt Rudolph has formulated a "rule of thumb" for "in-house use" that is considerably more extensive: "religion is the traditional belief of a community or of an individual in the influence of superhuman or supernatural powers of various sorts which affect natural and social occurrences, together with the resulting worship of those powers through specific actions which are handed down in fixed forms by the community and about which is grouped a set of doctrines, transmitted orally or in writing."[2]

The obvious problem with formulations such as Spiro's and Rudolph's is that they tend to confine religion to specific characteristics or forms. Nevertheless, they point in an

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[1]Melford E. Spiro, "Religion: Problems of Definition and Explanation," in Banton, ed., Anthropological Approaches, pp. 85-126, esp. pp. 96-98.

[2]Rudolph, p. 49.

important direction. The realization that what is fundamental to human life "transcends" the human, although not necessarily the empirical, is not confined to the Christian (and post-Christian) West. Where that realization is found, familiar features--for example, gods and rituals--provide clues to the presence of the religious. But we must assess these clues carefully. On a symbolic view, such clues may be directly religious, that is, they may constitute a system of symbols. When the topic is religious power, however, we must use them more subtly: familiar features that mark the "transcendent" nature of the fundamental are signposts, but not necessary signposts, to operations involving religious power. This third criterion may be softer than the other two, but it has distinct practical advantages. It gives more immediate access to the religious--a surer place to start--than abstract considerations of what is "fundamental" in a given community.

Both the Iliad and the Rāmāyaṇa contain familiar clues to the religious. The most prominent are "divine" beings: theoi athanatoi, devāsurāḥ. But the fundamentally religious character of both poems does not derive from the presence of gods and demons. Both epics focus too exclusively on the human. In the Iliad, the gods observe, comment on, and occasionally direct the action of the poem, but their position is tenuous enough to have led several modern scholars to remark that Homer "overdetermines" acts and events.[1] In the Rāmāyaṇa, the divine

[1]On questions of divine and human responsibility for action, see above all Albin Lesky, Göttliche und menschliche

forms a backdrop that, aside from similes and infrequent interruptions, hardly enters the poem at all. As the action unfolds, the devotional notion that the principal characters are gods in disguise is almost entirely ignored.[1] Taking the gods as clues to the religious rather than as constituting a set of religious symbols themselves, I am tempted to turn our common notion around. I am tempted to say that in each poem the gods are religious and assume their character as religious beings through their participation in something that is more fundamental to Vālmīki's world and Homer's society, through their participation in power, that is, religious power.

The World According to Vālmīki

Power appears throughout the Rāmāyaṇa. Nowhere, however, is it applied more intensely than in the sixth kāṇḍa, the battle kāṇḍa. Forces of dharma and forces of pleasure lock in mortal combat, and during that combat, a distinct image of power emerges.

According to my second and third criteria, this power is clearly religious. Familiar religious features invoke,

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Motivation im homerischen Epos (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1961).

[1]There is in fact a long tradition among certain Western scholars of denying any religious significance to Vālmīki's poem, beginning with Hermann Jacobi, The Rāmāyaṇa, trans. S. N. Ghosal (Baroda, India: Oriental Institute, 1960). Recently such a view has been championed by both J. L. Brockington, Righteous Rāma, pp. 13-14, 194-225; and Robert P. Goldman, in the introduction to his translation of The Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki: An Epic of Ancient India, vol. 1 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 41-49. Unfortunately, I find that this contention implies much too narrow a view of religion.

manipulate, and reveal power in what are to us extra-utilitarian efforts. Indrajit's sacrifice summons invincibility (Rām. 6.69). Through tapas, Atikāya receives extraordinary weapons and prowess from Brahmā (Rām. 6.59.30-31). Before slaying Indrajit,

> The fortunate Lakṣmaṇa placed an arrow on that best bow, drew it, and spoke a word fostering his purpose:
>
> "If Daśaratha's son Rāma
> is dharmātmaned and promise-true
> in virility unequalled,
> then slay that son of Rāvaṇa."
>
> Rām. 6.78.30-31

The rākṣasa Vidyujjihva confounds Sītā by creating a fake head of Rāma, severed from its trunk, through māyā (Rām. 6.22.6-9). Presaging death, devas rain blood on Rāvana's chariot (Rām. 6.94.15ab).

Implicated in sacrifices, divine gifts, invocations, magic, portents, and more, what are the characteristics of this religious power? It is not possible to discuss power's "substantiality," its "reity." Vālmīki is no metaphysician. But it is possible to speak of power's effects and its manner of working.

First, note the immense scope of power's effects, which extend to the entire natural world. Monkeys and bears may fight with rocks and trees, but human heroes and rākṣasas use no ordinary weapons. Rāma's arrows intimidate the ocean (Rām. 6.14) and illumine the cardinal directions (Rām. 6.34.21-23). In the duel of Rāma and Makarākṣa, multitudes of arrows fill

directions and intermediate directions and entirely blanket the earth (Rām. 6.66.27). Naturally, the most impressive weapon is reserved for the most decisive moment of all:

> Formerly fashioned for Indra by Brahmā boundless in energy,
> formerly given the king of suras longing to conquer the three worlds;
>
> In its feathers the wind; fire and sun in its tip;
> its shaft the sky; Meru and Mandara in weight;
>
> Bright flaming with beauty; good-shafted; gold-ornamented;
> made with the tejas of all beings; possessed of the sun's luster;
>
> Enveloped in smoke like the age-ending fire; ablaze like a venomous snake;
> cleaving hosts of chariots, elephants, and horses with speed;
>
> Crushing doors, iron-bars, and mountains as well;
> its limbs drenched in blood; fat-smeared, most dreadful;
>
> Of essence of diamond; loud-thundering; dreadful to encounter;
> fearful, causing trembling in all, like a hissing snake;
>
> To heroes, vultures, cranes, hosts of jackals and rākṣasas
> giving nourishment always in battle; Yama in form, conveyor of fear;
>
> Delighter of monkey-kings; disheartener of raksasas;
> feathered with various feathers--beautiful and conspicuous--from Garuda.
>
> Rām. 6.97.5-12

But even in the battle kāṇḍa, immense power is not limited to weapons. When the muni Bharadvāja offers a boon, Rāma asks that the trees lining the road to Ayodhyā flower and drip honey unseasonably. "Plants that lacked fruit bore fruit, and plants devoid of flower abounded in flowers; those that were withered became covered with leaves and flowed dripping with honey" (Rām. 6.112.18). By his mere thought, Brahmā creates a cart to fly

through the air, the vimāna Puspaka (Rām. 6.115.23d).

What are the effects of this power? What changes does it produce wherever it appears in the three worlds? First, it destroys. Weapons endowed with the ability to fulfill mammoth aims evoke the threat of universal destruction. Makarāksa's spear causes all creatures to tremble, for it gleams like the fire at the end of the age (Rām. 6.66.26-27). But the power to destroy can also counteract destruction. Rāvana receives personal prowess and invincibility, the ability to destroy others and avoid destruction himself, as a gift from the gods.

Religious power counteracts destruction most directly in healing. Battle done, Indra restores Rāma's slain allies to life (Rām. 6.108). Medicines, too, have the power to restore, reminiscent of the power of creation. When Garuda bursts on the scene to free Rāma and Laksmana bound by the serpents of Indrajit (Rām. 6.40.36), Suśena was just on the verge of dispatching monkeys to the ocean of milk, to the mountains of Candra and Drona, to retrieve two herbs that grow where the immortal nectar (amrta) was first churned, two herbs that Brhaspati once used to heal the devas overcome by the Dānavas in battle (Rām. 6.40.26c-32). Later, the mountain of medicinal herbs that Hanumān retrieves is located, appropriately, at the earth's navel (nabhi) (Rām. 6.61.54d).[1]

Power not only restores and destroys; it creates. Of course, cosmogony itself is no issue in the Yuddha-kānda. But

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[1]Motifs reminiscent of Mircea Eliade's work are so prominent here as to require only a gentle reminder.

"creation" does occur there--not always by the "magical" agency of illusion (māyā)--on the more limited scale of transformation and the calling into existence of that which exists beyond the normal orders of nature. For the latter, think of Bharadvāja's honey-dripping blossoms and the Puspaka cart that Rāvana pilfered from Kubera. For the former, consider a śloka from Suka's description of Rāma's allies: "the monkeys, born from devas and Gandharvas, are kāmarūpināh [can assume any shape at will]" (Rām. 6.19.5cd). At this line, the poet's audience must surely recall Hanuman's metamorphoses in leaping the ocean and breaking his bonds in Lańkā.

How does this power of generation, destruction, and restoration that operates throughout the three worlds work? Consider the descriptions of Rāma's Gandharva weapon:

> They did not observe Rāghava attacking their bodies,
> just as creatures do not observe the ātman of beings
> standing among the objects of sense.
>
> "This one destroys the elephant army." "This one destroys
> great chariots."
> "This one destroys with his sharp arrows footsoldiers and
> horses."
>
> All those rākṣasas slew each other, who had the appearance
> of Rāma,
> in battle, because they looked like Rāghava.
>
> Deceived by the great Gandharva weapon, whose ātman was
> great,
> they did not see Rāma destroying the enemy army.
>
> Those rākṣasas saw thousands of Rāmas in battle;
> then again they saw only one Kākutstha in great battle.
>
> The golden tip of the great-ātmaned bow revolving,
> its appearance a circle of firebrands, they saw, but not
> Rāghava.
>
> Rām. 6.51.20-25

Let me single out two aspects of the working of religious power from this account. First, note how Vālmīki handles the immensity of the weapon's power. There are, it seems, thousands of Rāmas. Multiplication--repetition--increases power's magnitude. The greater the number of agents, or the greater the number of means, or the greater the number of items affected, the greater the power. Almost unavoidably, individuality often perishes. The speaker or narrator simply adds, lumps together, or counts further individuals of the same class. The greatest power, the largest multiplication, bursts the ability to fathom. Suka and Sārana are unable to count the army of monkeys (Rām. 6.16.10). When Suka makes a lame attempt later, the epic tradition recognizes its chance for mathematical gyrations (Rām. 6.19.33; cp. 6.*411-*416). Similarly, the more ferocious battle scenes portray arrows released by the thousands in an instant (cp. Rām. 6.96.28-29). And there is nothing quite like an itemization of destruction to show the impact of really great power. Kumbhakarna dead, the monkeys set Laṅkā to flames:

> Attacked on all sides by troops of monkeys holding
> firebrands,
> those standing guard, of deformed eyes, fled.
>
> On the gates, towers, and thoroughfares, on various
> buildings,
> and on palaces they cast the oblation-eater with delight.
>
> Houses by the thousands the oblation-eater burned
> and the abodes of all house-holding rākṣasas.
>
> Ram. 6.62.5-7

Again, the epic tradition could not ignore a golden opportunity:

Palaces as big as mountains fell to the surface of the
earth;
aloes there were burned and the best fine sandal;

pearls, jewels resplendant, diamonds, even coral;
linen there was burned and radiant silk;

various sorts of woollens, gold-vessels, and implements;

. . .

Rām. 6.*1407

Unlike these examples, however, the multiplicity produced by the Gandharva weapon does not overwhelm individuality. Thousands appear to be fighting, but they are all Rāma. Here a second aspect of the working of power in the Rāmāyana emerges: its localization. Numberless hoardes may burn cities; they may even drape the mammoth frame of a Kumbhakarna; but they cannot kill him. Colossal destruction stems from an encounter of one against one. To kill the likes of Rāvana and Kumbhakarna requires a single hero of even greater stature. For that purpose, Rāma entered the world. The power of creation, destruction, and restoration localizes itself preeminently in individuals (cp. the king).

Possessed by individuals, preeminent power is also destroyed on an individual basis. One by one, Rāvana's generals enter battle and succumb to defeat, each fighting alone until, all slain, Rāvana takes to the field by himself. Homer depicts a series of individual duels, too, but his duels are deeds of heroes fighting side by side, not one after the other. In the non-martial sphere, it is the preeminent, individual muni, Bharadvāja who transforms the trees along the road to Ayodhyā. Likewise, preeminent power is bestowed as a gift from

individuals who have power to give. In return for thousands of years of god-pleasing tapas, Brahmā grants Rāvana limited invincibility (Rām. 6.80.23-28). Individual, added curses bring about his eventual demise (cp. Rām. 6.*1026).

Having examined power's nature, I must now return to the question of its religiosity. It is clear that in the scope of its effects and the manner of its operations, power is one. But it should be just as clear that my third, softer criterion for religious power holds in some of the preceding examples, but not in all. Is power religious in some cases but not in others? A clue to the answer is found in the persons of two rather different figures who share this power, Kumbhakarna and Rāvana.

Unlike the power needed to check Kumbhakarna's monstrous voracity, Kumbhakarna's own abilities stand, in one possible view, largely outside the second as well as the third criterion for religious power that I advanced above.

> By his own nature (prakṛtyā) Kumbhakarṇa is possessed of tejas and great might;
> The might of all other rākṣasa-kings derives from receiving a boon.
>
> Rām. 6.49.12

Kumbhakarna has done nothing to invoke, acquire, or manipulate his appetite. He was simply born hungry. His appetitive power was not given by divine being or sage. It is central to no religious observance and it constitutes no part of religion "descriptively circumscribed." Rapaciousness is simply one of Kumbhakarna's innate characteristics. He is a trencherman of the highest order. The closest we come to a religious clue is

metaphorical, or more than metaphorical. "The thirty [gods] could not slay him, saying in delusion (mohitāḥ), 'This is Kāla [time]'" (Rām. 6.49.11cd).

Kumbhakarna's incredible gastronomic abilities are not the only instance in which a unified power straddles the divide between divine and non-divine. Omens do, too. As Rāvana approached death, the devas rained blood. But then, "Strong circular winds blew from left to right. In whatever direction his chariot went, a flock of large vultures followed roaming in the sky. Laṅkā, covered with twilight that resembled the China-rose, looked like the earth ablaze in the sky . . . " (Rām. 6.94.15c-17). If the gods provided the only criterion for the religious, invocations addressed to gods would be religious, but other invocations would not. The same would be true of herbs used to heal. The powers of tapas may provoke divine boons, but they do not derive solely from boons. For that matter, there is nothing particularly god-like about showers of arrows, except that they invite comparison with Indra.

"Except" sounds innocuous enough, but divine delusion about Kumbhakarna sounds less so. The gods do not compare Kumbhakarna with Kāla. They actually mistake him for the invincible destroyer who brings the age to a close. The basis of comparison has become a basis for (mistaken) identity. Kumbhakarna must be the age-ender because of the magnitude of the destruction he wreaks and because of the degree of his invincibility. Kumbhakarna must be Kāla because of the greatness of his power.

The gods' own error shows how impossible it is here to distinguish the religious sharply from the non-religious on the basis of a connection with the divine. The divine is merely a clue to--one particularly vivid location of--the operations of religious power. Divinely accoutred or not, the power of creation, destruction, and restoration is fundamental to an entire way of life, or rather, to more. In Vālmīki's eyes, the triple world comprises individual beings living under various forms--humans, monkeys, bears, birds, serpents, rākṣasas, devas, Dānavas, Gandharvas, and more--the course of whose very existence is determined by the power to call these beings and their forms into existence, to destroy them, to restore them, and to transform them. This power and its operation constitute the preconditions for every activity of life, preconditions that are recognized, responded to (recall the omens), manipulated, or invoked, whether in tandem with gods and demons or in some other form. Such preconditioning by the power of creation and destruction is truly fundamental, truly religious.

The gods may not exhaust the religious, but as particularly vivid embodiments of religious power, they share in the characteristics of power. Thus, Vālmīki's gods are "natural." The lines that demarcate "divine" and "natural" are blurred; personal, social, characteristics are kept to a minimum. Agni is the (sacrificial) fire, Vāyu the wind. The age-destroyer, Kāla, is time. Vālmīki is not fond of the abstract, but if he had been, there were, of course, gods at hand to encompass power's general operations of creation, destruction, and

restoration/preservaton. Second, the gods are "individual." In the Rāmāyaṇa, divine society is underdeveloped. Vālmīki shows us no signs of divine family squabbles. Social interaction is minimal, and the social is manifested largely in names: a grandsire, a consort, a son. In general, divine beings appear en masse and indistinguishably--devas, Dānavas, Gandharvas--or they act on their own as Agni/Pāvaka, Brahmā, or Indra without direct intercourse with other divine beings. Rāmāyaṇa 6.105 combines both modes of operation. The divine speaks on Sītā's behalf first as an indistinct assemblage, then as Brahmā alone. Third, the gods create and destroy. Devas bring into being the natural phenomena that they are--fire, wind, rain, time--and they can put a halt to their ravages. Sītā pleads, "Agni, be cold to Hanumān," and he--or should I say it?--is (Rām. 5.51.24-27). Finally, the gods are capable of multiplication. Like Rāma multiplied by the Gandharva weapon, they can appear in several different forms at the same time. In Vālmīki's world, god can remain in heaven as Visnu, dwell here in Dharanī as the four sons of Daśaratha, and still as purusottama have all the world for his body.

Religion and Power in Homeric Society

Religious power of the sort found in the Rāmāyaṇa is not unknown in ancient Greece (cp. esp. Euripides Bacchae). It is not even foreign to Homeric epic. Its most conspicuous Homeric appearances, however, occur in the Odyssey: Circe's transformations and Calypso's enchantments. Significantly,

these figures, both women, live outside the geographical and cultural boundaries of normal, androcentric Homeric society, although not outside the realm of possible human encounter. Concern with such power remained a definite undercurrent in Greek religious life even when Greece's religion of "politico-social power" reached its apex.

In seeking the religious dimension behind the power of peithesthai, however, it is naturally necessary to look not outside but inside the setting that peithesthai delimits. Homeric society presents a variety of familiar religious acts and events, acts and events familiar because they almost invariably address or derive from one god or another, Zeus if no deity in particular. Sacrifices begin meals and conclude alliances. Prayers precede uncertain undertakings and lament disastrous outcomes. Oaths call the gods to witness interactions established in potentiality ("we shall . . . ") or actuality ("I never . . . "). Omens communicate divine will or knowledge, usually the will or knowledge of Zeus, a god so closely connected with the atmosphere that he touches the ground (presumably) only where earth and sky meet, in the far south among the Aithiopians. In the event of divine silence, humans can attempt to initiate conversation (divination, prayer). In the event of extreme concern, other gods than Zeus may well appear to a hero in person: an unseen voice, a form poorly veiled as mortal, a figure left to the imagination.

We cannot say precisely what Homer thinks power is. Like Vālmīki, Homer is no metaphysician. But once again we can talk

about what power does and its manner of operation.

In the Iliad religious power extends only to human persons and to those capable of interacting as persons. Of course, gods have greater abilities than mortals, and their superiority is not limited to such social categories as aretē, timē, and biē (Il. 9.498). Divine persons eat immortal food (ambrosiē), drink divine drink (nektar), have special liquid in their veins (ichōr), drive immortal horses, wear ambrosial raiment, control meteorological and natural phenomena such as fire, assume animal and human form at will, inspire and dash the spirits of horses and men, shadow the eyes of mortals with mist, figuratively and literally, invisibly transport wounded warriors to safety, and preserve corpses unscathed and untouched.

Despite these characteristics, all of which distinguish immortals from mortals, descriptions reminiscent of the Rāmāyaṇa's "natural" power are rare, if not unique to a single sexual encounter of god with god:

> . . . the son of Kronos caught his wife in his arms. There underneath them the divine earth broke into young, fresh grass, and into dewy clover, crocus, and hyacinth so thick and soft it held the hard ground deep away from them.
> There they lay down together and drew about them a golden wonderful cloud, and from it the glimmering dew descended.
>
> Il. 14.346-351

Even here, Vālmīki would have spoken differently, if not to say better. What poor gods whose love-making produces such meager results! Blooming trees of numberless species, rains of flowers, radiant limbs in place of Homer's paltry pragmatism

(bodies cushioned on new-grown grass indeed!), sublime pleasures, choice similes--with such ornaments would a Vālmīki or a mahākavi adorn the scene.

But more important here are other characteristics of the Homeric gods' abilities. First, such divine powers cannot be directly appropriated by humans; they are uniquely divine. No bow of Achilles's will disturb the ocean or illumine the quarters. If mortals wish to benefit from the gods' unique capacities, they must enlist divine aid through appropriate, social means: they must make the gods philoi.

Second, the unique capacities of Homer's gods are frequently devoted to social ends. In fact, these are often precisely the capacities that the gods require if they are to interact socially with humans. In the Rāmāyana, nature itself signals immanent actualizations pertaining to powerful beings through portents. The intervention of personal beings is unnecessary. Powerful actualization seems more or less contagious on its own. In turn, humans and other concerned beings read nature's signs. In the Iliad, omens require personal agency. A god applies power over nature for the entirely social purpose of communicating with mortals. When gods assume human shape, they are simply adopting a form that allows social intercourse with human beings. "It is hard," says Hera, "for gods to appear in their true shape" (Il. 20.131)--hard on the viewer, not on the appearer.

Within the social compass, the effects of religious power are limited to interactions and interrelations. Indrajit may

sacrifice for personal invisibility and invincibility, but in the Iliad, sacrifices reestablish relations with gods and with men. When relations with Apollo are strained, the Achaians bathe and sacrifice to pacify him (Il. 1.312-17). Similarly, a joint sacrifice renews proper relations with Chryses at the return of his daughter (Il. 1.440-76). At a sacrifice, Homer tells us, no one's thumos lacks an appropriate (eïsē) portion (Il. 1.468 et passim).

But sacrifices maintain as well as reestablish relations. In the Rāmāyana, boons granted for tapas performed are not reciprocations. Brahmā does not benefit personally from Rāvana's millenia of austerities. Tapas and sacrifice have their own benefits, quite apart from action on the part of any personal being. Homer's heroes, however, quite clearly think of sacrifice and other observances as gifts that, like all gifts, comprise the formal activities constituting stable relations of philotēs:

> . . . Hear me
> lord of the silver bow . . .
> Smintheus, if ever it pleased your heart that I built your temple,
> if ever it pleased you that I burned all the rich thigh pieces
> of bulls, of goats, then bring to pass this wish I pray for:
> let the Danaans pay for my tear shed.
>
> Il. 1.37, 39-42

Hektor can no longer pray, but the reciprocity that his gifts deserve is not forgotten.

> . . . Hektor, too
> was loved by the gods, best of all the Trojan mortals.
> I loved him too. He never failed of gifts to my liking.
> Never yet has my altar gone without fair sacrifice,
> the smoke and the savor of it, since that is our portion of
> honor (geras).
>
> Il. 24.66-70

When the context of power shifts from peithesthai to machesthai, the characteristics of power are not constant. In battle, after all, the aim is to destroy. But machesthai is a social (or anti-social) act, and power demonstrates some continuity between the martial and the social spheres. Athena makes flames shoot from Achilles's head; a signal of Achilles's rage, these flames terrify. The armor from Hephaistos's forge gleams like fire. About weapons or bodies, fiery haloes visibly indicate extreme, god-given excellence that will be demonstrated in performance (aretē). In no case, however, does such god-given fire itself accomplish anything in human battle. It certainly does not reduce the enemy to ash, as Sītā tells Rāvana she has been refraining from doing (Rām. 5.20.20) To insure success, gods do not bestow preternatural powers. They amplify powers that are present in all human beings. They strengthen knees and shoulders; they "breathe in" menos with their speeches (cp. Il. 15.254-62). Poseidon and Ares are even known to lead armies in person. On the defensive side, gods make heroes impregnable not only through exceedingly fine armor but by standing guard themselves. With gusts of wind and quick hands they avert menacing weapons from their favorites.

Obviously, we are no longer looking at the extent of power

but at its manner of working. A general statement can extend the workings of bellicose power to the realm of peithesthai. In the Iliad, religious power focuses not on individuals who immediately and directly accomplish their aims but on the systemic webs of causality through which individuals operate. Heroes commonly kill with their arms; gods interested in a hero's success may strengthen arms. The art of healing offers a more pacific example in which the familiar clue to the religious is present. Healers, like kings who hold themistes and scepters from Zeus, are themselves sons of gods and/or instructed by divine beings of various sorts. Even so, instantaneous cures are confined to the mythology of Olympus. Speedy recovery from wounds is part and parcel of a god's immunity to death (see Il. 5.901). For humans, healing is generally more tedious. The healer intervenes only at certain points to hasten the normal healing processes of human recovery. Drugs and prayers anesthetize and cauterize (Il. 11.846-848). Gods revive stricken spirits. But when Diomedes is wounded by a single arrow in the sole of the foot, even the best medical attention leaves him limping among the ships--a far cry from Laksmana's immediate recovery, through inhalation, from what had seemed certain death. When a wounded Aeneas returns to battle as if nothing had happened, the poet himself knows something is odd:

> So Aeneas stood among his friends, who were happy
> when they saw him coming back, still alive, and unwounded
> and full of brave spirit; yet they asked him no questions,
> for their other toils would not let them.
> Il. 5.514-517 (translation slightly altered)

Religious power operating through a systemic web does not invite repetition. A wound, once cauterized, does not improve with further cauterization. A god invoked (apparently) does not need to be invoked again in the same situation. The Iliad's religious observances are economical. That is not to say that the Iliad's religious observances are not magnificent. Feeding an army requires sacrifice on an immense scale. But it requires no more than one immense sacrifice at any single meal. Religious power is not applied with reckless repetition.

Consider the use of power to communicate in omens. The Rāmāyana's portents revel in what would seem superfluous expenditure to one of Homer's Greeks. Monstrous clouds rain blood; draught animals weep; banners fall; vultures squawk hideously; misshapen women laugh deridingly; dogs devour offerings; donkeys and cows, mice and mongooses, cats and leopards, pigs and dogs miscegenate, and still the portents in even a single list are not exhausted (Rām. 6.23.22-27). In the Iliad, one sign, perhaps narrated in some detail, is sufficient.

> [Agamemnon] spoke thus, and as he wept the father took pity upon him
> and bent his head, that the people should stay alive, and not perish.
> Straightaway he sent down the most lordly of birds, an eagle,
> with a fawn, the young of the running deer, caught in his talons,
> who cast down the fawn beside Zeus's splendid altar
> where the Achaians wrought their devotions to Zeus of the Voices.
> They, when they saw the bird and knew it was Zeus who sent it,
> remembered once again their warcraft, and turned on the Trojans.
>
> Il. 8.245-252

If comparison with the Rāmāyaṇa has any point to suggest, it surely invites us to consider more closely the relationship between religious power and the gods. Are the gods religious because they are repositories of religious power, or is power religious because it is wielded by the gods?

First, religious power in the Iliad is quite clearly fundamental power. It stands at the center of life in Homeric society; it validates and operates through all Homeric institutions. Second, there are in fact manifestations of religious power apart from immortal beings.

> Then they stretched the strife of battle most dreadful,
> dark-haired Poseidon and radiant Hektor,
> one supporting the Trojans, the other the Argives.
> Il. 14.389-391 (my translation)

There is no hint here that Poseidon and Hektor employ two different powers. Both drive on their forces in the same manner, The only difference is that one is mortal, the other immortal. But neither mortal nor immortal occupies the ultimate stage of determination in the Iliad's systemic webs of causation. Relations between fate and the gods are somewhat ambiguous. It is certain that the gods have not established moira (fate), which is in the Iliad still generally impersonal (but see Il. 24.49). It is also certain that the gods occasionally contemplate contravening moira but never actually decide to do so. Whether the gods could contravene fate if they desired is, for lack of evidence, unanswerable.[1]

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[1]On fate and the gods in archaic Greece, see William

Third, despite the fundamental character of religious power and despite certain manifestations of it apart from the gods, it is more difficult to separate gods and religious power in the Iliad than in the Rāmāyana. Even moira requires divine agents. There is no Iliadic Kumbhakarna. Achilles may be most powerful by birth, but those who recognize his natural attributes simultaneously stress his divine parentage (cp., e.g., Il. 1.178 & 280). When the Trojan women perform a ritual for the strength of their warriors--an act so obviously replete with arcane possibilities that might leave any concern for personal divinities behind--they present a peplos, a "dress," to Athena (Il. 6.286-311). In fact, the nature of religious power would itself lead us to expect a relative inseparability of power and gods. Religious power in the Iliad exhibits a marked propensity toward the social. It stands at the center of a social system, not at the center of a world. It operates through persons in systemic communities. It would be difficult to divorce such power from the actions of personal repositories; it would be difficult, that is, to find religious power existing entirely apart from the gods.

Differences in power can, in fact, account systematically for significant differences in the religious practices, conceptions, and social forms of the Iliad and the Rāmāyana. In the Rāmāyana the hidden but resplendant nature of the

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Chase Greene, Moira: Fate, God, and Evil in Greek Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1944), and B. C. Dietrich, Death, Fate and the Gods (London: Athlone Press, 1965).

individual--the extraordinary personal abilities that such a nature implies--can be tested ritually. Sītā establishes her purity by submitting to the ordeal by fire. Personal stores of religious power can be tested in the Iliad, too, but in a ritual that emphasizes power's social character. The Greeks demonstrate aretē religiously in the games, as they do at Patroklos's funeral. Invocations in the Rāmāyana--mantras--carry power in themselves. Invocations in the Iliad--prayers--address those who have power. Ritual activity par excellence in the Rāmāyana consists of personal exercises, including sacrifices, to obtain religious power for oneself (austerities).[1] Ritual activity par excellence in the Iliad--the sacrifice--carries a distinctively social valorization. To the last difference corresponds a major sociological difference between the two forms of religiosity. The Rāmāyana knows a major sociological group devoted to the cultivation of individual religious power that resides in the invisible nature to the exclusion of social pleasures: the various classes of ascetics and renunciatory religiosi. The Iliad knows religious specialists, too, but they are not renunciants. They are adjuncts--advisers and interpreters (priests and augurs)--to the real religious functionary, the

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[1] Tapas, of course, is acquired only by the person actually engaged in austerities. The beneficiary of the sacrifice is generally not the person performing the sacrifice but the person sponsoring it, the yajamana, although sacrifices performed solely for the benefit of the priests are also known.

aristos, who as "best man" performs the essentially social sacrifice.

The preceding list of contrasts is only suggestive. One other contrast is quite striking: differences in religious power correlate with different images of the gods. In the Iliad the gods are social. Their personality is sharply maintained against the realm of natural phenomena. Zeus is not lightning or rain or hail; he controls them (cp. Il. 10.5-8). Where divine personality yields in the Iliad, it yields to the social. Themis, Hate, Panic, Fear, Terror, Moira (Fate) are all less clearly personalized than any of the gods relating to natural phenomena: the Old Man of the Sea, nymphs such as Thetis, rivers such as Skamander. Moreover, the gods are "systemic." That is, they live in webs of fully developed relations that constitute a society. That society, with its tensions and conflicts, openly interacts with the society constituted by human beings. As a result, it merits a good deal of the poet's attention. Third, the gods govern relationships. The Olympians had and continue to have nothing to do with the world's existence as such. They belong to a later generation that stirs up evil battle and dreadful enmity but that also instils friendship on both sides (cp. Il. 4.15-16). Having a full range of relations with and interests in mortals, they themselves endure hardships as a result (Il. 5.873-74). Finally, the gods are "economical." They are strictly localized. The lord of the world can "incarnate" himself in all four of Daśaratha's sons at the same time. When Athena wishes to help Achilles by deceiving

Hektor, she must take her leave of her favorite before she can appear in altered guise to her victim (Il. 22.222-23).

Rhetorical Praxis, Religious Praxis

To state the obvious, religious power and persuasive power are identical in the Iliad and the Rāmāyana with regard to both the scope of their effect and their manner of working. Geography suggests that this correspondence is not coincidental. The Achaian ships sprawl on the beachhead in a long row. At the extremes stand the huts of Telamonian Ajax and Achilles. The black ship of Odysseus occupies the midpoint (Il. 8.222-26). When Achilles sends Patroklos to discern the identity of a warrior being carried from battle, a long speech from Nestor starts Patroklos back again.

> But when Patroklos, running, came to the ships
> of godlike Odysseus [i.e., to the center], where for them
> was the assembly (agorē) and themis
> and where for them were established the altars of the gods,
> he was met by Eurypylos, wounded, . . .
>
> Il. 11.806-809 (my translation)

Agorē, themis, altars: these three occupy the midpoint of the Achaian encampment. That location is hardly unfamiliar to historians of religions.[1] The geography lesson is clear: the

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[1] On the significance of the center, see especially Mircea Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: New American Library, 1963), pp. 367-387, and The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion , trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1959), pp. 20-65; for a comparative study of the ceremonial center, see Paul Wheatley, The Pivot of the Four Quarters: A Preliminary Enquiry into the Origins and Character of the Ancient Chinese City (Chicago: Aldine, 1971), esp. pp. 225-369.

power of peithesthai (themis: "patterned interrelations"), its actualization in public persuasion (agorē), and religious power specifically embodied (altars) are all three central to the assembled Argive host. Not that rhetoric is identical with specifically religious praxis in either epic. Rather, in both the Iliad and the Rāmāyana, persuasion forms a complement to specifically religious praxis. Both activities utilize the same sort of power.

Taken at its broadest, Homer's society is a complex system encompassing two classes of social beings, mortals and immortals. The power of peithesthai governs interactions throughout every dimension of this complex network. But the qualitative difference between god and mortal results--on the human side--in two distinct praxeis. When a mortal's attention is directed to the gods in circumstances of special need, that mortal implements the power implicit in peithesthai through prayers and specifically religious gifts (sacrifices, libations). When a mortal's attention is directed to fellow mortals in circumstances of special need, that mortal implements the power of peithesthai through rhetorical praxis properly speaking (which often includes, of course, the promise of gifts, timē). The goal of both praxeis is philotēs and the actions that result from philotēs. The ultimate aim, of course, is personal flourishing.

A different line generally demarcates religious practice from rhetoric in the Rāmāyana. There the distinction is based not on the different social webs toward which one might direct

attention but on the different modalities in which the individuated ātman may relate to the world, as agent (kartṛ) and as "experiencer" (bhoktṛ). Of course, qualitative differences similar to those found in the Iliad are not altogether absent. Sītā asks Agni, as kartṛ, to be cool to Hanumān, but so, too, do the sages beseech Rāma for help, and in ways that are not significantly different. In this regard, the distinction between agent and experiencer is more important. In the form of the formula and the curse, religious practice verbally addresses another being in its capacity as bhoktṛ. In speeches, rhetorical practice addresses another being in its capacity as kartṛ. The structures of both praxeis are, of course, governed by the same sort of power.

A broader model of religion can help us to understand the close relations between religious practice and rhetorical practice in the Iliad and the Rāmāyana. Elsewhere I have discussed briefly Shinran and Luther in terms of two variations on a single religious event, the "grace-event."[1] Here, too, I attempt to understand persuasive praxis and religious praxis within the scope of a history of religions that takes event rather than meaning as its fundamental category. But no one-to-one correlation between religion and event can account for the correspondence between these two praxeis. Unlike Shinran and Luther, neither the Iliad nor the Rāmāyana presents

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[1]Gregory D. Alles, "'When Men Revile You and Persecute You:' Advice, Conflict, and Grace in Shinran and Luther," History of Religions 25, no. 2 (November, 1985): 148-62.

a single, all-embracing event about which to array religious features. Sacrifice, for example, is a significant religious act, but the "sacrifice-event" does not assume ultimate importance as the foundation upon which all else is constructed. The Iliad and the Rāmāyana manifest a different sort of religiosity, a type of religiosity that holds the key to the correspondence between rhetoric and religious praxis, between persuasive and religious power.

Religions that center on events such as the grace-event isolate the particularly religious from its prior life-context. Isolation means that the encounter of event with prior context carries some sign of confrontation or conflict (jiriki/tariki; law/gospel). The result of the grace-event, at times simply the specific, actual occurrence of the event itself, constitutes well-being "outside" the confines of previous conditions: deliverance or salvation. But even such religious events do not stand entirely alone. At the very least, they establish dynamic structures that, in dialectic with alien structures and forces, result in concrete actions, thoughts and associations (naturalness, faith active in love). In plainer English, they transform. These dynamic structures--this transformation--may even strive to encompass the totality of existence. A subjectivist model based on religiosity of this sort might, with Wach, conceive of religion as ultimate, lived experience objectifying itself in thought, action, and society, a religion whose central purpose is salvation broadly conceived.

Nothing, however, requires the isolation of the religious

event from its prior context. An alternative, somewhat reversed religiosity might in fact integrate the religious within a totality of events. Here the religious would be not primarily an event of ultimate significance but the dynamic structures or patterns fundamental to all events. This type of religiosity would produce not deliverance or salvation in confrontation with a prior life-context; it would promote the flourishing of life as a whole. It could not entirely resist the drive to particularize.) Human concerns and interests make it incumbent at times to address and deal with the fundamental more or less directly (e.g., sacrifice, divination). At the same time, however, the distinction between religious and non-religious would be difficult to maintain as sharply as in religions critical of their contexts. In some sense, in this religiosity all of life actualizes the religious; in some sense, the history of religions merges here with a general "history" of "culture." A semantic-symbolist model based on this sort of religiosity might, with Geertz, conceive of religion as "a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic."[1]

The positions of power and praxis in these two sorts of religiosity are reversed. In religions of the grace-event,

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[1]See above, p. 157, n. 1.

power and praxis are adjuncts. Power is implicated in the total religious event because that event actually does occur. Praxis appears because a religious event necessarily provokes human activity, if only in such a minimal response as acceptance or praise. In addition, power and praxis are naturally implicated when the dynamic structures of the grace-event are actualized, when the world is transformed. But when actualization has no designs on full totalization (cp. Luther's two kingdoms), a correspondence between concrete events and structures established by the grace-event may occur only where there is a deliberate connection between the two, as, for example, in the conduct of religious conflict.

When the religious is integrated within a totality of events, however, the reverse relation ensues: the event is an adjunct to power and praxis. The individual occurrence contributes to the realization of flourishing by adopting, in dialectic with empirical possibilities, dynamic structures and patterns that make flourishing possible. That is, an individual event does not establish dynamic structures in its wake; structures of power--the formal reflexes of actualizations of power--pervade all events, constituting a liveable totality. That totality is not homogeneous, but it is embracing. Especially where flourishing is not a gift (as in the grace-event) but is in part the result of human activity, the totality of events includes several different praxeis. One praxis, religious praxis in a narrow sense, may focus more or less directly on religious power and its specific vehicles.

Where some such praxis does not exist at all, there is little justification for calling power "religious" (criterion 2). But in "the religiosity of the totality," "religious" and "non-religious" are fluid. Every praxis within the totality is in some sense a religious praxis, because every praxis actualizes structures established by religious power and contributes to that power's goal. Correspondences between praxis and praxis, power and power within the same totality should not be unusual. As human beings pursue flourishing, power--fundamental, religious power--manifests its structures--is actualized--in the various dimensions of the whole.

With this model it is possible to see why the power of persuasion resembles religious power in the Iliad and the Rāmāyana. In both poems, we can say, rhetorical praxis is an applied religious praxis. Both depict religions that seek the flourishing of totalities. Concerned to appropriate and actualize religious power, these religions ignore the singular, transformative event (sōtēria, moksa) altogether. In dialectic with empirical possibilities, religious power pervades all events, constituting a living totality. More specifically, in dialectic with the characteristics of similar poetic media, two different rhetorical praxeis actualize the dynamic structures of two different sorts of religious power: social, systemic, relational, and economical in the Iliad; natural, individual, creative/destructive, and repetitive in the Rāmāyana. But the persuasive act is a total act. The dynamic structures of the

two sorts of power actualize not simply in the realm of meaning, the realm of the referential. The power of persuasion affects every aspect of the rhetorical act: diction, argument, elaboration, and arrangement.

It is possible to extend the implications of this model further.[1] It is possible to extend the implications to myself. The different praxeis that appear within religious totalities are not everywhere the same. Homer depicts a central unity of assembly, themis, and altars: central praxeis of persuasion, adjudication, and "religion."[2] Vālmīki does not divide his world into the same pieces. He does not even have a word to express the activity of the Homeric assembly. There is no Sanskrit equivalent to peithein. For Vālmīki power is not exhibited socially and relationally through words and deeds. In his world, power concentrates especially in an individual--an individuated pocket of being--resplendant by birth and inauguration, the "sacred" king under whose sway even the orders of nature flourish, a being epitomized in Rāma, the dharmarāj.

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[1] A number of differences between Greek and Indian culture could, perhaps, be understood in terms of the different configurations of power that I have outlined here. A list of suggestions might include such diverse topics as architectural convention, both sacred and profane; conflicting styles of pedagogy and of "scholarship;" the differences between literature and kāvya and the implicity aesthetic canons appropriate to each; varying hermeneutical conventions in the West and in (pūrva) Mīmāmsā; and Pāṇini's generative approach to the grammar of words as distinct from traditional Western grammar's concern with the syntax of sentences--to name only a few.

[2] Compare with these three praxeis Aristotle's division of rhetoric into deliberative, forensic, and epideictic forms (Ars rhetorica 1.3.1-3).

The assembly (sabhā) is no arena for the competition of speakers manifesting the aretē of deliberation (boulē). Ministers advise; suppliants entreat; the king decides, instructing his advisers by his decisions. In the Iliad, power's character as social, systemic, and relational promotes, through the institutions that it fosters, a specific verbal praxis, persuasion. The Rāmāyana's power--natural, not social; individuated, not systemic; creative/destructive, not relational--does not distinguish acts of persuasion. It fosters a broader, verbal praxis that culminates in creative and destructive words of the highest order, in ritual formula and in curse. Vālmīki's power stands in a tradition that never did distinguish varieties of emphatic speech, that never did separate rhetoric and poetic.

In the West, we ask questions about persuasion. Ultimately, we reveal a heritage that extends back to the Iliad itself. We lost long ago the specific praxeis that sought to foster Homer's religious power directly. For any number of reasons, our religion of the totality yielded to a religion of an event. But to yield is not to disappear. Transformation has not become complete obliteration. By nature, a religion of the event begins with the directly religious and sends ripples outward. In asking about persuasion, we mark one of the limits to these ripples. In asking about persuasion, we embrace, now in uncanny forgetfulness, the structures of action and thought that once actualized the power of peithesthai, structures established when the gods were fresh and our world was young.

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